RONALD ANGELO JOHNSON

Diplomacy in Black and White

JOHN ADAMS, TOUSSAINT LOUVERTURE, AND THEIR ATLANTIC WORLD ALLIANCE

VISIT…

DIPLOMACY IN BLACK AND WHITE

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John Adams, Toussaint Louverture, and Their Atlantic World Alliance

Ronald Angelo Johnson

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CONTENTS

List of Illustrations *xi*

Acknowledgments *xiii*

INTRODUCTION
The Atlantic World: "An Ocean of Uncertainty" *1*

ONE
Saint-Dominguan Revolution: "We Can and Must Do Something There" *13*

TWO
U.S. Involvement: "Even South Carolinians Voted for It" *39*

THREE
Edward Stevens: "Our Minister to Toussaint" *68*

FOUR
Dominguan-American Diplomacy: "So Natural" *87*

FIVE
Allied Command: "Willing to Serve General Toussaint" *113*

SIX
The United States and Hispaniola: "On a Permanent and Advantageous Footing" *137*

SEVEN
After Adams and Louverture: "Great Changes Likely to Take Place" *161*

Notes *185*

Bibliography *209*

Index *233*

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ILLUSTRATIONS

1. *Isle de St. Domingue* 15
2. Timothy Pickering 27
3. *Residence of Washington in High Street, Phila.* 42
4. Andre Rigaud 47
5. Letter from Timothy Pickering to Toussaint Louverture 89
6. *Treaty with Haiti* 100
7. USS *Constitution* 115
8. Silas Talbot 127
9. *Map of the Island of Hispaniola or St. Domingo* 141
10. John Marshall 153
11. *Toussaint L'Ouverture Meurt dans la Prison* 182

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INTRODUCTION

The Atlantic World

"An Ocean of Uncertainty"

John Adams became the second president of the United States just before noon on Saturday, 4 March 1797. There, on the first floor of Congress Hall in Philadelphia, the members of a large crowd looked on, tears welling in their eyes. The U.S. government's first peaceful transfer of executive power created a scene that Adams later described as resembling "the sun setting full orbit and another rising no less splendid." He gave the inaugural address standing between the nation's two most famous Virginians, with George Washington and Thomas Jefferson towering over Adams's rotund frame. This was a fitting image: until recently, historical literature has portrayed the presidency of John Adams in a similar fashion—sandwiched between and overshadowed by the presidencies of these two American titans.[1]

Adams gave an unremarkable inaugural address. His wife, Abigail, criticized the speech's rhetorical construction as obscure and suggested disappointment in its overall lack of clarity. Political allies and enemies alike made no reference to his words. Yet on closer inspection, the speech reveals that the cantankerous, unpopular Massachusetts farmer, lawyer, revolutionary, diplomat, and now president intended to forge a path that diverged from that blazed by his venerated Virginian predecessor. Adams accepted Washington's long shadow over the presidency as an "example that has been recommended to the imitation of his successors." But in a sentence that spanned two full pages, Adams signaled that where his reason, experience, and "serious reflection, after diligent and impartial inquiry," led him to differ with Washington, he would, with adequate deference, chart his own course. Adams understood and accepted that as president, he sat alone, encumbered by domestic naysayers and Atlantic world nemeses, at the helm of a republican form of government that less than a decade before had been "launched into an ocean of uncertainty."[2]

Revolutionary events in the Atlantic world offered the new president an opportunity to craft a new U.S. foreign policy that would distinguish him from Washington in ways that have been largely lost to popular and academic history. Two months after the inauguration and some fourteen hundred miles south of Philadelphia, a similar transfer of power occurred on 2 May 1797. Toussaint Louverture assumed the mantle of military command and with it, for all intents and purposes, leadership of the government of the colony of Saint-Domingue. On that beautiful Tuesday, Louverture became the head of all French military forces on the island. Contemporary observers acknowledged him—tacitly and openly—as the Caribbean's first ruler of African descent. The event involved an impressive ceremony. In the center of Cap Français, the "Paris of the West," a garrison of multiracial troops stood in formation in the Place d'Armes, across from the Cathedral Notre Dame. In his address, the new commander in chief confronted the daunting tasks ahead. He underscored the challenges of "extirpating the enemies of Saint-Domingue, of contributing to its speedy restoration and prosperity, and of securing the happiness of its inhabitants."[3]

Saint-Domingue was a French colony located in the Caribbean, occupying the western third of Hispaniola. Since its cession from Spain to France under the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697, white colonial planters had developed the onetime pirates' hideaway into one of the world's richest sugar- and coffee-producing regions via the labor of some half million enslaved Africans. The profitable French slavocracy began to collapse in August 1791, when armed bondservants on the colony's northern plains took control of that region's plantations and towns. Stories of Africans killing Europeans along this march toward freedom spread fear among white populations across the Atlantic world. The combined armies of enslaved black people in the north and of free people of color in the south repelled French colonials and military units that sought to quiet the uprising.[4]

Like Adams, Toussaint Louverture's political rise resulted from revolution. Unlike Adams and other leaders of the American Revolution, Louverture did not provide the initial intellectual platform for launching military action aimed at independence. Saint-Domingue's revolt for freedom arguably began without him. By the time he ascended through the revolutionary ranks of power, France had already—in 1794—been forced to endorse slavery's abolition. No longer enslaved, Louverture now headed a regime of black, white, and mulatto leaders who represented a citizenry of free people of African and multiracial origins. In 1798, Louverture offered Adams closer bilateral commercial and political ties.

President Adams and his administration responded positively to Louverture's advances and engaged the United States in its first diplomatic relationship with a government of black leaders. The Adams administration and its congressional allies committed American governmental, military, and economic resources to the world's first revolution of enslaved peoples that spawned an independent nation. *Diplomacy in Black and White* is about how the short-lived period of American cooperation with Louverture's multiracial administration came about and the significance of relations between them, in both the short and long terms, for the evolving realities of race, the struggles over emancipation, and the formation of an African identity across the Atlantic world.[5]

Adams and his administration established diplomatic ties with the Dominguan revolutionary regime on a basis similar to their relationship with European nations. Saint-Domingue played an important role in Adams's Atlantic world foreign policy. U.S. officials had monitored the Saint-Dominguan Revolution and by 1798 reasoned that Louverture possessed the military strength and political will to declare the embattled colony independent from France. The Americans might not have wanted Dominguan independence, but they anticipated it. The United States neither prevented nor ignored the revolutionaries' determination to secure liberty or their interest in becoming the second republic in the western Atlantic world. Rather, the United States encouraged and embraced these possibilities. One of the goals of this book is to answer the important but still largely unexplored historical question of why a slaveholding nation, already burdened by racial issues, risked treating with Dominguan revolutionaries and abetting their strides toward universal freedom.

U.S. diplomatic engagement with revolutionary Saint-Domingue represents a critical historical encounter with significant consequences in the early Atlantic world. The two most famous outcomes are not generally attributed to this bilateral relationship: the U.S. acquisition of the Louisiana Territory in 1803 and the establishment of the Haitian Republic in 1804. Without American money, munitions, and amity during part of the five-year Louverturian administration, the revolutionary government would not likely have been able to prepare adequately for the French army's 1802 invasion. The Dominguans' defeat of Napoleon prompted him to sell Louisiana and enabled them to declare independence.

In addition, Saint-Domingue provided American trade much-needed routes and friendly ports. Adams's pro-Louverture policy wedged the United States between dueling European powers on Saint-Domingue and gained the Ameri-

cans diplomatic supremacy there. The Saint-Dominguan Revolution also influenced more than American foreign policy. The revolution's pursuit of universal emancipation shifted the course of American debates over slavery and race in Congress, print media, and the public. The achievements of formerly enslaved Africans who defeated seasoned European soldiers complicated white American arguments for slavery throughout the nineteenth century. The dissemination across the Atlantic world of Louverture's remarkable life and revolutionary achievements refuted assertions of black inferiority well beyond the U.S. Civil War.[6]

This book analyzes the diplomacy of John Adams and Toussaint Louverture against the backdrop of Atlantic world revolutions and American slavery. It tells a story of white Americans and the multiracial Dominguan population circumventing domestic and international mores of intercultural relations. By establishing bilateral ties with Saint-Domingue, the president and his cabinet recognized for the first time a government leader of the African Diaspora as a de facto head of state. From 1798 to 1801, the U.S. government embraced freedom and independence for people of color in an effort to advance its Atlantic world ambitions. The United States financed a fight for universal emancipation abroad while doing little to abolish slavery at home. American collaboration bolstered the Saint-Dominguan Revolution until Louverture's arrest and exile in 1802. Although this brief moment of cross-cultural cooperation did not immediately change racial traditions, it helped to set the stage for incremental changes in American and Atlantic world discussions of race well into the twentieth century.

Diplomacy in Black and White suggests that Adams and his administration abetted the idea of independence for people of color on the island of Hispaniola. This proposal represents an interpretative shift in the historiography. A century of articles and book chapters on U.S. relations with Saint-Domingue that includes works by Alexander DeConde and Thomas Ott argues against the likelihood of policymaking by early Americans that encouraged emancipation or independence for Africans in the diaspora. Rayford Logan's masterfully detailed account of bilateral encounters of U.S. involvement in Haiti cautions against a search for idealism in Dominguan-American relations. Yet the discovery of confluence between a government's vital national interests and the political ambitions of another government—despite the complexion of its leaders and populations—need not be idealistic. Robert Kagan suggests that "when Americans' pursuit of material and spiritual happiness thrust them into in-

volvement with other peoples, the principle of universal rights they proclaimed often became part of that interaction."[7]

This study builds on the three analytical pillars of existing historiography of Dominguan-American relations. First, the United States sought a geopolitical advantage by establishing relations with Saint-Domingue with the goal of gaining international leverage during the Quasi-War with France. Second, the Adams administration was conscious of promoting the American ideal of egalitarianism. Third, the United States sought economic advantage in a quest for new markets. Collectively, these pillars are instructive but have several limitations. They distinguish the United States as a senior partner and obscure the significant role that Saint-Domingue played in the relationship. Second, traditional political and regional analyses do not capture participants' complex and often contradictory views regarding race and cross-cultural engagement. Third, heavy emphasis on the Quasi-War relegates Dominguan diplomatic initiatives to the periphery of Atlantic history, an emphasis that distorts the reality of Saint-Domingue's importance.[8]

While relying on these historical frameworks, my study complements them with a fourth analytical structure. The book employs a transnational approach to analyze multicultural interactions between Americans and Dominguans as equal partners. This method is encouraged by the best study to date on the Haitian Revolution, Laurent Dubois's *Avengers of the New World*, which identifies the colony's inhabitants of color as legitimate Atlantic revolutionaries. Works by David Geggus and Norman Fiering and David Barry Gaspar and Geggus locate Saint-Domingue squarely within the context of enlightened Atlantic revolutions. This comparative method encourages the linking of political machinations of early Philadelphia to concurrent sociopolitical changes in locales such as Cap Français, Spanish Town, Santo Domingo, Naples, Paris, and London. The revised geographic framework relocates Dominguan-American diplomacy from the parochial setting of the U.S. capital to the larger realm of a dynamic, turn-of-the-century Atlantic world.[9]

While transatlantic in nature, *Diplomacy in Black and White* expands the perspective on U.S. slavery and race relations of the late eighteenth century, leaning on the analyses found in the canon of historical literature perhaps represented best by David Brion Davis's *The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution* and Winthrop D. Jordan's *White over Black*. More recent scholars who explore inconsistencies within regional positions on slavery, among them Joanne Pope Melish and Richard S. Newman, inform my broader exposition of

bipartisan, transregional support for multicultural diplomacy during the Adams administration. Broader analysis buttressed by the work of Patrick Rael underscores the evolving meanings of race and African identity in the Federalist era of American history. The opportunity for a long-term relationship existed for the United States and Saint-Domingue, though this opportunity was never realized.[10]

Diplomacy in Black and White represents the first monograph-length study of U.S. diplomacy toward Saint-Domingue during the Adams administration. Books by Timothy Matthewson, Gordon Brown, and Arthur Scherr address U.S. diplomacy during the Saint-Dominguan Revolution with chapters on Adams's foreign policy. These works' traditional emphasis on economics and somewhat static presentations of slavery fail to facilitate a broader understanding of race and relationships in a changing Atlantic world and do not allow the Dominguan population to evolve beyond caricatures. This study presents an important historical departure, examining how black people (enslaved and free) and white people negotiated the inconsistencies of cross-cultural, transracial relationships in the Atlantic world. The book illuminates U.S. diplomacy in Saint-Domingue to explain how Americans and Dominguans worked together as relatively equal partners, occupying a similar position within a volatile Atlantic context.[11]

Exploring black-white bilateral encounters reveals the ways in which individuals in both countries created productive multiracial relationships in environments dominated by slavery and racial hierarchy. Such an analysis illuminates elements of African agency and conflicts within white American and European racial thinking as a means to enlarge discussions of the dynamism surrounding human relations in the Age of Atlantic Revolutions. This approach, in turn, advances analysis of Dominguan-American diplomacy beyond a curious foreign policy anomaly. Instead, Dominguan-American diplomacy provides historians a new vehicle for understanding the checkered U.S. history of race in events such as relations with the Barbary States, congressional actions in the Northwest Territory, the debates over slavery in the Constitution, Native American diplomacy, Atlantic shipping and trade, yellow fever outbreaks of the 1790s, interracial marriage and relationships, African revolts, the Louisiana Purchase, the War of 1812, and the Missouri Compromise.

Diplomacy in Black and White offers a fresh view that uses Dominguan-American diplomacy as a lens through which to examine larger issues of race in the Atlantic world. I embrace Michael Krenn's conclusion that "to deny a

race's role in American diplomacy is to have an incomplete understanding of the nature of America's international relations." Still, this book is not intended as a study of racial theory or as a definitive work on slavery. Rather, it engages existing theories of race and the importance of race and slavery in the lives of people across the Atlantic world in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. This book illustrates how people across regional, national, and racial lines negotiated these factors to achieve mutually beneficial objectives. Dubois and Julius S. Scott argue that the "Atlantic world was deeply shaped by slavery and the slave trade and by the plantation complex it sustained." The period covered in this book saw Saint-Domingue emerge from the forced plantation complex and the United States pull its northern foot out of that complex while the southern foot remained mired in it.[12]

Eugene Genovese opens his magisterial work on American slavery by explaining that "cruel, unjust, exploitative, oppressive, slavery bound two peoples in bitter antagonism while creating an organic relationship so complex and ambivalent that neither could express the simplest human feelings without reference to the other." He continues, "The racism that developed from racial subordination influenced every aspect of American life," including U.S. diplomacy. Black and white Atlantic residents accommodated, confronted, and compromised with slavery and racial boundaries in a myriad of ways. The Saint-Dominguan Revolution presented the first three presidents of the United States with a singular opportunity to engage a movement intent on universal emancipation, which Nick Nesbitt describes as "the construction of a society without slavery, one of a *universal* and *unqualified* human right to freedom." Each president chose different levels of engagement based on various determinants, including race and slavery. As Bruce Dain suggests, "Ideas on race did not fall into neat, self-contained, racially determined categories. Such ideas encompassed more than racism." Ideas on race in the Age of Revolutions represented attempts—some earnest, others advantageous—to classify and explain human difference.[13]

Adams and Louverture—and each man's subordinates—inhabited an Atlantic world in which, as Franklin Knight proposes, "race became hierarchically organized and affixed to colors" and "slavery became sharply distinguished from other forms of servitude," describing almost exclusively enslaved Africans and their descendants. Race and slavery in many instances divided inhabitants of the Atlantic socially and politically but could not separate them geographically. People of all shades, regardless of laws and mores, intermixed for economic or

personal needs. According to Mechal Sobel, "The social-cultural interplay was such that both blacks and whites were crucially influenced by the traditions of the 'other.'"[14]

In the United States, with some half million Africans enslaved, "the emerging American identity of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century was increasingly fashioned . . . of many Old World traditions [including] those of Africa, . . . mingled and merged in various proportions in different locations." In the French Atlantic world, of which Saint-Domingue was an important part, interlocking histories "of plantation slavery, emancipation, and the development of 'Republican racism' . . . served as a foundation for the complicated politics of inclusion and exclusion that shaped French colonial polices." Political leaders and diplomats in Saint-Domingue and the United States negotiated racial strictures and the confines of slavery within their societies without dismantling either and utilized individual and innovative ways to work together in their respective national interests.[15]

This book explains why Adams advanced Dominguan-American relations beyond trade, risking domestic political fallout and Atlantic world scrutiny. Why would Louverture risk open conflict with France by seeking diplomatic ties with the United States, which held in bondage twice as many Africans as there were in the Dominguan black population? What advantages did the United States hope to gain in the Atlantic world commercial regime by cooperating with a colony in revolution? How did southern lawmakers who supported Adams reconcile the risks of Dominguan-inspired revolts in the South with the prospects of abetting an independent Saint-Domingue? What were the immediate and long-term effects of the Saint-Dominguan Revolution on American slavery and society? How did American and Dominguan Atlantic aspirations fare in the aftermath of their cooperation?

The search for answers to these questions involves interwoven stories. At one level, it is the story of an historic encounter between the governments of two individuals, John Adams and Toussaint Louverture. The two men never met, yet they shared the tremendous task of navigating the Western Hemisphere's first breakaway republics through the waters of an Atlantic world hostile to expanded trade competition and the spread of republicanism. Just over a year into their administrations, Adams and Louverture found themselves in need of one another and the diplomatic and commercial resources over which each presided. They charted courses that profited their respective governments while advancing moves toward greater independence for both countries. Nei-

ther man's motives were altruistic. Mutual commercial gains served the national interests of territorial survival in a mercantilist Atlantic world.

The Adams-Louverture alliance presents more than a story about diplomacy and trade. It introduces individuals who pursued similar objectives within an international and racial context that both fueled and limited their respective efforts. Standing behind the two leaders were people who encouraged cooperative policies and possessed larger hopes for their governments' Atlantic possibilities. Bilateral interactions between American and Dominguan officials spawned exceptional levels of cooperation between peoples of different complexions.

Historical investigation reveals that the actors in this diplomatic drama found inspiration for their part of the mission from different sources. White Americans and Dominguans of color experienced some of the closest transracial working relationships of the late eighteenth century. For some Americans, working with people of color on an equal footing was complicated and contradictory. Lawmakers and diplomats developed complex relationships across strained racial lines as a means to achieve strategic objectives. Policy observers encountered confused, conflicting views of race as they strove to understand an unfathomable juxtaposition of power within the African diaspora. The title *Diplomacy in Black and White* reflects the critical examination of intimate exchanges and affectionate moments as understood and recorded by these actors in personal diaries, diplomatic correspondence, and public commentary that reveal an evolution of sentiments amid revolution.

The book's focus on personal involvement and cross-cultural relationships in the shaping of Dominguan-American diplomacy reveals the indispensable and little-known role of Dr. Edward Stevens in U.S. diplomatic history. Adams chose Stevens to achieve the administration's policy objectives in Saint-Domingue. Despite his importance, historians have inadequately studied Stevens's career. One reason is popular interest in more illustrious American personalities such as Adams, Jefferson, and Alexander Hamilton. Yet, no one—including these luminaries—expended more effort to advance U.S. interests in Saint-Domingue than did Stevens. He was more than a consul responsible for trade relations, as historians have traditionally described him; rather, he was a de facto minister sent to proffer relations with the first black-led government in the western Atlantic world. This book offers a new evaluation of Stevens's career in which his work provided the cornerstone of diplomacy in the Adams-Louverture alliance.

Adams's cabinet, which included antislavery and proslavery officials, pre-

sents a useful sampling from which to explore the paradoxical nature of the U.S. cross-cultural coalition. Secretary of State Timothy Pickering of Massachusetts served as the architect for Dominguan-American foreign policy. Adams endorsed his chief diplomat's plan to advance the risky venture. Cooperation with Louverture was not an abolitionist scheme of two northern antislavery Federalists, however. Dominguan-American diplomacy was conducted by southern slaveholders such as John Marshall, Pickering's successor at the State Department, and Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Stoddert. Over time, these efforts garnered bipartisan support from members of Congress such as Federalist Robert Goodloe Harper and Democratic-Republican Albert Gallatin.

The U.S. Navy played a key role in successful Dominguan-American relations. In fact, the navy's first armed engagement in support of a foreign ally occurred in Saint-Domingue. White commanders participated in joint planning and operations with multiracial Dominguan forces. American ships and crews were placed under the command of Louverture and his officers. American commanders dined with black officers and granted them the customary respect and courtesies. Throughout, U.S. forces operated with honor and valor on the Saint-Dominguan station, advancing Louverturian military and political strategies. However, these sailors governed their cross-cultural interchanges by professional ethics rather than personal investment in progressive race relations. Eighteenth-century Atlantic maritime life necessitated that race-neutral hierarchies govern status etiquette. On the sea, talent mattered above race. The devotion of white seamen to maritime culture and its dictates equipped them to operate effectively with and under the command of black leaders, at least away from U.S. shores.

The members of the American public, almost universally opposed to the Saint-Dominguan Revolution in 1791, tempered their perspectives over the decade. Many overcame their racialized views of the diaspora to see revolutionary images from Saint-Domingue as not dissimilar to those that played out on mainland soil in the 1770s. African cries of "liberty or death" penetrated inflexible racial barriers in U.S. society. The readiness of formerly enslaved people to mete out violent resistance and to sacrifice their lives for freedom garnered a measured level of understanding from a nation born out of the same radical stimulus. A similar transition in public opinion occurred in Italy. Following Napoleon's invasion of the peninsula in 1796, Italians found strength and encouragement from the Dominguans' resistance movement and strides toward independence.

This story of transracial diplomacy reveals that prominent white Americans could collaborate effectively with their counterparts of color a decade before the Constitution banned the importation of enslaved Africans, forty-three years before John Quincy Adams argued *United States v. Amistad* before the Supreme Court, and sixty-five years prior to the Emancipation Proclamation. This book illuminates the checkered U.S. history of slavery and race relations. In its entirety, *Diplomacy in Black and White* is a multilayered narrative about a young nation's struggle for political stability, a radical multiracial colony's struggle for political survival, and the pioneering steps that two governments took to buttress each other in an effort to advance their Atlantic world aspirations.

The narrative unfolds in seven chapters. Chapter 1 opens with the commencement of diplomatic relations between the administrations of John Adams and Toussaint Louverture over a secret dinner. The Adams administration's conclusion that "we can and must do something there" represented a pragmatic and principled approach that reconciled the Declaration of Independence's standards of natural rights with the Constitution's allowance of slavery and its tasking of the federal government with securing American commercial interests. Chapter 2 provides the first extensive scholarly examination of Adams's personal involvement in Dominguan-American relations and Congress's reaction to his diplomacy. The president, no stranger to multicultural diplomacy, employed a winning legislative strategy regarding U.S. involvement in the Saint-Dominguan Revolution. His political rival, Jefferson, expressed amazement with the comment, "Even South Carolinians voted for it." Chapter 3 explores Stevens's prediplomatic life to explain the professionalism that he displayed in cultivating a meaningful, productive relationship with the Saint-Dominguan government.

In chapter 4, the narrative relocates to Cap Français, where a more pronounced U.S. presence led to an extraordinary relationship of mutual respect between the American and Dominguan governments. This effective bilateral relationship produced the tangible economic benefits that seemed so natural to the president. Chapter 5 studies the U.S. Navy's role in advancing American foreign policy objectives in the western Atlantic world. Examining U.S. naval officers' willingness to serve under Toussaint Louverture despite the conflicting American views on race and slavery, the chapter explores the development of early Atlantic maritime culture and employs modern sociological analysis to discuss the inconsistencies of white American actions in the Saint-Dominguan Revolution.

After establishing the bilateral gains of Dominguan-American diplomacy, chapter 6 addresses more fully the question of why white southern slaveholders assisted black Dominguan revolutionaries' efforts to win independence from France. It explains how, even after the end of the Quasi-War with France, U.S. officials moved to put Dominguan-American relations on a permanent and advantageous footing, steering U.S. diplomacy closer to Louverture and increasing the American presence in Saint-Domingue. Chapter 7 sketches the denouement of the Adams-Louverture alliance, ending with a sober discussion of how Dominguan-American relations improved the U.S. geopolitical position while Haiti failed to remain important in the Atlantic world.

Diplomacy in Black and White embraces the ambitions and aspirations of two revolutionary peoples—one black, one white—who believed themselves larger than their Atlantic world positions. Their story focuses on the historical importance of particular people in particular positions at a particular time. White Americans under Adams and Dominguans of color led by Louverture entered the nineteenth century with real but uncertain expectations of greater days ahead. They entered the new century together, looking toward closer, sustained relations that defied the racial bounds of their era. Black people and white people worked together. Their economies grew. A new nation was born from their efforts. And their collaboration, although it did not end slavery in the United States, irrevocably altered the country's discussion of race. In the end, however, the partnership that could have been never came to be. Adams and Louverture brought their peoples to the threshold of a lasting transracial relationship, but the permanent alliance failed to emerge. Instead, the ensuing two centuries have witnessed these two republics born of revolution move along divergent paths. They remained only several hundred miles apart geographically but grew worlds apart politically.

CHAPTER ONE

Saint-Dominguan Revolution

"We Can and Must Do Something There"

> Col. Pickering reminds Mr. Mayer of his request to-day, and begs him to present his respects to Mr. Bunell with an invitation to dine with Col. P. next Wednesday at half past three, with a few select friends.
> —Secretary of State Timothy Pickering, 1798

Around three o'clock in the afternoon on Wednesday, 26 December 1798, Joseph Bunel strolled through the streets of Philadelphia. America's capital city teemed with gaiety and brilliance. Snow had fallen earlier that week. With its sheen still on the icy ground, color and life were everywhere, as ladies and gentlemen assembled at private entertainments and a succession of dinners and balls hosted by foreign ministers and municipal dignitaries. Bunel made his way along the slippery, rutted, bumpy roads toward the residence of Secretary of State Timothy Pickering. As a merchant from the port city of Cap Français, the capital of Saint-Domingue, a French Caribbean colony, Bunel had visited the American capital before. By the 1790s, this southernmost of the nation's northern seaports—where the Pennsylvania legislature had begun to gradually abolish slavery in 1780—had long been a multiethnic city, where white Americans and European immigrants worked and lived alongside freed Africans and soon-to-be-freed enslaved people of color. Still, less than a decade into the creation of the federal government, the moderate social progress of the "Philadelphia experiment" toward a harmonious biracial urban existence began to give way to antiblack hostilities that would impede antislavery efforts throughout the nineteenth century from New York to Georgia.[1]

This trip for Bunel was much different from previous ones. This time, he was serving as the envoy to the United States of General Toussaint Louverture, the island colony's formerly enslaved black leader. His mission was to

convince American officials to reopen U.S. trade with Saint-Domingue, which Congress and President John Adams had embargoed six months earlier. Americans had maintained trade with Saint-Domingue since prior to the Seven Years' War. At that time, the British-American colonists fostered a robust clandestine commerce with their colonial neighbors to the south to circumvent the trade restrictions of the *exclusif*, or French mercantilist system. Among items exchanged between the two colonies were cheap molasses from Cap Français for American rum distilleries and New England's refuse fish to feed the island's enslaved population. According to C. L. R. James, Saint-Dominguan colonists "wished to shake off these [mercantilist] shackles as Britain's American colonies were to shake off theirs."[2]

By the 1790s, the Americans and the Saint-Dominguans needed each other in their respective strides through the Atlantic world. During the American Revolution, at "the news of the safe arrival of a convoy and sixty sail of merchant ships of St. Domingo," Adams, from his ministerial post in France, deemed the moment "a great event for this country and for ours." In the 1780s, when Britain closed its Caribbean islands to the United States, the hemispheric partners intensified their trade, giving the Americans much-needed access to French West Indian ports. In exchange for Dominguan sugar, coffee, and indigo that flowed north, the Americans sent southward iron, flour, cattle, and lumber. In response to costly Quasi-War privateering against American shipping in the Caribbean, Congress and President Adams took an extreme measure on 13 June 1798, embargoing all commerce with France and French dependencies. The clandestine Dominguan-American trade, which had survived several major wars, endured through the embargo.[3]

Bunel was on his way to Pickering's house for a dinner, the outcome of which would prove central for the future of his government and significant for U.S. history. In addition to renewed trade, Bunel wanted the Americans to establish bilateral ties with a revolutionary government on Saint-Domingue considering independence from France. As the son of a successful French merchant in Normandy, a merchant in his own right in Cap Français, and the paymaster general of the French colony, Bunel had benefited from Saint-Domingue's slave regime. The island's rich bounty of sugar, coffee, and indigo netted Bunel a sizable income.[4]

In late August 1791, the enslaved population of Saint-Domingue commenced a revolution for freedom that threatened Bunel's fortune, displaced the white ruling class, and later forced the French government to abolish slavery on the



Figure 1. *Isle de St. Domingue*, 1767. The French colony occupied the western third of Hispaniola. In 1791, armed enslaved Africans of the northern plains around Le Cap and free people of color in southern cities such as Léogâne took control of plantations and towns. Courtesy Map & Imagery Library, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida.

island. The French minister to the United States, Jean Baptiste Ternant, soon informed the Americans of "the negroes' own determination, to exterminate all the whites their tirants, and to destroy all sugar plantations." President George Washington and his cabinet promptly assured Ternant of their ready disposition to "render every aid in their power to our good friends and Allies the French to quell the alarming insurrection of the Negroes in Hispaniola." The negative view of the African uprising resonated with some Americans and white inhabitants of the Atlantic world. A newspaper in Florence, Italy, reported with contempt how "the Blacks on the island of Saint-Domingue, calling upon their natural ferocity, have refused to live any longer in slavery." These observers denied Africans the legitimate use of violence to free themselves.[5]

Other white Americans took a different view of slavery and the revolution on Saint-Domingue. Shortly after the uprising, George Thacher, an antislavery congressman from Massachusetts, attended a performance of *Incle and Yarico*,

a play by British writer John Thelwall that invoked abolitionist activism and mixed-race love and sexuality. The British Incle declares to the native West Indian Yarico, "There is no woman, either white or brown, that I love like you." Thacher wrote to his wife of the play, "I was not disappointed; the amusement fully answered my expectations." For Elizabeth Drinker, a Quaker whose Philadelphia home hosted many early American leaders, Saint-Domingue's troubles caused direct effects. "The Insurrection of the negroes in Cape-Francoies, has occasion'd the rise of many articles here, such as Sugar, Coffee, &c." The *Times* of London presented a circumspect analysis of the revolution's impact on the Atlantic world: "St. Domingo is shook to its centre . . . and probably will become the property of Spain. . . . The loss of St. Domingo to France would be irreparable. It would be the total ruin of their West Indian Commerce."[6]

Abraham Bishop, an ardent antislavery minister in Connecticut, responded to the revolution in a way that was uncharacteristic of the American population, though his support for the black Dominguans illustrates the diverse range of Atlantic thoughts regarding race and slavery. In response to public portrayals of African freedom fighters as barbaric murderers, Bishop suggested, "Let us be consistent Americans, and if we justify our own conduct in the late glorious Revolution [of 1776], let us justify those, who, in a cause like ours fight with equal bravery." This pro-Dominguan position fell more in line with Joseph Lavallée's *The Negro Equalled by Few Europeans*, which Philadelphia's *American Museum, or Universal Magazine* began publishing, translated from the original French, in installments in 1791. As reports arrived of the Saint-Dominguan revolt, Lavallée's novel offered American readers familiar language in the sympathetic assurances of a slaveholder's son to the protagonist Itanoko, an educated, well-traveled African enslaved on Saint-Domingue, that "the liberty of man is an inalienable right, which can neither be bought nor sold."[7]

By December 1798, Louverture, an Itanoko-esque African on Saint-Domingue, had reigned as general in chief of the island for a year and a half. His troops were formidable, having repelled French, British, and Spanish attempts to usurp the revolution. However, if the Louverture regime was to establish firm political control over the island, it needed the economic and diplomatic collaboration of its burgeoning neighbor to the north. But the United States was not the most amenable place for a nascent government of black men to seek diplomatic ties.

Only fifteen years removed from launching their own revolutionary war, a large majority of people in the southern states did not consider the involuntary

enslavement of people of color from Africa to be an evil. In the northern states, although the passage of emancipation laws decreased the number of slaves, free black people found it increasingly difficult to find jobs outside of those that kept them in the service of white Americans, who maintained the belief that people of color should be in servitude. Ten years remained before the constitutional prohibition on importing enslaved Africans took effect. And as "the much-touted legislation was nothing but pretense," southern slaveholders and illegal human traffickers continued a brisk trade in black people before and after the ban's enactment. Thus, Louverture sent Bunel into a milieu with a defiant southern slavocracy, checkered northern race relations, and shifting Atlantic viewpoints on slavery.[8]

Bunel's arrival in Philadelphia initiated talks between the Adams administration and Louverture's revolutionary government. Adams responded directly to and supplied the needs of this gifted general, but the relationship advanced beyond a mutually beneficial commercial arrangement. More than trade motivated the Adams administration from 1798 to 1801 to initiate the first U.S. diplomatic engagement with a black-led government. Sixty-five years passed before an American president repeated such a gesture toward a leader of the African diaspora.

Using Pickering's 1798 dinner invitation as a historical lens and locating the Dominguan-American relationship within the proper context of American race and slavery provide a broader understanding of the administration's singular response. The focus of previous works on economic expediency and predetermined proslavery and antislavery actions distort the dynamic, distinctive—and revolutionary—relationship between the eighteenth-century governments of white Americans and black Dominguans. The secretary of state and his "few select friends" sat down over dinner with Bunel, who told them that a once-enslaved black revolutionary leader was offering protection to U.S. interests in exchange for trade and diplomatic support. As part of the administration's broader legislative and diplomatic strategy regarding America's place within the Atlantic world, this dinner moved U.S. government officials beyond trading with the ports of Saint-Domingue.[9]

This dinner represents the beginning of diplomacy between the governments of John Adams and Toussaint Louverture. Representatives of the Adams administration did not allow race to prompt or prohibit diplomacy with Dominguan leaders during a period in American history when race prompted or prohibited all sorts of political decisions, legal opinions, and societal behav-

iors. Adams's foreign policy toward Saint-Domingue, while perhaps race neutral, was not race blind. White American leaders did not disregard the reality that formerly enslaved people of color headed the Dominguan revolutionary government. White American leaders also never forgot the domestic political impact of race and slavery and the care that diplomacy with a black-led government would demand.

The specter of race and slavery was never far from this diplomacy in black and white. On the same day as the Pickering-Bunel dinner, in neighboring Chester County, Sheriff William Worthington arrested David Lewis under the provisions of the Fugitive Slave Law. Lewis was "a mulatto man" who confessed to being enslaved to Leany Jones of Richmond, Virginia. The sheriff halted Lewis's flight toward freedom and posted a notice that "his master is hereby desired to come and take him away." While Lewis sat idle in the county jail, Pickering sat down with Bunel to forge America's first diplomatic relationship with a black-led government on a foundation of confidence and bilateral cooperation.[10]

Adams's foreign policy was not an act of abolitionism. The president's diplomacy does not point toward an inner social liberalism in terms commensurate with those of the twenty-first century. Revolutionary Dominguan-American diplomacy does, however, reveal Adams administration officials' capacity to look beyond the race of foreign individuals and act in ways that promoted U.S. national interests. Adams and Pickering, the chief architect of this revolutionary affair, could have achieved their economic objectives by trading without establishing diplomatic ties with leaders from the African diaspora. Washington and Jefferson had allowed American merchant ships to frequent the island's ports but made no official contact with people of color there during the first half of the Saint-Dominguan Revolution. Jefferson and Madison resumed this trade-only posture in 1801, after the Democratic-Republicans won the presidency. Adams and especially Pickering led the United States to treat formerly enslaved black government leaders with a political dignity and human decency on relative parity with that afforded European diplomats and officials. The administration's diplomatic conduct toward leaders of African descent, embodied in American revolutionary rhetoric and manifested during the Saint-Dominguan Revolution, would not be seen again in American history until after the "new nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal," had nearly torn itself asunder.[11]

Adams's foreign policy toward Saint-Domingue advanced U.S. trade in-

terests without forfeiting the Declaration of Independence's pledge of natural rights. From 1798 to 1801, the United States and Saint-Domingue shared a similar moment within Atlantic world history: that of emerging republics striving to escape European domination and finding their own way. At the cessation of Dominguan-American relations following Adams's electoral defeat by Thomas Jefferson in 1800, the revolutionary colony stood on the threshold of nationhood. For its part, the United States underwent what Jefferson heralded as the "Revolution of 1800," a phrase suggesting that with his election, the country had reversed its drift away from the revolutionary principles of 1776.

WHITE SPOKESMAN FOR A BLACK LEADER

As Bunel walked briskly along Philadelphia's walkways under a cloudy December sky and against a northeasterly wind, he likely went over in his mind scenarios of who would be at the dinner, what he would say, and how things would proceed. The seat of the U.S. federal government served as the national venue for legislative debates concerning American slavery. In the center of the City of Brotherly Love, with its population of some two thousand freed members of the African diaspora—and three hundred enslaved people of color, including eight in the employ of George Washington at the President's House—Congress passed the 1793 Fugitive Slave Law, which authorized unscrupulous slave catchers to kidnap free black Philadelphians into southern bondage. Prominent African resident James Forten noted the slow death of slavery in Philadelphia and lamented the betrayal of the full promises of the Revolution of 1776.[12]

Familiar with America's unsettling tensions regarding race relations, Bunel no doubt pondered the stickier question as he walked: How would a group of American officials receive a white man of French origin married to a black woman and speaking for a government of black revolutionaries. Historical literature on Dominguan-American revolutionary relations describes Bunel as a man of color or of African descent, and some scholars seat Adams at the dining table in the President's House on Market Street with a black or mulatto Bunel. These portrayals of the president dining with a diplomat of African descent present a tantalizing picture of eighteenth-century race relations in America. Yet the primary source evidence does not support descriptions of Bunel as a member of the *gens de couleur* or a *noir*.[13]

French sources portray Bunel as a white Frenchman. French brigadier general L. Ferrand, in an 1805 report to the French minister of the marine concern-

ing the siege of Spanish Santo Domingo by Haitian forces, identified him as such. Ferrand mentioned Bunel as a "un Français" (a Frenchman). Guillaume Mauviel, bishop of Saint-Domingue from 1799 to 1804, referred to Bunel as "un mauvais blanc" (a dirty or corrupt white man).[14]

Contemporary American newspapers and correspondence make no mention of a racial or color designation for Bunel. American print media in the 1790s routinely referred to Louverture as "black," the "general of color," and the chief of "dark hosts." However, a sampling of newspapers that reported on Bunel's four-month mission to Philadelphia finds no racial description for Louverture's envoy. The press describes him as a "French gentleman," a "gentleman," a "merchant," a "messenger," an "agent," a "native of Saint-Domingue," an "official deputy," and a "French commissary." A similar survey of the correspondence among Adams administration officials reveals only race-neutral monikers for Bunel. Pickering, who probably spent more time with Bunel during his Philadelphia visit than anyone else, refers to him consistently as "agent." Though the U.S. consul general in Cap Français, Edward Stevens, characterized Bunel and an American colleague as "two of the greatest scoundrels" he ever knew, he did not once describe Bunel with a racial designation. The British minister to the United States, Robert Liston, wrote of Bunel as a "man of no parts and of mean character" without alluding to his color. Even Adams's Democratic-Republican opponents referred to Bunel as simply "an agent." During the 1790s, when American records uniformly categorized people of color as "black" or "negro," if a once-enslaved black leader had sent a black or mulatto man to speak with the president of the United States, the story would have elicited at least one word of color categorization in newspapers or personal correspondence.[15]

A correct historical description of Bunel's race is important. Fully understanding the Adams-Louverture diplomatic relationship requires analyzing the ways in which individuals related to one another. In the case of eighteenth-century diplomacy, cross-cultural interlocutors who sit down together provide insights into a meeting, regardless of whether a single word or action was recorded. In Bunel's case, the correct identification of his race holds analytical importance, because Louverture's emissary was married to Marie Françoise Mouton Bunel, a black woman. Joseph was born in Pont-Audemer, France, to a business-oriented family and became a successful merchant in Saint-Domingue. Marie was born into slavery on Hispaniola. After achieving her freedom during the Ancien Régime, she became a successful Dominguan merchant. Their

marriage was widely known in France, Saint-Domingue, and the United States. The two jointly managed merchant operations in Port-au-Prince and in Cap Français. Sex between Africans and white Americans—"a thing so brutal, so disgraceful"—occurred in eighteenth-century America. Interracial matrimonial unions, however, were illegal in the South and socially scorned throughout the country. Bunel's presence in Philadelphia in the service of a black man and as the husband of a black woman challenged the American racial system, "where whites militantly asserted their superiority and treated most Africans with open contempt."[16]

Bunel's French adversaries remarked on his marriage to a black woman as a means of impugning his character and, through association, of discrediting Louverture and the revolution. Both Ferrand and Mauviel informed their correspondents that Bunel had shamed himself by marrying a black woman. During his visit to Philadelphia, a Democratic-Republican opponent of the Adams administration employed Bunel's marriage as a political bludgeon, questioning his morals. The Democratic-Republicans, in turn, found themselves targets of race-mixing charges during the 1800 presidential election when Federalists whispered that candidate Thomas Jefferson had cared about, had sexual relations with, and had fathered children by Sally Hemings, an enslaved woman of color. Jefferson's friend and party partisan, Albert Gallatin, a highly skilled orator and legislator from Pennsylvania, informed his colleagues on the floor of the House that the "wild tigers" of Saint-Domingue through "rapine, pillage, and massacre . . . have laid waste and deluge to that island in the blood of men." The suggestive remarks on both sides of the Atlantic about Marie Bunel's complexion, intended to paint a pejorative picture of Joseph Bunel, would not have had the anticipated effects if her husband had been a black or mulatto man.[17]

His status as a white man representing a revolutionary government of formerly enslaved people placed Bunel in an exclusive club of diplomats in Philadelphia. As a resident of the class- and color-conscious Cap Français, Bunel was no stranger to the complexities white people encountered when living in a slavocracy. In Saint-Domingue under the Ancien Régime, Bunel had witnessed the colonial *grands blancs* strip away the legal rights of the mixed-race *gens de couleur*. Members of the latter group were born free to biracial parents—predominantly white fathers and enslaved mothers—and entitled to equal political, economic, and social rights under French law. Bunel had seen this biracial group, led by Vincent Ogé, attempt to use the French Revolution to propel an

armed uprising against the white Dominguan planters. Their disjointed effort failed miserably, and the impaled head of Ogé along the main road to Le Cap symbolized their military fiasco.[18]

Prior to his diplomatic mission, Bunel's business ties to the United States had undoubtedly exposed him to the absence of personhood accorded to enslaved Africans in the South and the mistrust with which white Americans treated free people of color in the North. He knew that following the American Revolution, slavery—and the racial precepts that legitimized it—had not receded but rather had expanded throughout the southern United States. It is unclear how Bunel's understanding of American race relations and his personal experiences with tensions and slights affected his views on race. He must have wondered how the federal government would weigh a policy that could sanction the freedom of black people in Saint-Domingue when the same government fastened constitutional bonds on more than a half million black people within its borders.

Bunel's race provides some insight into Toussaint Louverture's sober foreign policy strategies. Notwithstanding Bunel's marriage, Louverture employed astute political thinking in sending a white merchant who knew Philadelphia and was known around the American capital. Throughout his tenure in command, the general had adroitly enlisted merchants to carry a message of ample profits in friendly Dominguan ports to Atlantic capitals and commercial centers. Prior to Bunel's arrival, he maintained close ties to white American merchants who lobbied the administration and Congress to reopen bilateral trade with the island. In this scheme, Bunel proved a wise choice to persuade mercantile northerners that the Dominguan leader would protect U.S. ships engaged in renewed Dominguan-American trade and to convince proslavery southerners that the black revolutionary leader did not want to invade the United States to free enslaved people of color.[19]

Louverture adeptly appointed an envoy to the United States with previous overseas experience, an aptitude for Atlantic commerce, and the ability to work in cross-cultural environments. Louverture's decision to send Bunel as his *porte-parole* to the American capital reveals the Dominguan leader's keen sense of Atlantic strategy. As a merchant, Bunel spoke as a colleague with members of the northern commercial community about the returns and risks of renewed bilateral trade. As a former slaveholding planter, Bunel appreciated and allayed southern plantation owners' fears regarding the threat of a Saint-Domingue–style insurrection among their human holdings.[20]

The origins of a personal relationship between Louverture and Bunel remain

unknown. The Dominguan commander in chief, however, described Bunel as a person "in whom I put my confidence." For this level of Louverturian trust, Bunel could thank his wife. Toussaint Louverture and Marie Bunel maintained a close relationship, perhaps dating back to their days as enslaved people. By some accounts, Marie enjoyed Louverture's trust and could influence his thinking. French general François-Marie Perichou de Kerversau characterized her as "a very powerful woman in the court of Cap Français." Marie also boasted close personal relationships with Louverture's deputies and future Haitian leaders Jean-Jacques Dessalines and Henry Christophe. In addition to Joseph Bunel's professional merits, his wife's ties to Dominguan government leaders played a role in his diplomatic appointment. Some historians assert that Marie's race benefited Joseph in Louverture's eyes. Being married to a black woman whom Louverture trusted gave the general confidence in Joseph Bunel. Though the complexion of the Bunels' union evoked verbal contempt from the Democratic-Republican opposition in Congress, such political attacks on their marriage gained little traction in the bitterly partisan print media. Not one publication thought it newsworthy to report the couple's cross-cultural makeup. One newspaper noted only that Joseph Bunel "is a native of St. Domingo, married his wife at Philadelphia, and has ever shown attachment to the United States."[21]

THE UNITED STATES MOVES FROM TRADING TO TREATING

Bunel had arrived in Philadelphia only a week before the dinner, accompanied by the U.S. consul, Jacob Mayer. Washington had appointed Mayer two years earlier to secure U.S. trade interests in Saint-Domingue. The United States maintained no direct communication with the previous governor-general, Étienne Laveaux. In late 1798, one week after very publicly dismissing the French government's point man, Theodore Hédouville, from Cap Français, Louverture had dispatched his envoy with a letter and talking points intended for Adams. Bunel met with Pickering privately at the State Department. Their meeting was cordial. Pickering received Bunel warmly and appeared most attentive to Louverture's proposals for bilateral engagement. He advised Bunel that because of the increasing strains on Franco-American relations and their domestic political implications, Adams could not receive the Saint-Dominguan envoy. Over the previous two years, France had increased its harassment and seizure of U.S. merchant ships after the United States ratified the Jay Treaty with Great Britain, effectively abrogating the 1778 Franco-American treaties of amity and commerce.

The steady deterioration of relations with France, which had included the public revelations in the spring of 1798 of the XYZ affair, brought the onetime allies to the brink of war.[22]

In addition to troubles with France, the Adams administration found itself dealing with other Atlantic challenges during Bunel's visit. The novice U.S. Navy was as yet powerless to enforce asserted U.S. rights of neutrality. U.S. ships could not thwart costly British seizures of American cargo and the impressment of American sailors into the Royal Navy. The administration also sought congressional approval for tributes coerced by the Barbary States in exchange for access to lucrative Mediterranean sea lanes.

A couple of days after the State Department meeting, Mayer informed Bunel that Pickering had invited the envoy to dine at his home with a few select friends. According to the French minister to the United States, Philippe Letombe, Pickering wanted to keep Bunel's mission very secret because several diplomatic tracks with regard to Franco-American relations were under way within the U.S. government. The secretary's intimate dinner with Bunel afforded Pickering the opportunity to lay out the administration's strategy for securing congressional approval for renewed trade with Saint-Domingue. Secretive meetings, dinners, and caucuses were common in the American capital at the end of 1798 and the beginning of 1799 as Federalist lawmakers staked out positions against the Democratic-Republican opposition and encouraged a military buildup against France.[23]

Pickering exposed Adams to serious political risk by meeting with Bunel. At the time of the envoy's arrival, the president worked to move Congress and the country away from the Federalist-fed war footing. Adams's annual address to Congress on 8 December had struck the necessary tone of resolve toward French belligerence while remaining open to diplomacy. He sought ways to respond to French overtures to reduce transatlantic tensions. The need for secrecy was crucial to the administration's dual French and Dominguan diplomatic strategies. Pickering's meeting and dinner with Bunel signaled a decisive shift in U.S. government policy toward Saint-Domingue: the administration would encourage and abet the revolutionary track.[24]

Bunel arrived at the corner of Sixth and Arch Streets to find a two-story brick house modestly more attractive than others in the immediate vicinity. Pickering's neighborhood, one of the fastest-growing parts of the city, housed congressmen, senators, artisans, tradesmen, widows, middle-class businessmen, and African Americans. The secretary's wife, Rebecca White Pickering,

probably greeted Bunel at the door and took his coat, and she may have asked about Marie Bunel. When he reached the dining room, the secretary shook Bunel's hand and welcomed him into the small gathering of Americans. Although all of these actions were normal courtesies for the period, the special circumstances gave them unique significance. Pickering had just done something that no other white American official had ever done before or would do again for a half century after 1801: welcome the representative of a black-led government into his home as an ally. Several months later, when Pickering became the first secretary of state to send official diplomatic correspondence to a black government leader, he again extended with ease such gentlemanly courtesies to Louverture, closing the letter with an expression common among eighteenth-century gentry: "I am with due considerations, Sir, your obedient servant." It seems ironic that while slavery prevailed in the U.S. capital, a white U.S. cabinet secretary would refer to himself as the servant of a black man who had once been enslaved. This letter also represents the first diplomatic communication between the United States and a black-led government.[25]

The secretary's very select dinner party included, among others, Congressmen Harrison Gray Otis from Pickering's home state of Massachusetts, Robert Goodloe Harper from South Carolina, and Speaker of the House Jonathan Dayton of New Jersey. Otis and Harper were young, politically rising Federalists. Both age thirty-three, they had worked together during the summer of 1798 to gain passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts. They had teamed up during the winter to push through Congress their party's plan of defense against the French. On 26 December, after that day's session in the House of Representatives, the two congressmen made the three-block afternoon stroll with the Speaker, directly north on Sixth Street from Congress Hall to Pickering's home. A few weeks earlier, Otis had become chair of the House committee on defense. He had spent the morning of the Pickering dinner ensuring that he would shepherd any legislation on France and Saint-Domingue through Congress. At the urging of local merchants, Robert Waln, a Pennsylvania Federalist, had introduced a petition in the House to revise the 13 June law suspending American commercial intercourse with France and its dependencies. Amendments to this law were crucial to the administration's Saint-Dominguan policy. Otis and Gallatin sparred about whether Gallatin's commerce committee or Otis's defense committee should consider the law's revision. The House majority voted that Otis had jurisdiction over the legislation.[26]

As the other guests introduced themselves to Bunel and exchanged pleasant-

ries, Pickering may have reflected on the glaring difference between his current approach to Saint-Domingue and the policy of the Washington administration. He had been secretary of state since 1795 and had not forgotten that Washington intervened in the island's revolution with the intention of thwarting the black revolutionaries' efforts toward freedom. Between 1791 and 1793, the Washington administration had provided Saint-Domingue's white planter population with some eight hundred thousand dollars, arms and munitions, food, and general support for a plantation society. Yet trade seems to have trumped skin color for Washington's cabinet: after the African rebels achieved emancipation in 1793, and as Louverture rose to become the colony's military commander, U.S. merchants and ships continued a brisk trade in Saint-Dominguan ports. Americans and Dominguans of all complexions exchanged produce and profit. However, no government-to-government communications existed. Pickering's dinner invitation to Louverture's emissary began the Adams administration's stark departure from Washington's trade-only policy in Saint-Domingue. From 1798 to 1801, the United States engaged in a vigorous, interactive foreign policy with the embattled colony. Adams's officials not only tolerated U.S. trade with the resource-rich island but also treated with its black leadership.[27]

During the meal, the handpicked guests discussed how to move Dominguan-American diplomacy forward. If not discussed directly, the question of independence for the former enslaved people likely consumed the diners' thoughts. When the revolution had begun, few observers had envisioned the eradication of the French slavocracy. Even black military leaders had considered restoring chattel slavery in return for their own freedom and security. Yet the emancipated Dominguans impressed on Louverture and others that the transformation from slaves to free citizens was irrevocable. No force on earth would return them to the status of chattel. By 1798, Americans operated under the impression that Saint-Domingue's leaders would sooner or later proclaim the colony's independence.[28]

Sitting at his dinner table with Bunel and the others was not the first time that Pickering had contemplated Saint-Dominguan independence. In the fall of 1798, a lengthy manifesto of unknown origin sent to the State Department tried to convince officials that the island remained "the real property of its white inhabitants." The unidentified writer claimed that "neither Great Britain, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Holland, or even America can wish to see [Saint-Domingue] free and independent in the jurisdiction of the mulattoes and



Figure 2. Timothy Pickering, n.d. The nation's third secretary of state became the first to correspond directly and to engage the United States diplomatically with a government leader of African descent. Courtesy Library of Congress Collection, Washington, D.C.

Negroes." He proposed that these nations jointly invade the island, with the assumption that "were the slaves to see their old masters supported by such an imposing armada, they would soon return to their former condition." Americans throughout the decade had voiced similar opinions against Saint-Dominguan independence.[29]

Nonetheless, for almost a year prior to the dinner, officials in Adams's cabinet had engaged in a vigorous correspondence that illustrates an overwhelming consensus within the administration. They concluded among themselves that the Louverture regime would eventually declare independence from France and agreed that the United States should help to establish the first nation-state with a majority-black government and citizenry. In April 1798, Pickering consulted Richard Yates, a wealthy New York merchant, about the "prevailing sentiments of the Peoples in the Southern and Western departments of Hispaniola." Yates, who had returned to Philadelphia from Saint-Domingue only days before Pickering's inquiry, offered the secretary an alternative view to that presented by the writer of the manifesto. The black Dominguans who inhabited and controlled the majority of the colony had no desire to go to war with the United States. He suggested, therefore, that the United States should foster relations with them. Like the Americans, the Saint-Dominguans felt deprived of their mutually beneficial trade. During his time there, a well-placed Dominguan official had told Yates, "The Americans are *good whites*, and we will not go to war with them." After his return, he informed Pickering, "I have no doubt in their readiness . . . in declaring the Colony independent." He explained that the Saint-Dominguans considered their future tied to trade with the United States. And in case Pickering missed the point, Yates wrote, "I think in the event of war [between France and the United States], and the discontinuance of supply from France that the French parts of Hispaniola would be declared independent."[30]

Administration officials agreed with Yates's assessment of the political situation in Saint-Domingue. They interpreted Louverture's actions prior to and after Bunel's arrival as movement in the direction of independence. They were almost unanimous in their opinion that assisting Louverture's regime was the U.S. government's most prudent course. Pickering himself had told the British minister in Philadelphia that the federal government would countenance a republic of black people in the Caribbean. When asked by the British foreign minister about Pickering's intentions, Rufus King, a Massachusetts Federalist and the U.S. minister in London, replied that he wanted to see two or three republics of former slaves in Latin America. Lest anyone thought administra-

tion officials held imperial aspirations, John Quincy Adams suggested that the United States "can and must do something" in Saint-Domingue and was just as clear that the island's residents should be "free and independent . . . in close alliance" with the United States but "as to their government, totally to themselves."[31]

President Adams's correspondence reveals resignation to the idea of an independent Saint-Domingue. He understood that any American assistance, commercial or otherwise, could encourage the island's independence. Contrary to the rest of his cabinet—a familiar position for Adams—the president wrote, "It appears to me that independence is the worst and most dangerous condition they can be in, for the United States. They would be less dangerous under the government of England, France, Spain, or Holland all together." Adams, however, conceded that "these questions may all be useless, because the independence of St. Domingo . . . may be brought about without our interference, and indeed in opposition to all we can do to prevent it." Despite his hesitation, Adams wielded the pen that would open relations with revolutionary Saint-Domingue.[32]

U.S. government officials were not certain of Louverture's intent. But they, their political opponents, and the American mercantile community operated on the assumption that Louverture was prepared to declare Saint-Domingue independent. Differences may have existed, however, between Louverture's intentions concerning independence and the Americans' evaluation of those intentions. Adams famously voiced his frustration at not being able to understand the revolutionary leader's political trajectory. Louverture "has evidently puzzled himself, the French government, the English cabinet, and the administration of the United States. All the rest of the World know as little to do with him as he knows what to do with himself." Though uncertain of Louverture's plans, Adams and other Americans made decisions based on the available information and their analysis of his intentions. The possible differences between American beliefs about Louverture's intentions and his plans do not negate American willingness to reopen commercial relations with Louverture's Saint-Domingue as well as their keen awareness that their actions could encourage the revolutionary leader toward independence. After Louverture had ousted British forces and the French front man in October 1798, many officials and merchants shared the view of Senator William Bingham, a Pennsylvania Federalist who had written to King in early December that "recent accounts from that Quarter confidently assert that the black General Toussaint is about declaring

the Island independent. . . . [I]t cannot but result favorably for this Country [United States], by the immense Supplies it will be required to furnish."[33]

NATIONAL INTERESTS AND PRINCIPLES

The administration's thinking with regard to a predominantly black nation in the Caribbean was both pragmatic and principled. It represented an example of what historian Bradford Perkins describes as an early American "norm," the mingling of ideals and self-interest as motives of diplomacy: "Material interests, culture, and the prism combine in a complex interplay that creates foreign policy." Each American proponent of engagement with Saint-Dominguan officials calculated that trade would result in considerable gains for U.S. shipping. Those who could tolerate an emancipated West Indian citizenry understood America's relatively weak position among the mercantilist powers that dominated the Atlantic world. This vast eighteenth-century sea of interconnected ports, brimming with raw materials of the Caribbean, the chattel labor of Africa, and European and American finished wares and intoxicants, was circumscribed by the Gulf of Mexico in the west and the easternmost bays of the Mediterranean Sea. A solid relationship with Louverture's Saint-Domingue would provide the United States with a much-needed trading base in the Caribbean. U.S. leaders had fought the Revolution of 1776 to rank their nation among European powers. Neither Washington's decisive military victory at Yorktown nor the Peace of Paris in 1783 secured the United States the vaunted status it sought.[34]

In that same year, the U.S. negotiators in France—Adams, Jefferson, and Franklin—sought a treaty of amity and commerce with the Kingdom of Naples, which covered the southern part of the Italian peninsula. Ferdinando Galiani, the Neapolitan minister of foreign affairs, thwarted the treaty, considering commerce with the United States "neither useful, nor urgent." He suspected the young American nation of using trade talks as a subterfuge to leapfrog Naples in the rigid hierarchy of Atlantic powers. "The United States is not entering into treaty talks to expand their commerce," he advised King Ferdinand IV. "It is taking this route in order to be a generally recognized power in Europe, and to have status among the other Powers." Neglect of diplomatic etiquette cost the United States diplomatic recognition by a European nation and a valuable commercial partner. Naples, offended, refused to be treated like a second-class nation by an international upstart. A similar view of the United States prevailed among Europeans as Adams began his presidency in 1797. In a letter to for-

mer French minister Pierre-Auguste Adet, Alexandre Maurice Hauterive, the French consul in New York, offered a rather downbeat assessment of America's place in the world: "Only a short while ago they spoke like a Herculean nation; today they act like a nation of pygmies." By the close of the century, American leaders who had held high expectations for the country found their shipping marginalized to the flanks of the Atlantic world and their geopolitical parity among the "petty nations" of the Barbary.[35]

During the 1780s and 1790s, the United States struggled with the Barbary States as a rival marginal player in the Atlantic world as each sought a better position vis-à-vis European powers. Following the American Revolution, U.S. leaders realized that liberty from Great Britain did not translate into freedom within the Atlantic trading ports. As U.S. minister to the Court of St. James's, Adams had failed to negotiate an economic treaty with Great Britain. Instead of finding more readily available markets, American merchants found some formerly lucrative markets closed to them. The lack of a professional navy allowed Barbary pirates and Caribbean corsairs to prey at will on U.S. shipping. While Americans never lost sight of their great visions for their national and international destinies, pragmatic leaders understood that increased trade and stature within the Atlantic world was a prerequisite for the achievement of their visions.

John Adams and his administration had little personal difficulty trading and treating with black Saint-Dominguans when economic gains within the Atlantic world were at stake. The administration shrewdly practiced what historians Felix Gilbert and David Fitzsimmons have called idealistic internationalism. Adams during the 1780s had demonstrated his propensity to see beyond cultural and religious barriers to secure the interests of his country. To end the raids on American shipping by Barbary pirates in the Mediterranean, Adams persuaded the Confederation government to pay tributes, or bribes, to the Muslim deys of North Africa. Adams adjusted to the complexities historian George Herring describes for the new nation in the Atlantic world regime: "Idealistic in their vision, in their actions Americans demonstrated a pragmatism born perhaps of necessity that helped ensure the success of their revolution."[36]

As president, Adams again overlooked religious, cultural, and complexion differences between Americans and revolutionary Saint-Dominguans. For the gains in trade in the western Atlantic, he largely acquiesced to Pickering's legislative and diplomatic strategies for Dominguan-American relations. Unlike Jefferson, Adams did not refer to Louverture or the revolutionary Saint-Dominguans with a color designation. The Adams administration viewed bilat-

eral ties with Saint-Domingue as a way to gain trading leverage against France and Great Britain in the West Indies. Skin complexion did not cause members of the Adams administration to pass up an opportunity to advance U.S. interests within the Atlantic world.

The president and his foreign policy team remained ever mindful of both American principles and interests. Throughout 1797 and 1798, as the Adams administration considered opening trade and diplomatic relations with a colony of formerly enslaved people of color in the midst of a revolution, officials such as Pickering and King remained conscious of their nation's international standing and determined not to surrender American independence to Atlantic world titans. U.S. engagement with Saint-Domingue promised mutual gains. More important than assisting Louverture's regime, engagement would help to secure U.S. independence. During the same period when administration officials contemplated the independence of Louverture and his followers, they also pushed one another to avoid allowing Americans to cede their hard-won independence to mightier Atlantic powers. By helping a revolutionary group of once-enslaved black people acquire their goals of freedom, American officials during the Adams presidency—just as they had during the Barbary crisis of the 1780s—also affirmed their own revolutionary zeal.

As lawmakers sat around Pickering's table with the white spokesman for the black revolutionaries and contemplated commerce, they may also have realized—if it had not occurred to them beforehand—that many founding Americans, including the secretary of state, had viewed the retention of slavery in the United States as inconsistent with the nation's fealty to natural rights. As early as 1774, Abigail Adams had written to her husband, the future president, to express her discontent that Americans were willing to fight for their liberty from Britain while "robbing and plundering" enslaved individuals of their right to freedom. Though as a woman, Abigail Adams was not part of the freedom forum of Philadelphia, the preservation of slavery in an American republic moved her to lobby her husband, who was a delegate. From Braintree, Massachusetts, Abigail could see clearly the paradox of the Congress, avoiding the issue of slavery to maintain unity among rebellious states while fighting for independence.[37]

Members of Adams's administration shared this inconsistent understanding of slavery in the American republic. Pickering and King had resisted efforts within the Confederation Congress to expand chattel slavery to the Northwest Territory. For these two men, slavery should not have lasted one day beyond

the revolution. Similarly, abolitionists across color lines argued that the Declaration of Independence guaranteed equality to all men at least as much as it safeguarded American national autonomy. Nevertheless, to mint a political union—an "invention" of American federalism—that authorized a national government to regulate commerce with foreign nations, delegates to the Constitutional Convention who opposed slavery had considered it necessary to broker compromises that institutionalized slavery in exchange for benefits to U.S. mercantile interests. During the convention debates of 1787, King "reminded his northern colleagues that if they expected 'preferential distinctions in Commerce,' they should be willing to give up something." They gave up the Declaration's promise of human equality and American emancipation of enslaved people. Historian Paul Finkelman frames this "dirty compromise" between U.S. mercantilist and proslavery interests as an "alliance for profit." The carrying trade of the northern states profited from transporting rice, tobacco, indigo, and other products produced by the slave labor of the southern states.[38]

Until the Civil War, many observers viewed this untenable compact with slavery as a forfeiture of American revolutionary principles. Though Pickering's dinner guests may not have consciously pursued this goal, Dominguan-American diplomacy during the Adams administration can be seen as a reconciliation of the Declaration's principles of natural rights with the government's constitutional task of securing American interests through commerce in a hostile Atlantic world. This Atlantic partnership between white Americans and black Dominguans illustrates that as early as the eighteenth century, white U.S. government leaders could relate to black people—at least those of another nation—on relative parity with fellow white people and extend to them the governmental courtesies afforded Europeans.

PICKERING AS A SKILLED TRANSRACIAL DIPLOMAT

Sitting at the head of his table, overseeing the dinner meeting he had orchestrated, afforded Pickering the opportunity to construct and execute a significant diplomatic strategy that reflected his economic and humanitarian worldview. In 1790, he held no position from which to advise the Washington administration on the doomed revolt of quadroon leader Ogé and his coconspirator Jean-Baptiste Chavannes. Although Ogé had purchased arms in Charleston just prior to the insurrection attempt and Chavannes had fought with white Americans in a Saint-Dominguan regiment of color during the Revolution of 1776,

the U.S. government offered no support for the island's diasporic uprisings in 1790 or 1791. Seven years later, as the chief U.S. diplomat, Pickering wanted the federal government to engage the Louverturian administration purposely for the mutual economic and political benefits that bilateral cooperation would yield. He set a tone within the administration of executing a diplomatic strategy that expressed respect toward the black Dominguan officials and honored their revolutionary achievements. This was not the first time Pickering took a progressive cross-cultural posture that eighteenth-century white Americans generally avoided. As postmaster general during the early 1790s, he had employed free black men, angering some of his fellow white citizens. To one critic he responded, "If you admitted a Negro to be a *man*, the difficulty would cease." One historian describes Pickering as "especially enthusiastic for [the Dominguan] alliance. . . . [I]t would guarantee new-won freedoms for the ex-slave."[39]

Pickering's service in the executive branch during the Washington and Adams administrations allowed him proprietary platforms from which to craft policy and shape modes of early American diplomacy. In fact, Pickering's diplomatic efforts throughout the 1790s with Native Americans and revolutionary members of the African diaspora illustrate the early republic's (unexploited) potential for effective, productive multicultural relations. In 1790, Washington appointed Pickering as U.S. commissioner to the Six Nations of the Iroquois Confederacy. Like other Revolutionary War officers, he had hoped for a ranking post in the new federal government, and the post of Indian negotiator did not quite satisfy his ambitions. Still, Pickering gave his best efforts to the peace mission that began at Tioga Point, Pennsylvania, and concluded in 1794 at Canandaigua, New York, with the Pickering Treaty.

When he arrived for the cross-cultural negotiations, he made a good first impression. As he would later do with Toussaint Louverture, Pickering engaged the lead Iroquois spokesperson, Sagoyewatha, or Red Jacket (as Americans called him), in a manner that respected the traditional forms of Indian diplomacy. He allowed Red Jacket to teach him the appropriate Six Nation diplomatic protocol. Pickering displayed genuine humility and uncommon respect for his counterparts in soliciting the indulgence of the Seneca for any inadvertent cultural offenses conveyed through his behavior. In a departure from contemporary American policies, Pickering returned land that white settlers had taken from the Six Nations a decade earlier. Despite hiccups and false starts throughout, Pickering and Red Jacket closely worked together to conclude a

treaty, the success of which resulted from Pickering's willingness to respect his interlocutors' concerns and to appreciate Iroquoian negotiation.[40]

The next year, after becoming Washington's secretary of war, Pickering got the chance to oversee bilateral diplomacy with Native Americans from a different perspective. He directed the peace negotiations of General "Mad" Anthony Wayne with the Northwest Confederacy of Native Americans in the wake of the U.S. victory in the Northwest Indian War. Again, Pickering displayed the humility and respect that became hallmarks of his Dominguan diplomacy. Unexpectedly, Pickering showed great concern "to preserve the Indians from the contagion of small pox," ordering Wayne to cleanse thoroughly American soldiers who had contracted the disease. Pickering counseled Wayne that the defeated war chiefs would enter the negotiation with expressions of humiliation, but "the cause of their humiliation then, as well as everything which could hurt the pride of warriors may be left unnoticed." He saw no point in disgracing a former opponent.

An insistence on honesty was the most notable characteristic of Pickering's management of the bilateral negotiations. In his first set of instructions to Wayne, Pickering drew on his previous experience in Indian diplomacy to establish "one great principle [that] ought to govern all public negotiations—*a rigid adherence to truth*—a principle that is essential in negotiations with Indians." This policy included acknowledging the new federal government's limited authority over the western frontiersmen. He instructed Wayne to say nothing about the Indians' petition for ability to prosecute the white Americans who had murdered members of the Confederation. Regardless of the administration's desire to comply, "*we cannot punish our own*. It is a maxim with the frontier people not to hang a White Man who murders an Indian. We ought to make no engagement that we have no moral certainty of fulfilling."[41]

Wayne initially did not share Pickering's enthusiasm for negotiating with the Native Americans but eventually came to appreciate the secretary's foresight, which facilitated the August 1795 Treaty of Greenville. As secretary of state under Adams, Pickering brought his moralistic forthrightness and cross-cultural liberality to bear on his plan to transition the United States from trading to treating with Saint-Domingue's black-led government. American pastors still used God's Word and pulpits to denounce the Saint-Dominguan Revolution as Pickering commenced bilateral relations with its leaders. Father John Thayer of Boston, in a severely misleading synopsis of the movement, preached that

under the ruse of enfranchising the African population with "the blessings of freedom, the slaves have been let loose upon the whites." Undaunted, as usual, by cynics, Pickering marched ahead of the cabinet and the country in conducting multicultural diplomacy with Toussaint Louverture with a strict adherence to truth. From the outset, the Louverturian emissary assured the secretary that in the Dominguan leader, the Americans would find a reciprocal commitment to trust and candor.[42]

DOMINGUAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS

As the meal progressed, Bunel conveyed to the assembled guests the proposals he had given to the secretary a few days earlier. Louverture had pledged to stop privateering against U.S. ships transiting Saint-Dominguan ports. Americans blamed the French government in Paris for the harassment of U.S. shipping in the Caribbean. Yates captured the opinion of many Americans, understanding the French government's goal as seeking to deprive the Dominguan leaders of the supplies and revenue that Dominguan-American trade supplied. In a letter to Pickering, Yates explained that "the Negroes who form a large majority of the Inhabitants [of Saint-Domingue] have always expressed dissatisfaction at the capture of our vessels by those of the French republic." In a letter seeking John Hollingsworth's assistance for Bunel's visit, Louverture reminded the Philadelphia merchant that "neither your Government nor your fellow citizens ought to question the sincerity of my proposals, they need only to recall to their minds that ever since American merchants have resorted to the ports of this Island . . . I never ceased to grant them protection." Louverture went on to assure Hollingsworth that "should then Your Government trust my promises which I have never made in vain, it will answer the mutual expectations of the two Nations."[43]

Bunel, as he had in Pickering's office, likely put a proposal on the table that spoke directly to a pressing U.S. need: suppression of piratical raids on American ships. The backing for the offer was the security of Louverture's word. Herein lies another noticeable moment in American diplomacy with people of African descent. In his letter to Adams and through his *porte-parole*, Bunel, Louverture offered the U.S. government the resumption of protected shipping based on his ability to keep his promise. Furthermore, the American officials' confidence in the once-enslaved black man's word served as a starting point for bilateral ties.

American officials also considered Louverture's urgent need of resources to sustain his precarious political and military position as collateral for renewed U.S. relations. Even before Bunel's arrival, Louverture had earned a reputation in certain corners of the United States for his fair and honest treatment of U.S. citizens, merchants, and ships in Saint-Domingue. Pickering had previously assessed Louverture as an amicable, prudent, and judicious leader. Louverture likewise considered Pickering deserving of respect. Even Gallatin, despite his opposition to legislation authorizing Adams to reopen trade with Saint-Domingue, went out of his way to avoid impugning Louverture's character. Gallatin acknowledged that the Dominguan leader "had behaved well to Americans." Diplomatic relations between the governments of Adams and Louverture commenced from a basis of confidence and were propelled by common bilateral interests. American officials related to Louverture as more than a black insurrectionist. They treated him as a de facto head of state.[44]

From Pickering's landmark dinner stemmed a foreign policy that signaled a clear break from Washington's trade-only policy with Saint-Domingue, and the U.S. ties to Saint-Domingue steadily strengthened. After Adams's presidency, roughly sixty-five years would pass before the United States and Saint-Domingue/Haiti again treated with one another on this level. Policy changes after Adams could not, however, negate the gains of the brief, mutually beneficial diplomatic relationship. Notwithstanding its capacity to establish and sustain diplomatic relations with foreign people of color, the administration's willingness and capacity to engage free and enslaved people of the African diaspora in the United States remained for the most part elusive. On Independence Day 1799, as the American president helped advance black Dominguans closer to perpetual emancipation, the owners of Charleston's Vauxhall Gardens reminded city residents that there would be "no admittance for people of color" to the celebratory events.[45]

In December 1798, Bunel's arrival presented John Adams with an opportunity to engage Louverture's revolutionary colony in bilateral diplomacy. Instead of opting for a simple trade agreement, Pickering received Louverture's emissary warmly and invited him to dinner. A closer look at the reception of Louverture's emissary, American views on Dominguan independence, and Louverture's stature among white Americans reveals that although the United States would grapple with the slavery question for another six decades and suffer for centuries from sour race relations, the Adams administration, before the

dawn of Garrisonian abolitionism or Lincolnesque reasoning on race, did not allow the color of a foreign leader's skin to prohibit diplomatic relations that proved beneficial for both governments.

As the dinner ended and Pickering bid good evening to Bunel, Dayton, Otis, and Harper, the Americans held a sober appreciation for the complications of the tasks ahead. Eight days later, they began the legislative process that authorized more substantial Dominguan-American relations. Pickering, for his part, possessed great hope in this strategy's ability to advance U.S. interests and honor U.S. revolutionary principles. He remained committed to closer ties with the revolutionary Saint-Dominguan regime throughout and beyond his tenure as secretary of state. American officials recognized that any U.S. action that aided the Louverture regime at this juncture of the Saint-Dominguan Revolution would encourage former black bondsmen toward independence yet still decided to move forward.

Bunel left the dinner and retraced his earlier steps through the darkened, slushy streets. He had no idea that David Lewis, the fugitive freedom seeker from Richmond, sat in the Chester County jail, anxious about whether Jones would come for him. Bunel departed Pickering's home with full appreciation for the political challenges that eighteenth-century American domestic race relations and hostilities regarding slavery posed for administration officials and lawmakers sympathetic to his mission objectives. Yet he also parted from his American interlocutors confident that Louverture's proposals had enjoyed a receptive hearing. He later learned of the administration's willingness to reopen trade and to treat with the Dominguan leadership. Four months later, Bunel sailed for home, accompanied by Adams's consul general. All things considered, Louverture's emissary had enjoyed a successful dinner.

CHAPTER TWO

U.S. Involvement

"Even South Carolinians Voted for It"

> He did not wish to see this black population independent; and that the interest will be wholly black is clear.
> —Congressman Albert Gallatin, 1799

The political lobbying around Philadelphia for expanded Dominguan-American relations by Secretary of State Timothy Pickering and Toussaint Louverture's envoy, Joseph Bunel, had just begun. After gaining support from key congressional leaders over dinner, Pickering and Bunel had to sway an even more discerning ally: the president. Five days after their dinner, on 31 December 1798, the two made their way to the south side of Market Street between Fifth and Sixth Streets. The three-story home there, with its London-inspired four-bay asymmetrical facade, was one of the city's largest private residences. The "President's House" accommodated George and Martha Washington from 1790 to 1797 and John and Abigail Adams from 1797 to 1800, when the national capital moved to Washington, D.C.

President Adams received the two diplomats in his third-floor office. It was fitting that the presidential office had large windows that afforded a commanding view of Congress Hall, only six hundred feet to the south. On the House and Senate floors a few days hence, legislators would begin a monthlong debate concerning the subject of this meeting: the future of bilateral relations between the United States and Saint-Domingue. In the stove-heated study, Pickering briefed the president on the plan to shepherd the legislation through Congress. Bunel presented Adams with Toussaint Louverture's request to reopen bilateral commercial traffic and the leader's personal promises to protect American vessels and respect U.S. sovereignty.

The president's meeting with the Louverturian envoy remained secret.

Clandestine conferences provided Adams with plausible deniability regarding potentially explosive policy initiatives, and treating with Africans in rebellion against France certainly qualified. The morning after the meeting, a city periodical reprinted an excerpt of a popular book by Francis Alexander Stanislaus, Baron de Wimpffen, *A Voyage to St. Domingo*, which extolled the virtue of the whip as a remedy for the "natural sloth and inactivity" of black Dominguans. Sentiments of diasporic African inferiority resonated throughout the white American population, regardless of region. They did not, however, represent a consensus about black Dominguans. News of "American disgrace" at the hands of French privateers in Saint-Dominguan waters continued to sway Americans toward a policy of cooperation with the burgeoning black-led government. The same issue that included Wimpffen's excerpts also reported that Louverture, "beloved and respected for his talents, mild manners and good faith, is director in chief of that extensive, fertile, populous, and wealthy island."[1]

The president assented to Dominguan-American diplomacy. Three days later, Harrison Gray Otis put into motion Pickering's congressional strategy as constructed at the dinner planning session. On 3 January 1799, Otis introduced for debate "An Act Further to Suspend the Commercial Intercourse between France and the Dependencies Thereof, and for Other Purposes." The bill was immediately tabled until the House began debating it in earnest two weeks later. But before events began to play out in Congress, the Adams administration needed to shore up its diplomatic strategy with Saint-Domingue.[2]

Adams invited Bunel back to the President's House, this time for dinner. On 7 January 1799, the secretary of state, Bunel, and perhaps others joined the president in the first-floor state dining room, marking the first dining experience between a sitting American president and a representative of an African-led government. The men sat at the south end of the house in a room adorned with a large carpet featuring a center medallion of the Great Seal of the United States. They strategized about the framework for a multicultural foreign policy after Congress passed the Intercourse Act. They discussed prospective profits for American merchants and exporters, the need for a future tripartite treaty including Great Britain, Louverturian protection for American citizens, and the presence of U.S. representation in Cap Français.[3]

At this dinner meeting, the president, known both then and now for his candor, likely expressed apprehensions about how American engagement with an African-led colonial government in the midst of a revolution would complicate already-hostile Franco-American relations. Perhaps anticipating U.S. hesita-

tion, Louverture had already instructed Bunel to assure the Americans "under the guarantee of my good faith and my *promission*, if your mission could result in the reunion of St. Domingue with the United States, I will do everything in my power to protect Americans who will frequent the ports of this Colony." Though he had not yet received these instructions, Bunel used language authorized by Louverture to project a stronger, more confident political position. He offered the Americans protection from "French pirates," guaranteed "by the Government of St. Domingue."[4]

The Dominguan administration advanced beyond working toward the 6 November proposal of "interests of two Republics," which presumed France and the United States. Instead, Dominguan leaders expressed their "desire to renew the friendship and the good *Intelligence* . . . between two Peoples toward their respective interests." Louverture's more assertive stance likely constituted a response to Pickering's 30 November letter outlining a shared vision for Dominguan-American rapprochement. The secretary's letter seemed to offer the Dominguan general great hope for relations between the two countries. The Dominguan leadership approached the U.S. government officials as fellow creoles, hemispheric brethren, joined together through the incommunicable experience of revolution. When violence erupted on Hispaniola seven years earlier, white Dominguans had employed a similar strategy. They secured support from the Washington administration under the banner of "creoleness," the concept of white peoples in the western Atlantic world banding together against white peoples of Old World Europe.[5]

Adams's reception of Bunel at the chief executive mansion was not the storied first dinner between an American president and a person of African descent. However, the meeting was diplomatically productive and remains historically significant. First, it underscores the vivid policy and worldview differences between Presidents Adams and Washington. While in the President's House, Washington had enslaved diasporic Africans and authorized U.S. support for the white planters against the revolutionary black Dominguans. Adams did not enslave Africans at the executive mansion but instead used that house to assist Saint-Dominguan leaders of color in securing their freedom. Second, the Adams-Bunel dinner took place in the state dining room, also known as the reception room, since it was the site of formal ceremonies between countries such as the presentations of ambassadorial credentials. The meal itself and its location in the presidential dining room indicate the president's engagement with a revolutionary island as more than commercial expedience.[6]

Figure 3. *Residence of Washington in High Street, Phila.*, 1830. President Adams received the emissary of Toussaint Louverture at the President's House on two occasions, becoming the first U.S. president to engage in diplomatic dialogue with a government led by a member of the African diaspora. Courtesy Collection of Anna Coxe Toogood, Philadelphia.

Third, the dinner illustrates several important aspects of American relations with Saint-Domingue at the close of the eighteenth century. In lieu of acting as an uninterested participant, Adams supported and engaged Dominguan-American relations. If Adams had sought only bilateral trade agreements, he would not have needed to meet secretly with Louverture's envoy. The United States had been trading with Saint-Domingue throughout the 1790s without presidential involvement. The president's actions risked international scrutiny from slaveholding Atlantic powers and domestic political backlash from the South. At a time when only a few politicians, preachers, and black people in the United States dared to go on record in support of the Saint-Dominguan Revolution, Adams offered the possibility of recognizing the legitimacy of the island's black leadership. Five days after the historic presidential dinner, a New Hampshire newspaper reported, "Toussaint's agent remains here. Our Execu-

tive will act with dignified circumspection on the subject. He is neither rash nor diffident." In the end, the president and his administration altered American foreign policy in a way that both benefited U.S. economic and geopolitical standing and sustained the fragile African diasporic march toward universal freedom.[7]

RUFUS KING'S LOBBYING FROM LONDON

After secret talks with Bunel—and over a year of monitoring the evolving situation in Saint-Domingue—the president and his administration, according to Pickering, fully anticipated that "if certain of our commerce, [Louverture] will declare the whole island of St. Domingo independent." To that end, the administration offered American commerce as encouragement to the black partisans and prepared to work with a Louverturian state. A viable Saint-Dominguan nation needed to form strong alliances with Atlantic commercial powers. France would not bolster the Dominguan trading position. Other European colonizers—Holland, Denmark, and Spain—would remain leery of assisting a revolution that might threaten their West Indian holdings and interests.[8]

From his post in London, U.S. minister Rufus King saw an opportunity for the Americans and Britons to secure a prized position in Saint-Domingue that would raise U.S. international stature and hurt French interests in the Caribbean. British troops withdrew from the island after their military defeat at the hands of the Louverturian army. In August 1878, Louverture and British general Thomas Maitland concluded a secret treaty (later published by the British) that many in the Atlantic world believed guaranteed Saint-Dominguan independence. King believed that the Anglo-Dominguan treaty "must end in the Independence of St. Domingo, and that would be followed by the independence of the other Islands." It was rumored that England's navy would protect Dominguan sovereignty in exchange for Louverture's commitment not to export the colony's revolution to neighboring British Jamaica. As speculation about Britain's next moves in Saint-Domingue fermented, King, British foreign secretary William Grenville, and British defense secretary Henry Dundas held an intense series of talks regarding the colony and its revolution.[9]

On 10 January 1799, after a meeting with Dundas and Prime Minister William Pitt, King drafted a detailed dispatch to Pickering, explaining his effort to ensure that the United States was not excluded from Saint-Domingue's important commercial potential. In agreement with the Americans, "Lord Gren-

ville said that it seemed highly probable that St. Domingo would become independent." The conferees formulated a plan for joint British-American action. It was understood that Britain would take the lead in the negotiations. King demanded that the United States and Britain enjoy similar trade status in Saint-Domingue. Both powers feared the meaning of the Saint-Dominguan Revolution for their slave societies and agreed not to allow other countries to trade with Saint-Domingue: "Going upon the idea of the entire Independence of St. Domingo, we and they might form Treaties with Toussaint, by which it should be agreed that the citizens of the United States and the subjects of G. Britain alone should trade to that Island."[10]

King emerged from the talks with a sense of diplomatic urgency. He reported to the Adams administration that Louverture "would throw off the yoke of France, if he could be supported" and advised that "something must be done immediately." British attitudes, Louverture's rise, Bunel's visit, and Pickering's diplomacy led King to conclude that the time had arrived for the United States to help establish an independent nation in Saint-Domingue. "We had never attempted to foment insurrections among our neighbours, nor to persuade the Colonies near us to throw off their allegiance." Yet given the apparent emergence of a Louverturian state, with its grand commercial potential for U.S. growth and development, "we should neglect what we owe to ourselves, if in the present case . . . we did not adopt such measures as should seem best calculated . . . as far as possible to make them beneficial to us."[11]

King's ideas for Dominguan-American relations moved beyond Adams and Pickering's intentions. King wanted the United States and Great Britain to ally with Saint-Domingue in moving the western Atlantic one step closer to replacing the European colonies throughout Latin America with independent republics. To that end, he suggested U.S. action in Saint-Domingue, unilaterally if necessary. He believed that the success of the Saint-Dominguan Revolution would encourage the collapse of the whole European colony system in the Caribbean. Louverture's position as de facto head of government presented the optimal moment for the American government to undertake "the accomplishment in South America of what has been so well done in the North." Alliance with Louverture would strengthen the movement toward Latin American independence. King advised Pickering, "Whatever we do, should be done with a view as well to the present Colony system, as to future events still more important than the present." To ensure that his proposals were taken seriously in Philadelphia, King enlisted U.S. Army major general Alexander Hamilton, the

virtual head of the Federalist Party: "For gods sake, attend to the very interesting subject treated of in my ciphered dispatches to the Secretary of State. . . . Our children will reproach us if we neglect our Duty; and Humanity will escape many Scourges if we act with wisdom & Decision."[12]

King's promotion of independence movements among nonwhite peoples conveyed few fears about trading and collaborating with neighbors whose citizenry's racial composition differed greatly from that of the United States. He argued that Latin American states and a sovereign Saint-Domingue would ensure American security, open new markets to U.S. trade, and thwart French plans to dominate the western Atlantic world. According to one biographer, King possessed a pathological fear that France planned to make the United States a subject in its reestablished colonial empire. The Federalist majority in Congress that passed the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 shared the U.S. minister's concerns over the reach of French militancy. Some of King's anxiety regarding French domination was expressed in a 1798 letter to the American ministers to France: "The French System once established in So. America and the West Indies, we shall be in perpetual risque; on the other hand, the independence of So. America on wise principles, will put an end to the Old Colony and Commercial System, and with obvious Combinations presents Wealth and Security to the U.S., and a new balance among nations."[13]

FRENCH POLICY IN THE WESTERN ATLANTIC

A closer reading of French ambitions regarding the West Indies and Latin America reveals that King's assessment of France and its strategic goals may have been wrong. Between 1793 and 1798, France endured internal and international struggles that siphoned off political and public focus from the western Atlantic and created a muddled colonial policy. This five-year window of reduced French involvement in the Caribbean allowed the emerging United States to gain political influence and to explore an increasingly advantageous economic alliance in Saint-Domingue.

In 1793, the French public witnessed the decapitation of its monarchical leadership, the commencement of the Reign of Terror and the subsequent deaths of thousands of its citizenry, and a declaration of war on Great Britain. The same year, the French commissioners in Saint-Domingue, Léger Félicité Sonthonax and Étienne Polverel, bargained universal freedom with black Dominguan military leaders and the entire African population in return for their assistance

against Spain's attempt to confiscate the colony. The National Convention in early 1794 upheld the Sonthonax-Polverel proclamation and abolished slavery in all French colonies. The Directory's ascendance in Paris the following year settled many domestic disputes and launched a new wave of military expeditions across Europe.

France racked up military victories in its expansionary campaigns across Europe. As it did so, however, its influence and interest in the western Atlantic seemed to waver. France maintained a military presence in the Caribbean colonies. But in Saint-Domingue following the emancipation proclamation of 1793, military leaders of color established spheres of influence and solidified their political positions vis-à-vis each other and France through patronage and aggressive agricultural programs. American newspaper readers followed the increasing dominance of the militaries of color in Saint-Domingue over their European adversaries. Elizabeth Drinker noted with some sense of awe a story in the *Philadelphia Gazette and Universal Daily Advertiser* "of the Massacre of upwards of 700 French white people, by the Negroes, at Fort Dauphin an Island belonging to the French and Spaniards." The French embassy in Philadelphia monitored closely the brinksmanship among the new colonial power brokers and reported their evaluations back to Paris. One general of color who gained notoriety in correspondence between the French mission in Philadelphia and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was André Rigaud.[14]

Rigaud, the slaveholding son of a French planter and an enslaved African woman from the southwestern coastal city Les Cayes, had fought for the rights of free people of color in Saint-Domingue prior to the African uprising of 1791. His penchant for expanded equality notwithstanding, Rigaud never wavered in his allegiance to France. He sought rights for the *gens du couleur* within the French republican system. During the American Revolution, Rigaud accompanied several Dominguan regiments of color to Savannah and New York to fight against the British as part of the Franco-American alliance. Beginning in 1794, Rigaud commanded full administrative and military authority of an area in southern Saint-Domingue that centered on his hometown. He proved himself a relentless military tactician, outflanking and routing British campaigns to secure strategic positions in the south. As a civil administrator, Rigaud reinvigorated the province's plantation economy with policies that restricted liberties of black Dominguans and advantaged mulatto citizens. In 1794, by his own estimation, "the province . . . is tranquil and in a reasonably good state of defense. . . . Work is going well." The French minister to the United States,



Figure 4. General Andre Rigaud. The military commander of southern Saint-Domingue had fought for the rights of free people of color prior to the August 1791 uprising. In 1799, he challenged Toussaint Louverture in a civil war to control the colony. Courtesy Manuscripts, Archives and Rare Books Division, Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, The New York Public Library, Astor, Lenox and Tilden Foundations.

Joseph Fauchet, and his successor, Pierre Adet, praised Rigaud's courage and military success and observed with little cause for alarm his increasing "mastery" over Saint-Domingue's southern province.[15]

One military leader of color who failed to capture the notice of the French embassy in Philadelphia was Toussaint Louverture. The more than a thousand pages of correspondence of French ministers to the United States from 1791 to 1797 contain no mention of Louverture. A survey of the papers of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs reveals no reference to the ascendant leader prior to his takeover of control. The failure to notice Louverture's increasing command over Saint-Domingue illuminates a strategic miscalculation or a significant misunderstanding of the colony's political transformation between emancipation and Louverture's installation as commander in chief.

A complex leader, born into slavery on Saint-Domingue and emancipated prior to the revolution, Louverture fought for Spain against France in the years immediately following the uprising. In 1794, after the National Convention endorsed the Sonthonax-Polverel proclamation, he entered French service, bringing with him under his command three military leaders of color who would play crucial roles in the Saint-Dominguan Revolution: Henry Christophe, Moyse, and Jean-Jacques Dessalines. Louverture and his army notched a string of defeats of former Spanish commanders before engaging British forces on the northern and central plains, where he at first slowed and then stalled their advance. His rise through the French military ranks seemingly went unnoticed in Paris. Louverture's name is a glaring absence on a 1795 list of military leaders credited with keeping Saint-Domingue in the hands of the French Republic—General Étienne Laveaux, the colonial governor; and mulatto commanders Louis-Jacques Beauvais, Jean-Louis Villatte, and Rigaud. During the following year, Louverture, Beauvais, Villatte, and Rigaud received the rank of brigadier general, a promotion that made Louverture the first *noir* general in the French military and commander of defense forces in the northern province.[16]

In March 1796, mulatto Dominguan troops in Le Cap arrested Laveaux in a coup d'état, and Villatte took the reins of government. Louverture responded quickly by threatening to send ten thousand black Dominguan troops into the city. Villatte backed down and released Laveaux. Louverture, as would become his trademark after a military victory, entered the city in a grand march at the head of a large force. Laveaux rewarded him with a promotion to lieutenant governor of the colony. French embassy papers and government memorandums from Paris take no notice of the plot or the appointment. Nevertheless,

it is unlikely that metropole officials did not know of Louverture. But euphoria over European continental conquest and the frustrations over the prolonged war with Britain may have blinded officials to the threat posed by a former slave.

While Louverture solidified his political and military grip in Saint-Domingue's northern province and Rigaud followed suit in the South, French ministers in the United States repeatedly urged Paris to reassert its dominance over developments in the colony lest France lose the capacity to influence military and political outcomes in the aftermath of the revolution. In the spring of 1795, Fauchet advised the ruling Committee of Public Safety, "It daily becomes more necessary that civil order be reestablished to ensure that the colony remains in the hands of the Republic." He warned a strong central colonial government was essential to give France any hope of regaining control of "the once most important of our colonial possessions."[17]

Fauchet's words from the west advocating a more focused Saint-Dominguan policy arrived in mid-1795 as France underwent a political transition from the terror of Robespierre to the Directory. As politicians in Paris grappled with what kind of republic should emerge from the French Revolution, they also debated future metropolitan involvement in the western Atlantic world. The Directory initially showed signs of heeding Fauchet's advice to reengage the revolutionary French West Indies. Title 1, article 6 of the revised Constitution of 5 Fructidor stated explicitly, "The French colonies are an integral part of the Republic." The subsequent article named Saint-Domingue as a French department. Title 6, article 156 empowered the metropolitan government to send agents to the colonies to "exercise the same functions as the Directory." In 1796, acting on its constitutional authority, the French government sent a commission led by Sonthonax to reassert its presence in Cap Français.[18]

The commission encountered two major setbacks, one on either side of the Atlantic. From the moment they arrived in Le Cap, Louverture viewed the commission as a whole and Sonthonax in particular as an inconvenient impediment to his political ascendance. Sonthonax had issued the emancipation proclamation that eventually led to the freedom and the acquisition of French citizenship for all of Saint-Domingue's people. Louverture had joined the French military only after Sonthonax's action and, three years onward, many black Dominguans did not know Louverture. The general understood the affectionate adoration that Sonthonax, a kind of Abraham Lincoln of Saint-Domingue, enjoyed from the black Dominguan population. This population also represented Louverture's largest and most important constituency in light of his long-term goals

for the colony. He could not afford such a strong political rival at this critical juncture.

By year's end, Louverture had begun a campaign to undermine Sonthonax's authority in Saint-Domingue and ultimately to force him to return to Paris. In a letter to the Directory, Louverture acknowledged the wisdom in Sonthonax's freedom proclamation and its positive outcomes for citizens of color in the French colonies. Later, however, the general accused his rival of sacrificing the trust of Saint-Dominguans and the Directory to his personal ambitions. According to Louverture, Sonthonax was using his popularity in Saint-Domingue to plot against the Republic. Louverture suggested that at several meetings, Sonthonax had attempted to enlist the general in the treachery, "asking me to defend him in the same way I had defended General Laveaux." Without giving specifics about "a vast project," Louverture warned, "Sonthonax has begun securing the necessary men to succeed in his plans." The Directory ignored or failed to respond to Louverture's warning.[19]

The French intelligentsia and public were engaged in serious debates over the value of West Indian colonies without enslaved populations. By 1795, the French population had become exceptionally discouraged about the country's prospects in the Caribbean. In that year, a defeated Spain signed the Treaty of Basel, ceding Santo Domingo to France. Yet the Directory made no real effort to take control of the territory. It sent a commission to reside in the eastern three-fourths of Hispaniola, but France's inability to exert control over what had been the crown jewel of the French West Indies siphoned off the Directory's interest in exerting administrative control.[20]

By the mid-1790s, strong arguments emerged in Paris for France's withdrawal from the Caribbean. Foreign Minister Charles Delacroix became a leading proponent of this relatively inward-looking view. In late 1796, during a meeting with the British minister to Paris, the Earl of Malmesbury, Delacroix expressed his long-held opposition to European "conquests of the spirit of freedom" among black peoples of the Caribbean and offered, "I should be better pleased with an addition of four villages on the frontiers of the Republic, than the acquisition of the richest island among the Antilles." He predicted that independence movements across the western Atlantic world would "soon deprive Europe of its possessions in those parts."[21]

In the spring of 1797, the Council of Five Hundred vigorously debated whether and how to regain control in Saint-Domingue. From his seat in that body, Vincent-Marie Viénot, Count of Vaublanc, could not have disagreed

more with Delacroix. Instead, Vaublanc blamed the Directory for mishandling colonial affairs and argued for greater, more urgent involvement to retake political and military control in Saint-Domingue. In a passionate speech, he urged his colleagues to exercise the constitutional power vested in the legislative body as "the true protector of the colonies . . . to wrest power from the hands of those who have bloodied and dishonored . . . the finest colony in the world."[22]

Future European statesman Charles Maurice de Talleyrand spent much of the mid-1790s in England and the United States. He returned to Paris with ideas spawned in Philadelphia for reinvigorating the French empire in the western Atlantic, using Louisiana to support the Caribbean centerpiece. Parisian pessimism over prospects in the West Indies seemed to dampen his enthusiasm. He soon leaned toward more acceptable proposals. Twelve days before succeeding Delacroix as French foreign minister, Talleyrand explained his vision for French foreign policy in a speech to the National Institute. In the opening paragraphs he seemed resigned to his predecessor's argument that France had lost its colonies. Then, however, he swiftly pivoted from "loss" to propose a grander vision of "gain" for the French global presence: "But, at the same, we must cast our eyes toward other shores, and there prepare to establish new colonies." Talleyrand sought to replace the profits and prestige lost in the West with a new French colonial system along the western coasts of Africa and in Egypt.[23]

In large measure, Talleyrand's new colonialism had arrived in Paris too late to help France retain its Caribbean dominance. Two months prior to the speech, Louverture had become commander in chief of all military forces and the ascendant leader in Saint-Domingue. According to his design, Laveaux had been elected to the legislature and was defending the Louverturian regime in Paris. To counter Vaublanc's accusations against the loyalty and character of Louverture and other Dominguan leaders, Laveaux asked the Council of Five Hundred, "Do we wish to lose Saint-Domingue totally by slandering the chiefs who saved that Colony and the citizens still living there?" By year's end, Louverture had engineered Sonthonax's inglorious return to Paris. Like Talleyrand, Louverture had fostered a larger vision for Saint-Domingue. Beyond acquiring political control in the colony, Louverture envisioned presiding over all Hispaniola.[24]

Talleyrand's revised ideal for France demonstrates that the revolution in Saint-Domingue had enlightened his thinking regarding the establishments of new colonies. To those assembled at the institute, Talleyrand offered, "We can no longer keep silent on the question of how to treat the freedom of the

blacks. . . . [S]ooner or later we must introduce a new system in the culture of colonial production." As a model for an improved metropole-colony relationship with new colonies in Africa, Talleyrand looked to positive French experiences in Canada and Louisiana. "The settlers in these two colonies were French, still are, and always have had an affinity towards us." The incoming foreign minister's proposal seems to ignore that his two examples included predominantly white settlers and did not address the thornier, more difficult necessity "to create more natural relationships with colonies," which by their location, would be multiracial. Outside of revolutionary Saint-Domingue, a diverse, egalitarian-style colony did not exist in the Atlantic world.[25]

Despite such high-minded rhetoric about abandoning the Pearl of the Antilles after a century of French presence and profiteering there, Talleyrand and the French government could not find an expedient way to make up the lost revenue from the Caribbean prior to initiating proposed colonization efforts in Africa. Joseph Leborgne and other members of the legislature continued to clamor that "France must take control of this precious territory. . . . [T]he colony is lost unless the Directory hastens to send help promptly. . . . If Saint-Domingue is conquered, the French must renounce for a time having a presence in America." By the fall of 1797, a detailed plan circulated through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to secure France's Caribbean holdings. The document's first page presented a clear rationale for action from the metropole: "The French colonies are of a very high importance to the government. . . . The advantages that France has gained from the colonies since before the war for the factories and domestic industry are incalculable." The Directory planned to send more commissioners and about ten thousand armed forces to "restore order to those once-happy places." Still, six months prior to the XYZ Affair led to the beginning of the Quasi-War, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs looked to the United States to provide horses, beef cattle, and cargo ships to sustain the French expedition for an estimated mission of nine months to a year. The plan never materialized. Historian Anna Julia Cooper describes how the Franco-British war made it unfeasible to attempt any military mission in Saint-Domingue. Instead, the Directory sent Theodore Hédouville as a last ditch effort to check Louverture's ascendance following three years of French disinterest and indecision.[26]

France's intense focus on the wars in Europe in the mid-1790s left its Caribbean colonies vulnerable and opened a door for the United States to take a greater role in political outcomes in the western Atlantic world. Fauchet believed "the United States are generally either too little regarded, or esteemed

much beyond their importance." This message did not resonate in Paris, to the detriment of France's position vis-à-vis Saint-Domingue. According to historian Vertus Saint-Louis, France did not consider the United States a major power and, therefore, viewed the United States as no serious threat to the European power's Atlantic position. While Bonaparte fought across Europe and Talleyrand surveyed colonies in Africa with little regard for the United States beyond disdain, the upstart North American nation seized on the French absence to maneuver into a position of influence in the colony. From 1794 to 1797, the French government allowed the country's commercial traffic to the Caribbean to diminish, a major misstep during a crucial period when Laveaux, Louverture, and Rigaud began to restore the colony's economic promise. From the ports of Le Cap, Dominguans saw many more ships bearing American flags than the French standard.[27]

ADAMS AS A CROSS-CULTURAL INTERLOCUTOR

France's hesitation regarding its policy in the Caribbean and Saint-Domingue's initial economic recovery coincided with John Adams's second term as vice president. The despondency Adams experienced in his primary national function, tucked away from the presidential cabinet as president of the Senate, is well documented. Washington consulted Adams on minor matters of foreign policy but did not seek his counsel on deteriorating Franco-American relations or the fluctuations of power in the western Atlantic world. These gaps are ironic in light of the fact that U.S. foreign policy during the Adams presidency became defined by initiatives relevant to the Quasi-War inherited from Washington and the revolution in Saint-Domingue.[28]

From his perch in the Senate, Adams monitored the volatile situations in Paris and the French West Indies. He discussed these and related matters with his closest political confidant, his wife, Abigail. From 1793 to 1797, the two exchanged letters that addressed the colonial Caribbean. As mistress of Peacefield, their home in Quincy, Massachusetts, Abigail monitored the rising prices of West Indian products and the political actions of French refugees in the United States. The vice president seemed content not to influence Washington's policy toward Saint-Domingue. But his correspondence with Abigail offers glimpses into his future Saint-Dominguan diplomacy. In early 1794, as emancipation settled upon Dominguan Africans and Louverture began his ascent to power, Adams commented, "So! The Tables are turned on the French Faction! . . . The

French Navy wholly ruined: and Insurrection spreading from Province to Province." This seemingly gleeful report did not represent the reveling of a raging Anglophile. Adams observed Britain's attempt at a land grab in the confused colony with trepidation: "Alas I see no Cause of Joy in all these Exultations. . . . I fear the English will have all the West Indies leaving a little to Spain. This I don't like at all. . . . I am [not] delighted with the Idea of The West Indies in the hands of the English."[29]

Some of Adams's firsthand knowledge of France and its colonies came from Talleyrand. The vice president and future foreign minister dined together during the latter's sojourn in Philadelphia. Adams placed Talleyrand among "a great Number of Men of Talents in this Country." Still, Adams remained convinced the French Revolution was a fallacious endeavor, seeing nothing in it beyond "Anarchy, Licentiousness, and Despotism." By the last weeks of his vice presidency, he reported to Abigail that "the French have plundered and wronged Us twice as much as the English" and that the white refugees from Saint-Domingue among whom he had been living in Philadelphia were "all unfriendly to America."[30]

Adams became president on 4 March 1797, eight weeks before Louverture became the leader of Saint-Domingue. Adams was the right man to lead the United States into bilateral diplomacy with a revolutionary government of diasporic Africans. His life experiences with people of color in Massachusetts and beyond did not qualify Adams as an abolitionist. The president seized changing political opportunities and followed personal convictions to advance U.S. interests despite the dominant American views regarding race. He negotiated with the emissary of a Black Atlantic leader on two separate and intimate occasions. Like his secretary of state, Adams established a working relationship with Bunel and, by proxy, Louverture. Three decades of legal encounters with enslaved Africans in Massachusetts and multicultural diplomacy with the Barbary States had honed his presidential capacity to communicate and collaborate with the multiracial regime of Saint-Domingue.

Adams never owned an African as a slave. Abigail had grown up in a home with two enslaved Africans and brought a female African servant with her when she married John. Both Abigail and John held antislavery views that tracked with their political fears of evils that threatened the young republic. They believed that enslaved labor—not specifically racially motivated enslavement—corroded the virtue and work ethic of white Americans. John believed that slavery and bonded labor sapped entrepreneurial drive from Maryland's white

population that could have improved the state's economic progress: "They have but few Merchants. . . . The lands are cultivated, and all sorts of trades are exercised by Negroes, or by transported Convicts, which has occasioned the planters and farmers to assume the title of Gentlemen. . . . [T]hey bring [their sons] up in idleness or what is worse in horse racing, cock fighting, and card playing." Abigail similarly boasted that a virtuous Massachusetts work ethic equipped two New Englanders to outwork twelve enslaved Africans, and she sarcastically pointed out to a friend that the "true Republicanism" of southerners "drive the slaves half fed, and destitute of clothing . . . whilst an owner walks about idle."[31]

The president's opinions regarding race and slavery involved few cross-cultural interactions, though they were important. His most personal encounters with people of the African diaspora came during his tenure in the 1760s and early 1770s as a lawyer on the New England circuit. After one conversation with a black man in Salem, Massachusetts, he committed a leveling conclusion to his diary: "I find discontent in all men. The Black thinks his merit rewarded with ingratitude, and so does the White. The Black estimates his own worth and merit of his services higher than anybody else. So does the White. This flattering, fond opinion of himself, is found in every Man."[32]

Adams represented white defendants in cases involving enslaved plaintiffs suing for emancipation. Though he gained acquittal for the British soldiers charged in the Boston Massacre, he lost cases against freedom-seeking Africans on at least three occasions. Despite the fact that Massachusetts had not yet enacted emancipation, the jury or appeals judges in these cases ruled in favor of the black plaintiffs' freedom, and Adams did not question or criticize the rulings against him. These cases exposed him to black people using legal means to gain freedom. Decades of legal precedents in Massachusetts had upheld the right of Africans to be free.

Adams laid the legal foundation for the abolition of slavery in his home state. Three years after working in committee with Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson to create the Declaration of Independence, he singlehandedly drafted the Massachusetts Constitution. In its Declaration of Rights, the constitution set forth, "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties." Adams's enlightened if not axiomatic language did not emancipate Africans. Instead, it empowered "a solemn decision" from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court that "put an end to the idea of slavery in this State." In 1783, Chief Justice William Cushing noted from

the bench, "Our Constitution of Government . . . sets out with declaring that all men are born free and equal . . . and in short is totally repugnant to the idea of being born slaves. . . . [T]he idea of slavery is inconsistent with our own conduct and Constitution; and there can be no such thing as perpetual servitude of a rational creature."[33]

Adams's experience as a jurist in Massachusetts influenced his view of Africans and slavery in the 1790s. As vice president, he engaged Jeremy Belknap, a Boston clergyman and historian, regarding the emancipation of Africans. In response to Belknap's query about abolition in their home state, Adams recalled, "I was concerned in several Causes in which Negroes sued for their Freedom before the Revolution. . . . I never saw a Jury, by a Verdict to determine a Negro to be a slave. They always found them free." Adams's lifelong legal opinions and experiences had impressed on him that black and white people of the Atlantic world desired freedom. Through the lens of legal access to liberty, Adams as president could appreciate the origins of the march by Dominguans of color toward universal emancipation. He related to Belknap that in each case in which Africans won freedom, "The arguments in favour of their Liberty were much the same as have been urged Since in Pamphlets and Newspapers, in Debates in Parliament &c.—arising from the Rights of Mankind."[34]

Adams had exhibited the professional propensity to conduct multicultural diplomacy, to work with interlocutors of different races and religions, some fifteen years before becoming president. A U.S. minister in Europe along with Franklin and Jefferson in the early 1780s, Adams engaged in negotiations with the Barbary States over access to the lucrative trade in the Mediterranean Sea. The 1783 Treaty of Paris secured American political independence, but the British navy's dominance in the Atlantic, particularly in the Caribbean, kept the newly independent United States commercially hamstrung. It was both humiliating and necessary that the United States would have to pay tribute—bribes—to the Barbary leaders to trade in the Mediterranean. Seizing an opportunity, Adams advocated talks with the Arab-descended Muslim leaders, over the opposition of his fellow ministers. To Charles Dumas, a longtime American agent in the Hague, Adams dispassionately explained, "The capture of one or two of our vessels by the Barbary Powers obliges us to think seriously of treating with the Port, Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, and the rest." Contrary to Franklin and Jefferson, he saw through national pride, racial biases, and religious hesitations to locate the bilateral difficulties in the context of eighteenth-century Atlantic world struggles.[35]

Based predominantly on the need for an increased share of Atlantic trade, Adams in the 1780s advocated paying the bribes. Congress agreed with him. In 1797, President Adams again contested Jefferson's nationalist views, signing a treaty with Tripoli that conceded tributes to that country's bey and declaring that the United States was not a Christian nation. Secretary Pickering complied reluctantly, but Adams understood the Barbary States as the linchpin of the U.S. presence in the Mediterranean. He also monitored the change over time in American opinions of Barbary pirates, which moved in his direction. Adams also embraced the practice of maintaining consuls in the Barbary capitals to represent U.S. interests.[36]

Adams's ten years' residence overseas and his singular experiences in multicultural diplomacy made him the ideal white American leader to engage seriously a black revolutionary regime during Dominguan-American negotiations of the late 1790s. He and Pickering had experienced treating with cross-cultural interlocutors in ways that equipped Adams to see beyond racial animosities and act in the interest of the United States. Pickering and Bunel used the dinner meeting at the President's House to entice Adams's involvement in the diplomatic plank of the plan. The two diplomats convinced an indifferent president to affirm the black Dominguan leadership with reciprocal gestures. The president was receptive to the Dominguan overtures and supported, albeit cautiously, his secretary of state's strategy concerning the prospect of Saint-Domingue's independence. Much like the Barbary States in the Mediterranean, Louverture's Saint-Domingue had become a linchpin for American trade in the Caribbean. Adams's experience with the Barbary States had exposed him to issues regarding maritime insurance hikes, privateering, and negative effects on American shipping, and all of these problems recurred during Dominguan-American negotiations.

Adams had served as the chief architect of the 1776 Model Treaty with France, an experience that taught him and other American leaders the benefits of alliances with no political or military connections but only commercial connections. He likely wanted to restrict Dominguan-American relations to these arenas. The Model Treaty and Washington's Farewell Address were oriented toward a more powerful Europe, which most Americans believed wanted to recolonize the American continent. Despite the "great rule" that Washington had set down in his Farewell Address, Adams's inaugural address pronounced his intention to deviate from the Virginian's policies. Adams certainly never relinquished the practice of resolving domestic and foreign politics into consid-

erations of interest. He maintained the same belief in 1799 that he had expressed to the Continental Congress in July 1776: "Reason, justice and equity never had weight enough on the face of the earth, to govern the councils of men, it is interest alone which does it, and it is interest alone which can be trusted."[37]

The president and his foreign policy team came to embrace the idea that American involvement in the Saint-Dominguan Revolution—pitting diasporic Africans in search of universal emancipation against the mighty French empire—might not conform to Washington's great rule of commercial realism and republican idealism. In his meeting with Bunel, President Adams had to consider extracommercial issues: the complexities of African freedom in the Western Hemisphere and Saint-Dominguan independence in the Atlantic world, the political pitfalls of engagement in the area of domestic race relations, the sticky question of prospective recognition, and the exchange of representatives. Following his audience with the emissary, the president ordered U.S. Navy warships in the Caribbean to present themselves in Saint-Dominguan ports as an expression of Adams's support for Louverture. The revolutionary leader welcomed the gesture.[38]

Far more than trading, the Bunel dinner moved Adams to treat with the black Saint-Dominguans. Historian Felix Gilbert argues that "America has wavered in her foreign policy between Idealism and Realism, and her great historical moments have occurred when both were combined." U.S. diplomacy toward the Louverturian administration during the Saint-Dominguan Revolution represents one of those great moments of rewarding coalescence between American idealism and realism. One historian of the American Revolution describes the diplomacy of Adams, Washington, Jefferson, and their 1776 compatriots as customary, European, and conservative. Adams was more circumspect than were ardent cabinet members such as Pickering and King but nevertheless presided over diplomacy with diasporic Dominguans from 1798 to 1801 that encouraged African self-determination within the Atlantic world beyond any transracial initiative undertaken by the two more famous Virginians. Adams's diplomacy toward Saint-Domingue was anything but customary or conservative.[39]

THE INTERCOURSE ACT IN THE U.S. CONGRESS

The Adams-Pickering plan to renew U.S. trade with Saint-Domingue reflected congressional input and possessed key legislative support before the debate began. Notwithstanding the genuine animosity and mistrust that existed be-

tween Adams and Pickering, which ultimately led to the secretary's firing in May 1800, the two men coordinated superbly on a legislative strategy to push an amended Intercourse Act through Congress. With Pickering in the lead, the two Massachusetts men executed a foreign policy toward Saint-Domingue that increased American commercial coffers, provided bargaining leverage in Franco-American negotiations, and put the United States on an elevated footing vis-à-vis Britain—at least in regard to one island—in the Caribbean. The Adams-Pickering legislation and diplomacy toward Saint-Domingue moved U.S. policy toward a black-led government farther than any other American administration prior to the Civil War.

Lawmakers from both political parties expected the president to propose legislation related to Saint-Domingue. According to one Charleston newspaper, Bunel's arrival "occupied much of the *chit-chat* in the Congress lobbies—nothing less than an alliance offensive and defensive with the *monarch* of *Hispaniola* was expected!" Still, the legislators who had sat secretively around Pickering's table with Bunel knew well that there existed fierce opposition to actions leading to an independent republic of black citizens. At the December meeting, they had agreed to attach a rider to the bill prohibiting U.S. trade with French dominions that would come up for congressional renewal after the new year, a tactic that showcased Pickering's shrewd comprehension of sectional politics. It exploited the nation's existing hostility toward France, the North's preoccupation with the need for increased Atlantic market share, and a most basic concern for slaveholders of the South: the ubiquitous fear of insurrections by enslaved Africans.[40]

The bill would maintain Congress's French Embargo Act of June 1798, with a key amendment. Section 4 of the revised bill would authorize the president, at his discretion, to reopen trade with "any persons, claiming, and exercising command and authority, in any island, port or place, belonging to the French Republic" that guaranteed to stop privateering against U.S. merchant vessels. Opponents responded swiftly, pejoratively terming the amendment "Toussaint's Clause." Congressman Edward Livingston, a Democratic-Republican from New York, argued that the original legislation did not possess the clause and insinuated that "perhaps occurrences have recently happened, which may have made it necessary" to alter the law. Livingston intimated that the administration and certain members of Congress had colluded with Bunel to move Congress on Louverture's behalf. "We have seen the arrival of [Louverture's] agent announced in the papers; and we have seen a bill brought in to meet the very

case." Opponents stalled debate on the measure for several weeks. During this period, Pickering and Harper escorted Bunel around the city to visit members of Congress. During his twelve-week mission, the emissary assured southern lawmakers that Louverture's regime had no desire to foment insurrection elsewhere. In exchange for tacit assurances that the United States would support Dominguan moves away from France, Bunel persuaded American legislators that a black governor in Saint-Domingue benefited northern commercial and southern agricultural interests.[41]

The House debate on the Intercourse Act began in earnest on 18 January 1799. What followed were ten days of fierce, comprehensive, personal, and impassioned floor speeches on the meaning of Dominguan-American relations. From the outset, congressional deliberations encompassed extracommercial issues of racial parity and independence. On these grounds, two northern, nonslaveholding legislators emerged as the floor leaders and exchanged arguments for and against the bill. Democratic-Republican Albert Gallatin of Pennsylvania, the ranking member on the Commerce Committee, rose on 22 January to rally the opposition. He charged the administration and its congressional allies with using section 4 as a diplomatic carrot in the form of a trade agreement to entice Saint-Domingue to separate from France. Gallatin correctly and bluntly stated that the Intercourse Act anticipated a future when the Dominguan revolutionaries would no longer acknowledge Paris's authority: "When they have thrown off their allegiance to their government, then this section says, we shall be ready to negotiate with them." He agreed with the administration—as did most other Americans—that Dominguan trade was necessary and would be advantageous to the United States. Still, he adamantly opposed any attempts, economic or otherwise, to encourage the black Saint-Dominguans toward independence.[42]

The Swiss-born Gallatin exhibited exceptional debating skills and political acumen. His leadership against American participation in the Saint-Dominguan Revolution did not stem from personal support for slavery or an acceptance of African inferiority. By all accounts, Gallatin, a noted ethnologist specializing in Native American philology, was an abolitionist. In 1793, as a member of the Pennsylvania Society for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery and of the Pennsylvania General Assembly, he authored a legislative committee report arguing, "Slavery is inconsistent with every principle of humanity, justice, and right, repugnant to the spirit and express letter of the constitution of this Commonwealth." By his own admission during the floor speech, "No

man wishes more than I do to see the abolition of slavery, when it can be properly effected." However, his opposition to independence for Saint-Domingue stemmed from a distrust of African capacity for self-government after only a few years of freedom. He analogized encouraging republican-style independence for "a whole nation of freed slaves, who had arrived at the age of thirty years" under slavery to "throw[ing] so many wild tigers on society."[43]

By the late 1790s, Gallatin was a full-fledged participant in Jeffersonian politics. If a political stance hurt Adams and the Federalists, he supported it. He resisted attempts by a fellow (more moderate) Democratic-Republican, Samuel Smith of Maryland, to gain bipartisan support for the bill. Gallatin refused to accept the administration's claims that Dominguan-American relations could be limited strictly to commercial interests. He "was astonished to hear" Connecticut Federalist Chauncey Goodrich "say that this is merely a commercial question." "The independence of St. Domingo had been a favorite theme with [certain] gentlemen," according to Gallatin, and they hoped to purchase the American public's support with the revenue from Dominguan trade. He openly accused the secretary of state and his congressional collaborators of misrepresenting the bill's intentions. He offered his suspicions—apparently based on good intelligence—that the insistence on section 4 resulted from secret meetings between the administration, congressional members, and Bunel. He fingered Otis and Harper as the administration's legislative collaborators. He asked them to submit to the chamber General Louverture's dispatches to the president and Louverturian intentions toward independence. Gallatin asked them directly what had transpired at "any *petit soupér* or *dinér*, at which these gentlemen may have been parties." He warned his House colleagues not to be fooled by the commercial arguments: "This section is inserted in the bill to encourage Toussaint to declare the island independent." Gallatin did not want "to see this black population independent."[44]

Secretary Pickering, for his part, had chosen his congressional allies well. Otis proved himself an agile orator and able advocate. A wealthy Boston Brahmin merchant with no known personal connections to slavery, Otis began with a straightforward mercantile argument. The black Dominguan government had offered unmolested shipping within its ports: "The interests of this country, and of our mercantile citizens in particular, require us to place ourselves in a situation to meet these advances." He quickly pivoted to take the debate directly to Gallatin and his caucus, however. To the Democratic-Republican refrain that "an agent has arrived from a usurper in St. Domingo," Otis responded that "he

did not know of any usurper in St. Domingo." To the best of his knowledge, Toussaint Louverture presided as the legitimate head of government there. For those who refused to acknowledge the Louverturian administration, he asked, "shall we now begin to examine into the legality of the powers of persons in authority, either in France or in her West Indian possessions? Have we not uniformly adhered to the principle that those who exercise power *de facto* are the only persons that we are bound to recognize?"[45]

Otis did not approve of slavery, but he was also no abolitionist. Later in life he stressed to his congressional colleagues, "I do not wish to be distinguished as a zealot in the cause of emancipation. . . . I look to [abolition] entirely as a question of policy, affecting the equitable right of the various parts of the Union. . . . I shall strenuously and forever oppose the extension of slavery, and all measures which will subject a freeman, of whatever color, to the degradations of a slave."[46]

With this pragmatic, dispassionate view of race and slavery, Otis directly addressed the question of Saint-Dominguan independence. He did not desire the possibility but "could conceive it possible that St. Domingo may declare itself independent" despite the wishes of the United States. If Saint-Domingue became independent, however, "it would be good policy to be upon the best terms with the persons in authority there." In essence, Otis argued that the best defense against Democratic-Republican fears of nationalized black Dominguans arriving in the United States was an aggressive commercial offense. The United States needed to trade with Saint-Domingue and accept the island's postrevolutionary politics, whatever the result. Otis closed his remarks with a strong summary and policy statement: "We carefully abstain from inciting them to revolt, and are silent upon the result of their independence, we should not omit any fair occasion to teach them the advantages to be derived from an amicable discourse with our country; and to cultivate those good dispositions which others will improve if we unwisely repel them."[47]

THE ADMINISTRATION'S SOUTHERN STRATEGY

Pickering's congressional plan garnered little bipartisan support. The plan's genius lay in its ability to stoke intraregional controversy about race and slavery abroad. First, it pitted northern antislavery thinkers Otis and Gallatin against one another. Then, on 23 January, southern proslavery legislators took the floor and debated questions of American involvement in Saint-Dominguan independence. Democratic-Republican John Nicholas of Virginia began with a

fundamental question. What would the United States do "if Toussaint should tomorrow declare himself independent?" Would the president recognize a Saint-Dominguan nation? Would he push forward with bilateral trade or pull out? Nicholas, a strong advocate for extending slavery to the western territories, restricted his argumentation to concerns about nation building and international law. Despite Federalist avowals to the contrary, Nicholas could not see the Intercourse Act as anything beyond an American invitation to Dominguan revolutionaries to declare independence. He warned, "The moment they throw off the French yoke they will receive all the assistance from this country which a free commerce can give them."[48]

Democratic-Republican Nathaniel Macon of North Carolina joined in charging the administration with failing to fully disclose the bill's intent. He could not comprehend southern support for the administration's position, which endangered the region's economy and way of life. As a slaveholder, Macon spoke for all southern gentlemen about the real threats a bill supporting independence through revolution within the African diaspora could have for their personal security and livelihood. An ardent defender of African enslavement—"the good old way"—as the better condition for an inferior race in the presence of white Americans, he later argued that "there is no place for the blacks in the United States." He believed black Dominguans to be incapable of self-government. In the event that Louverture established a U.S.-supported Saint-Dominguan nation, "the consequences [of Africans' incompetence] will be that instead of being ruled by one of the European Powers, they would become a tool of them all." The Europeans, in turn, would wield against the United States the constant threat of black invaders, just as the Europeans had with the Native Americans.[49]

Thomas Pinckney of South Carolina next rose to explain why a fellow southerner supported the administration's bill. The former governor and diplomat offered the floor some sobering counsel: "Nothing which we can do can bring back the internal state of that island to the state it was formerly in." The United States needed Saint-Dominguan trade and would have to deal with an emboldened black colonial regime or an independent nation. He had reflected on these options and knew as well as anyone else that the outcome of the Dominguan move toward universal emancipation would directly affect "his native country [the South] and everything dear to him." "Considering the [Dominguan] inhabitants, then, in the light of freemen, whether will it be better for us, in the Southern States, to have to deal with them as such, or under the direction of French Government . . . [h]e had no hesitation in saying, that, it would be more

for the safety of the Southern States to have that island independent, than under the Government of France."[50]

Moreover, contrary to Democratic-Republican portrayals, Pinckney "did not himself believe that this bill would have the least tendency to procure the independence of St. Domingo." Two decades later, Pinckney, along with many others, blamed the Saint-Dominguan Revolution's example as a cause of the Denmark Vesey insurrection plot. But in 1799, the Charlestonian merchant came to a different conclusion about one area of the African diaspora than did the more rural southerners Nicholas (from Williamsburg, Virginia) and Macon (from Warrenton, North Carolina).[51]

Another Federalist, South Carolina's Robert Goodloe Harper, affirmed Pinckney's rebuttal in the face of southern opposition to the administration's plan. Seeking to trade with Saint-Domingue if the de facto government there ceased privateering "cannot surely be construed into an exciting of rebellion." Believing he could say nothing to dissuade the opposition's view that the Intercourse Act led to Saint-Dominguan independence, he restricted his remarks to trade and the Quasi-War. As a participant in the secret Pickering-Bunel dinner, he knew firsthand that the administration wanted to maintain the focus of Dominguan-American relations on its commercial dimensions. He reminded his southern colleagues how French depredations had injured U.S. trade. The 1798 Embargo Act had neither changed French behavior nor enhanced the U.S. share of Atlantic trade. The bill under debate sought to "obtain a certain good" with "certain and precarious" advantages: "If General Toussaint prohibits privateering, we shall suppose he has the right to do it."[52]

Harper resided in four southern states over his lifetime. He grew up with slaves on a plantation thirty miles from Macon in rural North Carolina and began his legal practice in the South Carolina backcountry hamlet of Cambridge. Atypical of his fellow southerners, Harper came to believe that slavery was literally a sin and that Africans shared human equality with white Americans. Directly contrary to Nicholas, Harper opposed the eighteenth-century westward expansion of slavery. Yet like his proslavery colleagues, he did nothing to retard the growth of American slavery. It was a necessary evil on which U.S. freedom rested. Enslaved Africans were the foundation of American wealth. In 1798, Harper warned the House about a pending black Dominguan invasion of the South, a warning that proved to be groundless. After talking with Bunel and signing on to the administration's strategy for multicultural diplomacy, Harper, like Pinckney, reasoned that supporting Louverturian leadership

in Saint-Domingue served U.S. national interests and would eventually alleviate southern fears of an invasion.[53]

Designed over a secret dinner among carefully chosen guests, Pickering's congressional strategy—highlighting the secretary's keen shrewdness regarding sectional politics—outflanked the administration's critics. The bill authorizing Adams to trade and treat with Louverture passed the House on 28 January 1799 by a vote of fifty-five to thirty-seven. Garnering only five Democratic-Republican votes, support for the Intercourse Act was not truly bipartisan. But the sixteen votes cast by southern legislators were not only significant but decisive. Without a cogent southern strategy, the administration's Dominguan agenda could not have advanced. Pickering's plan had worked because key proslavery southerners such as Harper and Pinckney came to see Louverture as a man to be trusted and Saint-Dominguan independence as something not to be wholly feared. The administration's legislative prowess in passing the Intercourse Act elicited surprise from its archenemy Jefferson, who could hardly believe that "even South Carolinians in the H. of R. voted for it."[54]

Pickering savored the political victory, confiding to Alexander Hamilton, "I suppose everybody understands the main object of this [law] is to open the commercial intercourse with St. Domingo." To win its passage, the administration and its congressional allies had consistently employed that talking point. To Rufus King, the secretary of state explained more candidly that his strategy had centered on the narrative that the black Dominguans "will not be dangerous neighbors [and that] if left to themselves, that the Blacks of St. Domingo will be incomparably less dangerous than if they remain the subjects of France. . . . Of this the Southern Members [of Congress] were convinced, and therefore concurred in the policy of the Independence of St. Domingo, if Toussaint and his followers will it."[55]

In the end, as opponents had charged, the administration's congressional maneuvers initiated an alliance between a white president and a black general. Anticipating an independent Saint-Domingue, Pickering consulted Hamilton about a plan for government operations and raising revenue for a people who, five years out of slavery, were not yet prepared for republicanism. Pickering became anxious "that Toussaint & his Chiefs may fix on a practicable & efficient plan for administrating the government of the Island, and settling *the right of succession to the Chief command* (it cannot be a republic)—and *establishing a simple plan* of FINANCE that shall insure him the means of supporting an army, & the government." The initiative was Pickering's alone. He wanted the plan

of government to accompany Edward Stevens's arrival in Cap Français as the American government representative. But, he cautioned Hamilton "this cannot be done officially."[56]

Hamilton replied hastily to Pickering with a sketch of a military-style government of three branches. He prescribed "a single Executive to hold his place for life," a supreme judiciary of "twelve judges to be chosen for life by the Generals," and "an Assembly composed of the Generals & commandants of Regiments." Hamilton reasoned that "no regular system of Liberty will at present suit St. Domingo. The Government if independent must be military—partaking of the feudal system." Pickering's request and Hamilton's response illustrate not only the secretary's contingency plan for the birth of a free nation but also an aspiration to be a part of its development. Pickering confided to Hamilton, "To what we advise, Toussaint would listen." Hamilton also backed the island's independence and proposed making commercial intercourse with Saint-Domingue contingent on Louverture's declaration of independence. His main concerns appear to have focused on the political ramifications if the Atlantic powers viewed the United States as creating republics out of European slave colonies.[57]

Hamilton and Pickering's assessment of Louverture's capacity to govern Saint-Domingue may have racial overtones. It is also likely that the secretary's request for a Hamiltonian plan of government exposes the republican beliefs of a Massachusetts-bred lawmaker who represented an extreme brand of New England Federalism. Pickering, like Adams, believed that people of the Atlantic world were divided into two groups, gentlemen and simple men. The American gentry deemed the latter unfit to serve as political leaders. Pickering would have agreed with the characterization, given the requisite liberal, enlightened education reserved for gentlemen. If Pickering, Hamilton, and other Federalists denied that ordinary Americans could manage a republican government, they almost certainly held similar views about a leader and a population of recently enslaved people who had little or no education and who had been cultivated in a French system of government that the Federalists deplored.[58]

Rufus King's advocacy from London, along with French laissez-faire policies toward Saint-Domingue, prompted the president and Congress to act to advance America's policy and presence in the Caribbean. King had stalled British plans for unilateral action and gained the Adams administration a valid place alongside a greater nation to share power in the embattled colony. On 10 January 1799, he had adeptly suggested, without checking with the State Department, "that the President would think it adviseable to send some person to

join Col. Grant [the British representative] in settling the arrangements with Toussaint." King was the first to put in writing the need for a U.S. envoy to Cap Français. But talk of an American emissary had likely transpired during the presidential dinner four days earlier. Therefore, following the impressive effort to win congressional approval for Dominguan-American diplomacy, the State Department turned its focus toward finding the right person to carry the message of political friendship and commercial cooperation to the Louverturian government.[59]

CHAPTER THREE

Edward Stevens

"Our Minister to Toussaint"

> Dr. Stevens possesses more knowledge of the true state of things here than almost any other man.
> —Commercial Agent Tobias Lear, 1801

On 9 February 1799, President John Adams signed the Intercourse Act into law in the second-floor executive office of the President's House. Administration officials quickly shifted their strategy to advance Dominguan-American relations beyond their public rhetoric. As Democratic-Republican leaders correctly feared and adamantly opposed, the administration planned to use the new law to build stronger political ties with the revolutionary colony. The president understood the link between Dominguan-American commerce and Louverturian sovereignty. To advance an Atlantic-focused strategy, Adams accepted the complexity of Dominguan diplomacy. He advised Secretary of State Timothy Pickering, "We had better leave the independence of the island . . . in commerce as well as legislation . . . to the inhabitants of the island." Yet by the end of this letter, Adams concluded, "These questions may all be useless, because the independence of St. Domingo . . . may be brought about without our interference, and indeed in opposition to all we can do to prevent it."[1]

According to Treasury Secretary Oliver Wolcott, the administration saw in Saint-Domingue an opportunity to "extend the commerce and political influence of the United States in the West Indies. The idea was fully approved by the President." The Louverturian pledge to protect American trade and the potential for an amicable Atlantic ally provided Adams's fledgling federal government with a domestic economic boost and with a small international advantage vis-à-vis hostile Europeans. Adams remained more hesitant than others to embrace Dominguan independence, but he prepared nonetheless for the plausible

contingency of working with a sovereign Toussaint Louverture. The president understood the political perils involved. The key to managing the risks was to find the right person to send to Cap Français and to equip him with suitable standing.[2]

In this endeavor, Adams's Dominguan counterpart had provided a template. Toussaint Louverture faced similar domestic sensitivities and Atlantic angst when he opened relations with the slaveholding United States. In appointing Joseph Bunel to carry his message to the American government in late 1798, Louverture found someone who had traveled previously to the United States and possessed contacts on the ground. He chose someone whose background equipped him to negotiate political obstacles and to understand macro- and microvariables of Atlantic trade. Louverture's selectee could effectively cultivate sensitive cross-cultural relationships in light of the potential racial barriers between their two peoples.

Adams chose Edward Stevens to represent the U.S. government in Saint-Domingue. Adequate treatment of Stevens and his importance to the U.S. achievement of national objectives in Saint-Domingue have remained absent from the historical literature. One reason is popular interest in the more illustrious American personalities involved in Dominguan-American diplomacy. John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, Timothy Pickering, and Alexander Hamilton garner much more historical attention. But no one, including these men, expended more to advance U.S. Atlantic interests in Saint-Domingue than Stevens. He became the chief instrument of diplomacy in the Adams-Louverture alliance. Stevens was more than the consul responsible for trade relations, as historians have traditionally described him; he was de facto minister and an indispensable diplomat sent to proffer relations with the first black-led government in the western Atlantic world.[3]

The president's engagement with Saint-Domingue and his appointment of Stevens with a ministerial portfolio complicate the historical view that the second president did not act on his antislavery beliefs. Adams and his administration constructed a cunning diplomatic strategy that realized American interests in the Atlantic world and knowingly aided members of the African diaspora toward universal and perpetual emancipation. These U.S. leaders enacted this policy at a time when prominent U.S. politicians could still voice antislavery sentiments. Many Americans throughout the 1790s depicted the black freedom fighters of the Saint-Dominguan Revolution as bloodthirsty savages who raped innocent white girls and mercilessly slaughtered brave white men. The federal

government could do little to improve the plight of enslaved Africans of the United States, but the president and other American officials aided and abetted the freedom of black people in Saint-Domingue. John Adams was the first president to take unpopular action regarding race with notably positive results for both the United States and the African diaspora. The person and professionalism of Edward Stevens made that achievement possible.

THE MAKING OF A MULTICULTURAL DIPLOMAT

The president's search for a top diplomat to send to Saint-Domingue was short and directed. The secretary of state's inquiries around Philadelphia quickly focused on Dr. Edward Stevens. The eventual nominee's preparation for the job, conversely, entailed more than four decades of learning, living, and working across the Atlantic world. Stevens was born in 1754 on Antigua to Thomas Stevens and Ann Andsley Stevens. His merchant father moved the family shortly thereafter to Christiansted, St. Croix, the Danish West Indian capital and Denmark's most important sugar-producing colony. The island played a significant role in Atlantic world affairs, with strong ties to Britain, Holland, and the American colonies. Consequently, the island fostered a relatively cosmopolitan atmosphere.[4]

Stevens grew up in an Atlantic world in which the white population was conflicted about the enslavement of Africans. The Christiansted of Stevens's youth embodied that moral dilemma. His father's profession and the city of Christiansted presented a young Edward with a living laboratory of eighteenth-century Atlantic commerce. Two prominent features in St. Croix's major town—like most other Caribbean ports—were agriculture and Africans. Three blocks from his front door, Stevens could experience the sights, sounds, and smells of ships filled with chained human beings from the Danish-held African Gold Coast; merchant houses trading in sugar, cotton, and other agricultural products; and the workings of the West Indian and Guinea Company, which auctioned off recently arrived Africans in its public courtyard.[5]

A young Alexander Hamilton was closest among Stevens's childhood and lifelong friends. Ned and Alex, as the two were known, lived one street apart. The boys shared a remarkable resemblance to one another and enjoyed an extremely close relationship. Each was fluent in French, mesmerized by medicine, and outraged by slavery. The two friends shared sympathy for the plight of

enslaved black people. Part of their sympathy stemmed from self-interest: like other white people in slave societies, they feared an African-led rebellion. St. Croix's population included twelve people of African descent for every white resident. Another aspect of Ned and Alex's antislavery sentiments stemmed from their childhood experiences. The boys grew up in a racially mixed neighborhood where free black people, mulattos, and white Cruzans lived in close proximity and at the lower levels of society shared workplaces.[6]

Histories of the U.S. Federalist era often cite with little explanation Hamilton's prominence as the primary reason Stevens became involved in American foreign policy. One observer at the time commented on the two men's closeness, surmising that "thro' his influence Dr. Stevens became an American functionary." This conclusion, though understandable, is incorrect. And its prima facie acceptance by historians obscures the personal nature and cross-cultural complexity of Dominguan-American diplomacy.[7]

Hamilton is known for his lofty ambitions and achievements. Stevens was as ambitious as his more celebrated friend, if not as daring or resourceful. After completing baccalaureate studies at King's College in New York (later Columbia University), he took a more conventional route for a Scottish creole to elevate his station: medicine. Stevens entered the medical school at the University of Edinburgh in 1776, the same year Lemuel Haynes, a free African Minuteman in Massachusetts, published *Liberty Further Extended*, in which he used the recently issued Declaration of Independence to argue for emancipation, concluding "that Liberty is Equally as precious to a Black man, as it is to a white one."[8]

In the final year of the American Revolution, Haynes, an emerging voice of the Black Atlantic, married Elizabeth Babbit, a white American member of the Congregationalist church in Granville, Massachusetts, where he served as one of America's first African pastors with a white Christian congregation. In that same year, after receiving his medical degree, Stevens returned to St. Croix, which greatly needed his European medical training as it grappled with a notable rise in the mortality rate among its African population. Stevens operated a medical practice in Christiansted and married a woman named Eleanora about whom little else is known. No records exist to suggest he owned Africans at this time.[9]

Throughout the 1780s, he presumably treated white, free black, and enslaved African patients. Like other doctors in the Danish West Indies, Stevens likely adopted a contract system to provide medical services to ten or so Cruzan plan-

tations. Routine African health care services offered an annual retainer fee for each plantation African. To sustain a nonresident practice in rural areas, doctors such as Stevens routinely employed African nurses to oversee slave hospitals and general plantation health under the doctors' prescriptions. His tenure as a plantation physician provided Stevens with increased proficiency in the treatment of diseases such as yellow fever. In confronting the latter, "as frequent as any of the complaints among the negroes," Stevens employed the treatment later dubbed the West Indian method that gained him a first taste of public notoriety. Stevens's childhood surroundings, settled lifestyle, and successful medical practice, however, did not diminish his desire for professional recognition and social elevation in the Atlantic world. Throughout the 1780s, he sought ways to leave St. Croix.[10]

PHILADELPHIA AS A HUB IN THE BLACK ATLANTIC

After Eleanora Stevens died in 1792, Edward Stevens looked intently toward the United States, where Hamilton served as secretary of the treasury. Stevens regarded North America as better suited for his professional growth and intellectual sustenance. His friend and Edinburgh classmate William Thornton, the future architect of the U.S. Capitol, shared Stevens's opinion. Like Stevens and Hamilton, Thornton had grown up in the West Indies, but by the early 1790s, he was living in the United States and urging Stevens to join him: "I might expect to see you in America." When he learned with dismay of his friend's intentions to relocate to what is now Guyana, Thornton advised against it: "Indeed philanthropy might call you [but] to live in Demarary would not only rob the world of you for a time, but the unhealthiness of the country might perhaps deprive it for ever of one of its greatest ornaments." As "one of your sincerest welwishers," Thornton felt induced "to urge your thoughts on North America [where] men of talents and virtue are there wanted." According to Thornton, Stevens's abilities and character would "qualify you for filling the most important places, either in the universities or in the civil departments." Thornton's subjective evaluation of his friend's professional prospects in the United States proved remarkably accurate.[11]

In 1792, Stevens married Hester Kortright Amory, herself a recent widow. This union and the 1791 marriage of Hester's twin sister, Elizabeth, proved significant for Stevens's future role in U.S. diplomacy, since her new husband was James Yard, a wealthy Cruzan shipbuilder. Yard and Stevens had lived one street

over from each other in the 1780s and were likely acquainted. By 1793, both couples had relocated to Philadelphia, where they resided two streets apart.[12]

The summer of 1793 also witnessed the arrival of the first wave of Dominguan immigrants to Philadelphia. The Saint-Dominguan Revolution was in its second year, and on 20 June, the fighting reached the colonial capital at Cap Français. By that afternoon, free black men ran through the streets exclaiming, "You are all free! The commissioners say you are all free, all whites are now equal to us, this whole country belongs to us." The following day, French commissioners Léger Félicité Sonthonax and Étienne Polverel issued a proclamation of emancipation. The revolution began slowly and steadily to erode the slave system of the Atlantic world. The armies in Saint-Domingue forced the abolition of colonial slavery first there and then across the French empire. Dominguan freedom, like America's freedom from slavery exactly seven decades later, came at high costs. In addition to the thousands who had died since August 1791, the battle for Cap Français led to that city's destruction and the deaths of between three and ten thousand souls.[13]

By July 1793, some seven thousand Dominguan refugees arrived in American port cities such as Charleston, Baltimore, New York, and Philadelphia. Africans and Americans across the country had followed newspaper reports of the revolution, and the new arrivals provided eyewitness accounts of the fighting on Cap Français's streets. These cross-cultural encounters produced different reactions among different domestic audiences. White Americans simultaneously suspected and sympathized with white Dominguan refugees. Many blamed exceptionally harsh slaveholding practices and white factions for the revolution and its resulting emancipation. The presence of the refugees and the destruction of Cap Français signaled the importance of racial consensus among white people in the United States. Dominguan emancipation and the African revolutionaries' takeover of Le Cap persuaded white Americans that the future of the U.S. republic depended on white solidarity. Skin color allowed the exiles to exploit what historian Ashli White terms "creoleness" to garner sympathy and support from white Americans, who established personal, social, religious, and government relief funds to assist their unfortunate French brethren.[14]

One beneficiary of the white Atlantic assistance program was John Thomas Carré, a Dominguan planter whose property was confiscated and destroyed by revolutionary fighters. Philadelphia resident Charles Willson Peale funded the emigration of the Carré family and supported them after their arrival. Carré expressed his gratitude to Peale for "the sympathetic concern you showed me,"

by which "I am enabled to furnish my children with warm clothes for the winter, which I think shall be very hard for them to bear being used to a warm climate."[15]

Not all of the refugees from Saint-Domingue had white skin, but white Americans' racialized definitions of philanthropy excluded Africans and exiles of color. Some white Dominguans brought their bondservants when they arrived in the United States, where limited opportunities forced many of African descent to continue working for their slaveholders, to attempt to gain a share of the meager assistance available from African organizations, or to fend for themselves. Despite these economic hardships, many enslaved refugees in Philadelphia took advantage of Pennsylvania's abolition laws to gain their freedom. Other crafty Dominguan slaveholders shipped or sold their bondservants to the South rather than lose their property.

Philadelphia's increased free African population changed the complexion of churches and shops and politicized the city's existing population of color. African refugees related how they had seen black people militarily defeat white people. Black Atlantic leaders Absalom Jones and Richard Allen came to prominence during this revolutionary period. In 1787, the two men had founded the Free African Society (FAS), Philadelphia's first black benevolent society. Several years later, Jones and Allen walked out of one of the city's segregated Methodist churches. In 1793, the two preachers broke ground on Fifth Street between Walnut and Locust Streets for what became the country's first African church or meetinghouse, St. Thomas's African Episcopal Church, and Jones became its leader. A few blocks away, at Sixth and Lombard Streets, Allen erected Bethel African Methodist Episcopal (AME) Church.[16]

Like the Dominguan revolutionaries, Jones and Allen were accomplishing historic tasks. The African Methodist Episcopal Church was the Atlantic world's first major religious denomination established because of sociological disparities. It was the first denomination organized and incorporated by Africans in the United States. The presence of black Dominguans in American cities and the inspiration that Africans gained from the revolution, however, did not readily prompt vocal praise or endorsements of the Saint-Dominguan Revolution from members of the city's community of color. Despite their prominent advocacy regarding black Philadelphians—and perhaps to avoid endangering their fragile institutions—Jones and Allen remained silent throughout the 1790s on Hispaniola's sociopolitical transformations.

Prince Hall of Boston, the founder of the first African Masonic Lodge in the United States, singularly identified himself and his audience with Saint-Domingue in a 1797 speech intended to bolster black Bostonians against white hostility. At the close of the eighteenth century, free Africans simultaneously possessed optimism and skepticism about the future of U.S. slavery and race relations. Hall's speech exhibited Calvinist, Federalist-tinged republicanism and deftly steered clear of seeming to endorse armed rebellion. The Black Atlantic leader encouraged his African audience and white Americans who read the speech against despondency by invoking the events in Saint-Domingue: "My brethren, let us remember what a dark day it was with our African brethren six years ago, in the French West Indies. Nothing but the snap of the whip was heard from morning to evening . . . for nothing else but to gratify their masters' pride, wantonness, and cruelty: but, the scene is changed; they now confess that God hath no respect of persons, and therefore receive them as their friends, and treat them as brothers."[17]

The arrival of African witnesses to a black revolution and their renderings of Black Atlantic heroism inspired Gabriel's Rebellion in 1800 and fomented a New York City riot the next year. Though the Saint-Dominguan Revolution did not galvanize black communities across the United States to coalesce into a more visible movement for greater freedoms, Africans in America generally seemed to support black successes in Saint-Domingue. When Haiti became an independent nation in 1804, U.S. African leaders more readily embraced the achievement. But little evidence supports the idea of a broad public identification of black communities with Dominguan revolutionaries of color.[18]

POLITICS AND THE YELLOW FEVER DEBATE

The appearance of Dominguans on American shores coincided with the onslaught of a ghastly yellow fever epidemic in Philadelphia, where the increased creole presence heightened fears of social unrest and provided a convenient scapegoat for understanding a medical calamity. Before temperatures and the humidity fell and the *Aedes aegypti* mosquito population died off in mid-November, some six thousand of an estimated forty-five thousand Philadelphians of all races had succumbed to yellow fever. Hundreds of families reeled from the emotional devastation of losing loved ones. Both during the outbreak and for years thereafter, doctors argued via print media about the causes and

treatments for yellow fever. The family of Elizabeth Drinker, a wealthy Philadelphia resident, as well as President George Washington and his cabinet evacuated the city to reside in nearby Germantown.[19]

Drinker's August 1793 diary entries capture Philadelphians' fear and confusion: "The yallow-Fever spreads in the City, many are taken with it. . . . [M]any families have left the City. . . . I am much distress'd that any of our family continues in town. . . . [W]e have been rendred very uneasy this evening by hearsays from the City, of a great number of funerals that have been seen this day there, hope and believe that the number is greatly exaggerated." Her writings also illustrate how the disease mingled with talk of race and Saint-Domingue: "Poor black Joseph gone away sick to some Negro House, where they have promis'd to take care of him. . . . [W]e have hopes it is not the contagious fever that he has. . . . [S]ome say it was occasion'd by damag'd Coffee, and fish . . . others say it was imported in a Vessel from Cape-Francoies which lay in our warfe . . . 'tis realy an alarming and sereous time."[20]

The epidemic proved important for Edward Stevens's professional future. Alexander and Eliza Hamilton contracted the disease, but Stevens guided his friends back to health using a regime of bark, wine, and cold baths. Some physicians criticized the treatment, though the newly arrived Stevens avoided becoming embroiled in heated debates involving the country's leading physicians. A friend of Hamilton's, however, could hardly steer clear of political imbroglios. On 11 September, Hamilton published a letter to the College of Physicians in John Fenno's Federalist-leaning newspaper, *Gazette of the United States*, in which Hamilton described his recovery from the dread disease. Such a public endorsement vaulted Stevens into the public eye and earned him an unwarranted Federalist label. Moreover, Hamilton's endorsement of Stevens's treatment included a repudiation of bloodletting for yellow fever victims, a practice advocated by the venerable Dr. Benjamin Rush. Wrote Hamilton, Stevens's "mode of treating the disorder varies essentially from that which has been generally practiced—And I am persuaded, where pursued, reduces it to one of little more than ordinary hazard." Not surprisingly, the statement attracted not only Rush's attention but also his ire.[21]

Stevens was not a noted expert on yellow fever. The Hamiltons were his only known patients with the disease during the 1793 crisis. The College of Physicians' archival collection of studies on the epidemic's causes and treatments includes writings and significant contributions from Adam Kuhn, Samuel Griffitts, Jean Devèze, and Rush, but Stevens left no record of his research on the subject. He

did write and publish a letter to the college regarding his treatment of Hamilton in which Stevens advocated "the tonic plan," invigorating patients so that they could withstand the disease. He based this recommendation on "extensive experience and accurate observation" during his ten-year practice in Christiansted, where he regularly observed yellow fever in Africans and Europeans. He offered a "warning against the ill consequences of debilitating applications, or profuse evacuations."[22]

Stevens leveraged his notoriety in the yellow fever debates to establish a medical practice. During Philadelphia's 1797 yellow fever outbreak, he became a chief physician at the Bush Hill Hospital, the primary public medical facility. There, he served the city's poorest and worst-off victims pro bono when at least six physicians died after contracting the disease through their work. As in Christiansted, Stevens worked at the hospital alongside black nurses and assistants and treated black patients. When the city offered Stevens and other Bush Hill doctors five hundred dollars' worth of stock in consideration of "the high sense the Board of Health entertain of the service of those gentlemen during the calamity . . . Dr. Stephens wrote a letter to the Board, politely declining the acceptance." Stevens's milder treatment became more widely employed around the city, with "bleeding used less profusely."[23]

Contemporaries and historians have used the public Stevens-Rush debate to cast Stevens as a Federalist, but a disagreement over treatments need not reflect partisan politics. Stevens was not a Federalist in 1793. He did not possess the personal trust and political confidence of American party leaders. The Adams-appointed ministers to France during the XYZ Affair—John Marshall, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, and Elbridge Gerry—were battle-tested politicos with rich political pedigree, years-old friendships within both parties, and state-level public followings. Stevens was a newly arrived immigrant doctor who nursed a longtime friend (who happened to be an ultra-Federalist) back to health. Stevens and Rush differed on a professional level about medical expertise and research methods but did not necessarily disagree politically. To infer that Stevens was a Federalist undermines the importance of Dominguan-American diplomacy to the Adams administration.[24]

FROM DOCTOR TO DIPLOMAT

In 1798, Toussaint Louverture reached out to John Adams by sending Joseph Bunel to Philadelphia. Although another outbreak of yellow fellow gripped

the city later in the year, Stevens did not return as a physician to Bush Hill Hospital. Instead, he undertook a mission to Hispaniola that led directly to his later nomination as Adams's representative to the Louverturian government. In February, a French privateer, *La Boudaine*, operating out of Saint-Dominguan waters, captured a four-hundred-ton Philadelphia-based merchant vessel, the *New Jersey*, with a crew of thirty, and carried it into port at San Juan, Puerto Rico, where captured American sailors often experienced great suffering and humiliation. Pennsylvania governor Thomas Mifflin, a political moderate who leaned toward the Democratic-Republicans, commissioned Stevens to travel to the Caribbean to negotiate the release of the ship and its cargo and crew. In March, Stevens embarked on a seven-month mission to the Admiralty Court at Santo Domingo, the capital city of Spanish Hispaniola.[25]

The effort to retrieve the *New Jersey* proved a high-profile venture, involving the ship's owners, the state government, the Navy Department, the State Department, and the president. Navy Secretary Benjamin Stoddert's instructions to commanders regarding the Stevens expedition underscores the importance to the U.S. government of the Atlantic trade in general and ships such as the *New Jersey* in particular: "The duties this vessel will pay to the [federal] government, if she arrives safe—$10,000—make her an object meriting public protection." To ensure that the captains appreciated the extraordinary nature of Stevens's mission, Stoddert instructed them "to say nothing about the duty of the government to protect the property of all its citizens."[26]

The Admiralty Court condemned the ship and its cargo despite the protests of Stevens and the federal government. The special envoy did not return home after the unfavorable verdict. Instead, he traveled west to Cap Français, where he spent most of the summer. A contemporary magazine reported that the *New Jersey*'s owners had authorized him to pay the French agent, Theodore Hédouville, a $250,000 bribe to win the ship's release. It is unclear whether Stevens met with Louverture or Hédouville, but the sojourn provided the American diplomat with exclusive access to key individuals in the Dominguan government. He met Philippe Roume, who was serving as the Directory's agent in Santo Domingo. Roume gave Stevens a copy of a decree that offered French protection to neutral ships. American officials, however, distrusted Directory pledges and agreed that Louverture controlled the island.[27]

Meeting in Le Cap with black officers, Stevens uncovered an alleged French plot to invade the southern United States from Saint-Domingue. "A black chief in the confidence of General Hédouville" disclosed to Stevens that "the Agency

of Saint Domingo had received positive orders from the Executive Director to invade both the Southern States of America and the island of Jamaica." Congressman Robert Goodloe Harper informed South Carolinians that Hédouville had been preparing to invade the South "with an army of blacks; which was to be landed with a large supply of officers, arms and ammunition, to excite an insurrection among the negroes." This threat represented white Americans' gravest fear regarding the Saint-Dominguan Revolution. Hédouville consulted Louverture about the plan and, according to one informant, the general "strenuously opposed this invasion." Harper reported that Louverture thwarted the invasion and drove Hédouville from the island.[28]

Stevens also used his time in the Caribbean to forge close acquaintances with nongovernmental actors in Hispaniola, among them Juan Bautista Oyarzábal, a wealthy sugar planter. Like many other moneyed island residents, Oyarzábal lived in Santo Domingo but transacted business and maintained political contacts in Le Cap. Oyarzábal led Stevens to other important acquaintances. He formed a friendship with Louis Ambrose Grandjean d'Aubancourt, a lawyer and merchant from Port-au-Prince (known as Port-Républicain from 1793 to 1804) who was also Joseph Bunel's nephew and enjoyed close relationships not only with his uncle but also with Generals Jean-Jacques Dessalines and Henry Christophe, who became Haiti's first two leaders. Through Grandjean, Stevens may well have met Bunel.[29]

Correspondence between Stevens and Oyarzábal during Bunel's mission to Philadelphia reveals mutual political and commercial interests. Oyarzábal apprised Stevens of Louverture's actions and intentions and reported Hédouville's departure. Shortly after the French agent's exodus, Grandjean and Roume relocated to Le Cap to benefit from greater access to the Louverturian bureaucracy. Oyarzábal interpreted Roume's co-optation into the revolutionary government as an affirmation that Louverture had consolidated power. Oyarzábal relayed commercial news and stressed the need for Hispaniolan merchants to purchase U.S. ships. Forecasting increased Dominguan-American trade, Oyarzábal sought to expand the island's contracting in ship sales with their mutual friend, James Yard.[30]

The mission to secure the *New Jersey* served as a capstone to the life of cumulative professional experiences that by the winter of 1799 garnered Stevens the notice of Adams and his administration. Stevens possessed extensive knowledge of the Atlantic world, a cultural worldview that opposed slavery, keen political skills, and unequaled access to Dominguan contacts. For these reasons, Adams

nominated Stevens to establish American ties with the Saint-Dominguan government. Years later, Pickering confided to Stevens that his "actual acquaintance with the principal Chiefs of [Saint-Domingue] acquired in a previous successful undertaking in behalf of some Philadelphia merchants enforced the propriety of proposing [the Cap Français post] to you. You therefore were selected; and the government deemed itself singularly fortunate in obtaining your acceptance of the mission." Congressman Harper affirmed the choice, considering Stevens "a man of honour and character, well known [around Philadelphia] and well acquainted with the West-Indies." He possessed a key diplomatic prerequisite, according to Harper: "As he spoke their language well, he was led to cultivate an acquaintance with them."[31]

An additional reason for Adams's nomination of Stevens involved both profit potential and friendship. Stevens returned from the *New Jersey* mission having learned that Hispaniola held enticing profit potential for Yard's shipbuilding business, information he would undoubtedly have shared with his brother-in-law. The Yard and Pickering families lived directly across from one another on Chestnut Street for much of the 1790s, and when the Pickering family moved two blocks north, to the corner of Sixth and Arch Streets, the Yards occupied the Pickerings' former home. Pickering came to consider Yard a friend and "a gentleman of distinguished sagacity and information."[32]

During the week of 11 February 1799, Pickering and Yard met at the City Tavern to discuss Stevens and the Cap Français post. The watering hole was one of Philadelphia's most popular gathering places for the great and the near great in local and federal government circles. Yard was known to walk to City Tavern, on Second Street just around the street from his house, to discuss important business with the city's politicians and merchants. It is unknown who called the meeting, which would have taken place in one of the tavern's two coffee rooms, but during the tête-à-tête, according to Pickering, "I expressed my opinion of Dr. Stevens from what I had heard of his character, from Mr. Yard, or some other source of information. The arrangement being thus far advanced, I said to Mr. Yard—'But, I have not yet seen Dr. Stevens.'" Yard suggested, "I will bring him to you." At a second meeting, Pickering met Stevens in person for the first time.[33]

The president submitted Stevens's nomination to the Senate one week after signing the Intercourse Act. The two men had apparently not previously met, although the president was probably familiar with Stevens from his medical practice or through his earlier mission to Saint-Domingue. Historians regard

Pickering as a Hamilton lackey and cabinet saboteur, yet the secretary's detailed recollections of Stevens do not refer to Hamilton as having influenced the nomination process. Rather, Yard was the personal connection who facilitated Stevens's transition from Atlantic world doctor to American diplomat.[34]

MINISTER IN THE GUISE OF A CONSUL

In sending an envoy to Le Cap, the Adams administration became poised to secure preferential status with a prospective Saint-Dominguan nation-state. The Americans needed to forge a closer relationship to the Dominguan government than the British already enjoyed by virtue of a treaty with Louverture. U.S. officials needed to take advantage of Dominguan distrust of Britain without seeming overly eager to endorse rebellion among enslaved peoples throughout the Atlantic world. Domestically, the Adams administration could not overtly support the independence of emancipated Africans who had gained freedom through violence.

The Washington administration had sent consuls with commercial duties to the white colonial government in Saint-Domingue. Adams's first appointee assumed a more assertive diplomatic posture with the Black Atlantic revolutionary leadership. Revised bilateral, multicultural relations required a higher U.S. profile. Adams wanted to employ his chief diplomatic instrument as part of a larger strategy to secure and advance the U.S. position among Atlantic powers. Secretary Pickering elevated the diplomatic posting of Cap Français from a consulate to that of consulate general within days after Congress passed the Intercourse Act, a first step toward strengthening bilateral relations. The Louverturian government had sent an official agent to the U.S. government and persuaded Adams to send an envoy of equal rank. For Louverture's part, he needed the presence of a ranking American at Le Cap to secure his domestic position and to project stronger Dominguan-American engagement to the Atlantic world.

This mutual understanding between Adams and Louverture over the rank of an American official represented a key diplomatic agreement. Administration officials respected the host government's right under the law of nations to permit or refuse official American presence on Dominguan soil. They were acquainted with Emmerich de Vattel's conclusion in *The Law of Nations*, published in 1758, that no rule of international law imposed on a state an absolute obligation to receive consuls accredited to it by foreign powers. The admission

of consuls was understood to depend either on convention or on the tacit or express permission of the sovereign in whose dominions they were to reside. U.S. leaders also appreciated their lack of leverage to force recognition of an American official. In fact, no Dominguan government, including Louverture's, had openly acknowledged an American consul during the 1790s.[35]

George Washington had appointed Jacob Mayer as consul to Cap Français in 1796. Still, years later, when Mayer returned to Philadelphia with Bunel, the Dominguan government had not acknowledged his commission. Colonial governments' repeated refusals to receive American consuls underscored the weak U.S. position in the eighteenth-century Atlantic world. Dominguan governments—including revolutionary ones—did not consider consular relations with the United States a diplomatic priority. The federal government during the Washington years equally did not deem the Dominguan government important enough to its national interests to push for improved relations.[36]

Political conditions and Atlantic outlooks in Philadelphia and Cap Français had changed significantly by December 1798. By then, Adams had been president for almost two years, and Franco-American relations were steadily worsening. To avoid overdependence on British concessions for the advancement of American strategic interests, the Adams administration needed a reliable Atlantic ally and trading partner. In Saint-Domingue, Toussaint Louverture's domestic capital and international stature had grown steadily after his 1797 installation as commander in chief. He sent Bunel to Philadelphia to raise political issues as well as to procure commercial concessions. In exchange for greater U.S. diplomatic attention to Cap Français, Bunel assured U.S. officials that "an agent should be received [by Louverture] from the United States to watch over their interests." For an American administration under fire at home and ridiculed abroad, Saint-Domingue's *agrément* marked an affirmative step for Atlantic diplomacy.[37]

Nominating Stevens and gaining Louverture's cooperation still left the administration to wrestle with the thorny question that plagued its Atlantic foreign policy: "In what character should [Stevens] represent the United States?" The Senate retained its partisan posture when considering Stevens's nomination as consul general. Instead of pushing the matter through a pro forma advise-and-consent process when the president's nominating message arrived, the members ordered that it lie for consideration. The chamber repeated the same procedural delay two days later. On 21 February 1799, the members voted eighteen to seven to confirm Stevens's nomination. The opposing Senate minor-

ity distrusted the administration's public policy statements of trade only with Saint-Domingue and the president's appointment of a consul general. The nominal promotion in diplomatic rank from consul to consul general implied a closer bilateral connection than the two governments had previously shared. Democratic-Republican lawmakers continued to believe, as they had throughout the congressional debate over the Intercourse Act, that the administration sought closer political ties to the Louverturian government.[38]

These lawmakers were right. Historians remain hesitant to call Stevens an American diplomat. They use his title, "consul general," and focus primarily on the trade-related duties in his portfolio. One author describes his mission as explicitly "limited to opening trade" with some implied interest in diplomacy. Others note that Stevens possessed "diplomatic powers," offering little elaboration. His lone biographer refers to Stevens as fulfilling "quasi-diplomatic functions." But Edward Stevens did more than that, and eighteenth-century politicos knew it. Stevens's duties were those of an accredited diplomat to the Louverturian government, not a consul. In fact, "there were [actual] consuls at the principal ports in St. Domingo, who performed the duties & received the endorsements [associated with] ordinary consular functions." Adams expected Stevens to cultivate a strengthened bilateral relationship with a revolutionary government that the president believed would eventually become the second sovereign state in the western Atlantic world. Thomas Jefferson understood Adams's thinking. The Virginian and the rest of the Democratic-Republican opposition kept close tabs on the Pickering-Bunel negotiations of 1798–99 and the legislative efforts concerning the Intercourse Act. As the Senate debated Stevens's nomination, Jefferson lambasted all things Adams and reported to his fellow Virginian, Edmund Pendleton, "A nomination is before the Senate of a consul general to St. Domingo. It is understood that he will present himself to Toussaint, and is, in fact, our minister to him." Even Hamilton winced as he witnessed Adams expand U.S. foreign policy toward Saint-Domingue beyond trade. After hearing of Stevens's confirmation, Hamilton cautioned Pickering regarding the political perils of "sending an agent to Toussaint to encourage the independence of St. Domingo."[39]

The Adams administration found itself in a complex position. In addition to the Quasi-War and the troubling U.S. position vis-à-vis the Barbary States of the Mediterranean, American officials needed to establish a practical policy in the western Atlantic. For the most part, Americans had reacted as a junior partner to the European wars and Caribbean maritime encroachments on U.S.

sovereignty by the larger powers throughout the 1790s. Louverture's offer to Adams of economic and geopolitical collaboration between their governments presented U.S. officials with the opportunity to gain an advantage in at least one Atlantic locale.

Americans had intelligence that the British were sending envoys—one at the level of commissioner of His Majesty the king—to Saint-Domingue. If Britain secured an exclusive or favored Dominguan alliance, Caribbean-American trade would remain crippled. Americans surmised that France would eventually attempt to retake the island and reenslave the black population. If the United States did not support the Saint-Dominguan Revolution as a check on European dominance in the West Indies, the nineteenth century would dawn with virtually a pre-1791 status quo in the western Atlantic world regime. Rufus King argued that the United States could not forfeit this opportunity to forge a prosperous and friendly alliance with an independent Louverturian state: "Providence seems to have prepared the way and to have pointed out the instruments of its will. Our children will reproach us if we neglect our duty; and humanity will escape many scourges if we act with wisdom and decision."[40]

To secure a favorable position for the United States vis-à-vis the Europeans and to cultivate a constructive relationship with Louverture, Adams decided to send a ranking diplomat to Saint-Domingue. Mindful of Americans' sensitive views regarding the African diaspora and slavery, the president dispatched Stevens as the American minister to Cap Français in the guise of a consul general. In talks with the administration about the mission, Stevens and Pickering discussed the "delicacy and difficulty" of the embassy in Saint-Domingue. The secretary later detailed the administration's pragmatic plan: "Consul General [was] the only public character that could with propriety be given [Stevens] yet, from the peculiar circumstances of that island, his duties were *essentially ministerial*." Stevens appreciated and accepted the need to forgo an official title, understanding the sensitive nature of domestic political views regarding race and slavery and European hostility toward American and Dominguan progress within the Atlantic regime.[41]

The president and the secretary of state valued the true character of Stevens's mission and expected him to maintain an official residence, "a style of living and a hospitality suited to a public minister of the United States." He was promised a salary at the chief of mission rank. Pickering assured Stevens, "You were to be in *fact*, *their minister*; yet in negotiating with the administration of a *colony* of France, it was obviously improper to assume it. The character of Consul Gen-

eral occurred, and with that you were invested." Adams, Pickering, and Stevens entered a gentlemen's agreement that Stevens would serve in his understated capacity for one year. Within that time, they believed, Louverture would declare Saint-Dominguan independence and implement a functioning government. The idea was likely that the administration would officially upgrade Stevens's ranking to minister after independence. When Louverture did not move the colony to sovereignty, Stevens extended his tour at the State Department's behest on the incorrect assumption that Adams would win reelection to the presidency in 1800. His defeat by Jefferson truncated the Adams administration's plans. However, the new president understood that Stevens's job description possessed a diplomatic character. Jefferson opposed but nevertheless defended Adams's presidential authority to employ Stevens as "Agent to St. Domingo . . . on the level of a chargé des affaires."[42]

Adams's ruse of sending Stevens as a consul general did not deceive Jefferson and the political opposition. The Democratic-Republican candidate in the 1799 Pennsylvania gubernatorial election, Thomas McKean, raised Adams's Dominguan diplomacy as an issue in his successful bid over Federalist rival James Ross. However, the president's policy toward the Louverturian government generally remained publicly circumspect, providing his domestic opposition little room for rebuke. Even as Stevens sailed for Le Cap, Wolcott maintained the public line that "our object is to gain trade on safe principles; questions of interior policy and government are to be settled by the people of the island." But ultimately, Wolcott admitted, "I believe the island will assert and maintain its independence."[43]

Adams chose an opportune time and employed a cunning foreign policy to advance U.S. interests in the Atlantic world. He commanded Federalist majorities in both houses of Congress. Wars in Europe did not allow France to halt American expansion in Saint-Domingue. Britain welcomed the weaker, fellow slaveholding nation to its venture in Saint-Domingue, believing that the Royal Navy's maritime dominance could contain American commercial and political gains. Louverture's offer of rapprochement was a small consolation for an American people who believed that their nation should rank alongside the European powers. But the president, a realistic practitioner and an old hand at Atlantic diplomacy, took what he could get at the time and chose Stevens as the chief instrument of U.S. diplomacy with the Louverturian government. Stevens's skills, experience, and capacity matched the president's need for a sensitive and successful Dominguan strategy. Adams adeptly avoided the do-

mestic risks surrounding questions of race and slavery in an alliance with his Dominguan interlocutor of color to enhance U.S. stature in a hostile Atlantic political system.

The French, however, did not believe the president's appointment of Stevens as a mere consul general and the administration's statements of trade-only interests in Saint-Domingue. The French consul general in Philadelphia, Philippe Letombe, possessed great intelligence regarding the administration's actions and intentions. From sources such as Spanish minister Carlos Martinez de Yrujo and informed Americans, Letombe followed Bunel's travels and knew about the Saint-Dominguan envoy's meetings with Adams, Pickering, and congressional leaders. The French diplomat intercepted and read Louverture's messages to Bunel, read American and British newspapers, followed the debates in Congress, and monitored Stevens's preparations for departure. Letombe reported to Foreign Minister Talleyrand the suspicion that Adams was planning a secret relationship with Louverture. Letombe remained dubious regarding Bunel and Louverture's repeated pledges of loyalty to France. However, he also shared a frustration with the president's Democratic-Republican opponents. Administration officials exercised such discipline in maintaining their public message that Letombe lacked ironclad evidence of Adams's subterfuge. Therefore, to gain greater access and evidence regarding Dominguan-American intrigue, the resourceful French consul sent spies to Cap Français to observe and report the situation on the ground. Letombe's men traveled to Saint-Domingue on the same vessel that conveyed the U.S. minister to the Louverturian government.[44]

CHAPTER FOUR

Dominguan-American Diplomacy

"So Natural"

> I shall at all times feel a sincere pleasure in promoting the Tranquility & happiness of St. Domingo.
> —Consul General Edward Stevens, 1799

The merchant ship *Kingston* set sail from Philadelphia on 17 March 1799. Onboard were Edward and Hester Stevens and Joseph and Marie Françoise Bunel. President John Adams's appointee to the government of Toussaint Louverture became the highest-ranking American diplomat ever dispatched to Saint-Domingue. Robert Ritchie of Pennsylvania traveled along as the new U.S. consul to Port-Républicain. Jacob Mayer returned as the consul in Le Cap. Philippe Letombe's French spies were also aboard, tailing the group. Charles Carré accompanied Stevens as his secretary. Carré's father, John Thomas Carré, was a former planter on Hispaniola who had escaped to Philadelphia in 1793. Hearing of Louverture's offer for white Dominguan émigrés to return unmolested to their plantations, John and Charles Carré journeyed south, the latter to assist Stevens's embassy, the former with hopes of recovering the family lands confiscated by the revolutionary forces.[1]

Adams endowed Stevens with the president's professional confidence and a de facto ministerial appointment to negotiate with the Louverturian government on behalf of the United States. To ensure that the envoy and embassy team arrived safely at their new posting, Secretary of State Timothy Pickering arranged their passage on the *Kingston*, an armed merchant vessel. The ship's skipper, Captain Hodge, took the *Kingston* to Hampton, Virginia, and entered the harbor with a white flag on the ship's forward topgallant mast and an American flag on its main topgallant mast. He fired two guns to leeward to identify his vessel to the U.S. Navy in port as a friendly. Captain Thomas Tingey of

the USS *Ganges* had already received orders to take the *Kingston* under escort to Cap Français. When they arrived in the Dominguan harbor, Tingey was to hover a day or two to give Stevens "an opportunity to influence Toussaint to invite" the captain to a meeting. Administration officials expected a U.S. naval presence in Dominguan waters to be welcomed. If he met with Louverture, they instructed, Tingey should "conciliate the good opinion of that General, and his people" toward the United States.[2]

Secretary Pickering provided his new emissary with two standard-issue items for overseas assignments: "Standing Instructions to Consuls and Vice Consuls of the United States" and the three-volume *Laws of the United States of America*. In addition, Pickering sent along several supplementary items. The first was Hamilton's secret "practicable & efficient plan" for the administration of a postindependence government in Saint-Domingue. Pickering could not officially pass along governing plans to Louverture, but the secretary indicated that Stevens "will know how to use" the plan. The second document was a memorandum from the secretary of state to the Dominguan commander in chief on behalf of the president. The 4 March 1799 letter represents the State Department's first communiqué to a black head of government.[3]

The secretary's memorandum also served as the de facto minister's letter of credentials. Pickering introduced Stevens as "a gentleman [who] possesses the confidence of the President" and went on to affirm the Louverturian government's esteem within the U.S. administration. In response to "the good disposition manifested" in Louverture's 6 November 1798 letter, Pickering conveyed Adams's "firm persuasion that the Government in the Island" would keep its pledges to protect American interests. The president's initial diplomatic efforts with Saint-Domingue raised expectations for the future of Dominguan-American relations. In 1801, when Jefferson replaced Stevens with Tobias Lear, Louverture took great offense at the new administration's failure to send a similar letter.[4]

In a show of good faith toward his Dominguan counterpart, Adams afforded his envoy a third and more controversial set of items. The lengthy Pickering-Bunel talks revealed that the lack of provisions on the island and growing social distress endangered Louverture's authority. The president "felt a desire to have it in his power to relieve the wants of St. Domingo while he should promote the interest of the United States." In response to these "urgent wants," Adams authorized the transfer of sixty thousand dollars in U.S. government funds and a shipload of flour, salted meats, and dry goods to the Dominguan leader. This decision caused dissension in the cabinet and sowed suspicion among lawmakers.



Department of State
Philadelphia March 4. 1799.

Sir,

I am directed by the President of the United States to acknowledge the receipt of your letter addressed to him under the date of the 6th of November last, the object of which is to procure a renewal of the commercial intercourse between the United States and the Colony of St. Domingo.

The numerous pretexts used by the French Government and its colonial Agents for capturing and condemning the vessels and property of citizens of the United States, in violation of the law of Nations and treaties, and the repeated refusal of that Government to give redress, or even to listen to our candid and amicable overtures to negotiate on the subjects of difference between the two Nations, compelled the United States to seek and adopt measures of safety and defence. Hence proceeded the act of Congress "to suspend the commercial intercourse between the United States and France, & the dependencies thereof"; and the renewal of that act in the late session of Congress. But in the latter act (a copy of which I inclose) you will see provision is made for opening the commercial intercourse either with France or any Island or place belonging to the Republic, if the President shall deem it expedient and consistent with the interest of the United States.

And

Figure 5. Letter from Timothy Pickering to Toussaint Louverture, 1799. President Adams directed Secretary Pickering to send the Department of State's first dispatch to a black head of government. This letter acknowledged Louverture's initial memorandum and suggested the U.S. willingness to engage the government of Saint-Domingue. Courtesy National Archives, College Park, Md.

The Democratic-Republican chair of the House Committee on Commerce and Manufactures, Samuel Smith of Maryland, who had voted with the administration on the Intercourse Act, questioned the prudence of the president's action. Nevertheless, almost all of the cabinet secretaries concurred with the idea of sending provisions with Stevens to Saint-Domingue as "an object of national importance, perfectly consistent with the spirit" of the Intercourse Act.[5]

Attorney General Charles Lee, the lone dissenter in the cabinet, considered providing federal assistance to bolster the Louverturian government "neither lawful nor expedient." His disagreement stemmed largely from distrust of Louverture: "I have no more confidence in black Frenchmen than in the white," he wrote, "and am willing they should suffer in St. Domingo till they actually refrain from depredations on our commerce." The president agreed with Lee's legal reasoning that providing money and supplies to Saint-Domingue was unlawful under the French Embargo Act of June 1798. But Adams and the rest of the cabinet disagreed with the attorney general's assessment of the black Dominguan government. They trusted Louverture and the promises he had made through Bunel and saw the general as a leader with whom they could collaborate. From bilateral relations in Saint-Domingue, "a great national object is to be attained."[6]

Bunel's reporting made it clear that to engage the revolutionary regime, the administration needed to buttress Louverture's position among the Dominguan people. Pickering correctly projected that the general "for some time past [has] been feeding [his people] with *promises*." Louverture funded his military and government operations through a barter system, allegedly reimbursing merchants with agricultural products and holding anxious creditors at bay with risky debt schemes. According to an 11 April 1799 news story, the Louverturian administration purchased imported cargo with bills of exchange drawn on Cap Français banks, payable in two or three months. When offered sugar for services rendered, one shipowner complained that he needed money, not sugar, to feed his family, pay his workers, and settle his debts.[7]

U.S. officials viewed it as expedient to put "*supplies* or *presents*" at Louverture's disposal, seeing the preemptive gesture as a "*political measure*" to gain the trust of the Dominguan population and to "impress the mind of General Toussaint" toward meeting American objectives. The president and the secretary of state compared their aggressive diplomacy toward the Dominguan regime to the long-standing American arrangements with the governments of the Barbary States, which U.S. officials routinely bribed to maintain open shipping lanes in the Mediterranean. In 1797, the president signed and the Senate

ratified a treaty in which the United States agreed to pay and deliver "the money and presents demanded by the Bey of Tripoli, as a full and satisfactory consideration on his part, and on the part of his subjects, for this treaty of perpetual peace and friendship." Through its progressive stance toward Saint-Domingue, the administration put Dominguan-American relations on a similar footing as that of other contemporary U.S. foreign policy engagements.[8]

Lee's assessment that sending supplies to Louverture "will expose the officers in the Executive to public opprobrium" proved prophetic. Mayer, disgruntled at his failure to receive the top job in Cap Français, mailed a copy of the *Kingston*'s cargo invoice to Philadelphia's Democratic-Republican newspaper, *Aurora*, which duly printed it. Democratic-Republican opponents seized on the disclosures to accuse Stevens of profiting illegally from selling agricultural products in his station as a government official. Mayer went further, spreading rumors that Stevens, Pickering, and Adams had gained financially from the transfer of goods to Le Cap. "This thing made a good deal of noise among the friends as well as the enemies of government," so that former president George Washington—who harbored his own financial interests in Saint-Domingue—questioned whether Stevens was a mercenary "unworthy, altogether, of public confidence." Aside from these political attacks, President Adams's risky actions to support the Louverturian regime had the intended effects in Saint-Domingue. The relatively small cache of items provided a level of "comfort and relief" that helped to stabilize the general's standing among his population.[9]

The Adams administration employed a perilous foreign policy strategy that resulted in economic and political benefits for both the U.S. and Dominguan governments. The extraordinary relationship between Louverture and Stevens crossed eighteenth-century racial barriers to provide the Americans with greater influence and commercial returns on Hispaniola than the more powerful British. As a result, Louverture implemented a counterrevolutionary economic program that cost him domestic political capital. This plan and its financial returns, however, allowed the governments of the United States and Saint-Domingue to command greater notice within the Atlantic world for the duration of their short-lived bilateral collaboration.

WHITE AMERICANS ENGAGE A BLACK LEADER

As his newly constructed embassy team streamed toward Cap Français under U.S. naval escort, John Adams remained concerned about the sagacity of his

decision to treat with the Louverturian government in a way that could expose him politically. To Pickering, the architect of Dominguan-American diplomacy, the president wrote, "The whole affair leads to the independence of the West India Islands; and although I may be mistaken, it appears to me that independence is the worst and most dangerous condition they can be in, for the United States." The secretary of state, however, remained steadfastly confident in Louverture's ability and the benefits of the chosen approach for American commerce and stature. The Dominguan leader would fulfill his pledges, and bilateral commercial "intercourse will be opened in six or seven weeks" after Stevens's departure. The president came to share these views.[10]

As Stevens began his Dominguan mission, one magazine editor offered American readers a concise and adroit assessment of Louverture's complicated foreign policy. "The black king of St. Domingo, Toussaint Louverture, seems to be playing a deep game . . . but whether he will outwit his old masters [France], or Great Britain and the United States most, is still left to conjecture. While he is negotiating treaties, as an independent prince with the two latter, he still endeavors to preserve the confidence of the Directory."[11]

Historian Philippe Girard describes the disappointment of partisans on both sides of the Atlantic regarding the Dominguan general's perplexing maneuvers. "Louverture, ever autonomous, steered a middle course that stopped short of the military adventurism preached by his superiors in Paris and of the declaration of independence his American neighbors hoped for." One of Adams's most often quoted statements about Saint-Domingue captures his misgivings about Louverture's strategy: "Toussaint has evidently puzzled himself, the French government, the English cabinet, and the administration of the United States. All the rest of the world knows as little what to do with him as he knows what to do with himself."[12]

Indeed, Adams felt uneasy with Louverture's enigmatic policy moves that purposefully kept allies and enemies alike guessing about his true intentions. The president and the Dominguan commander in chief employed similarly multifarious Atlantic foreign policies to maximize their disadvantaged positions among mercantilist and military powers. As Adams criticized Louverture's lack of transparency, the president faced analogous charges at home. Members of his cabinet and his home state's congressional delegation felt betrayed and "thunderstruck" by Adams's unilateral decision to send a second peace commission to Paris at the same moment he dispatched Stevens to Cap Français. They applauded the latter move, abhorred the former. Fellow Massachusetts

native Theodore Sedgwick thought the second peace attempt a "most embarrassing and ruinous measure." According to one biographer, this act "distinctly drew the line between [Adams] and his cabinet."[13]

Adams and his administration supported Louverture's governing efforts. Still, the president considered Dominguan-American relations "problematical and precarious." One reason for Adams's sensible apprehensions regarding his cross-cultural diplomacy was that he and his administration associated with black people in a way that was unfamiliar to most eighteenth-century Americans. The government was breaking new ground in American race relations. Adams had never owned a son or daughter of Africa as property, but like most other white people in the North, the black people he had encountered as a lawyer, diplomat, and public servant had been servants, never his social or professional equals. After the American Revolution, a flurry of political and social agitation took place regarding the issue of slavery. The number of antislavery societies multiplied, and their members included such prestigious Americans as Benjamin Franklin, John Jay, and Benjamin Rush. As residents of a land professing the ideals of liberty and equality, white Americans discussed slavery in the light of an image of black people that featured misery, failure, and the absence of hope.[14]

Many white Americans opposed to the peculiar institution believed that the people of the African diaspora merited kindness, not equality. Antislavery advocates celebrated the Second Continental Congress for exhibiting "much wisdom and benevolence in advising to a total stop of the slave trade." The imaginary black man of antislavery writings in the 1790s was the "poor negro," seeking charity from inhumane white masters. The "poor negro" served the ubiquitous image of "those creatures that are placed below us [upon whom] it is truly a transgression of the laws of benevolence and humanity to put them to misery." Even Richard Allen, Lemuel Haynes, and other well-known Africans of the time appealed to white benevolence when arguing for the advancement of black people.[15]

Toussaint Louverture did not approach American officials seeking benevolent acts toward his revolutionary movement. He did not come to federal authorities hoping they would bless an antislavery petition. He sent Bunel to Adams with an offer of renewed commercial intercourse that benefited both governments. The Dominguan regime presented white American officials with an opportunity to relate with black men in a fashion that rarely, if ever, occurred elsewhere in the eighteenth-century Atlantic world. In Louverture, the presi-

dent collaborated with a governor-general of African descent who had demonstrated remarkable courage, skill, and savvy in making his way out of slavery, succeeding as a planter, and ascending through the ranks of the French military system. Throughout the 1790s, Adams had read State Department dispatches and newspaper accounts about this man of color making strides to become the only other sovereign in the Western Hemisphere.

Louverture initiated the relationship with the United States. Unlike free Africans in the northern states, who desired patronage relationships with white people as a means of advancement, Louverture could not be easily dismissed as an alien Other. He leveraged agricultural resources in exchange for imports and specie from U.S. merchants on the Eastern Seaboard. He engaged the Adams administration not with the emblematic subservience of enslaved black peoples in the southern United States but as the head of a victorious military force that conjured palpable fear within white Americans from Maryland to Georgia. The Dominguan commander in chief was unlike any other black man in the eighteenth-century Atlantic world. His revolutionary presence and achievements forced the United States and the Atlantic community to recognize that at least in the case of Saint-Domingue, they had to reckon with black peers. During a very brief period, the power structure permitted black people and white people to treat each other more like fellow human beings than was the case anywhere else on earth.

The Saint-Domingue of 1798–1801 was by no means postracial. Race remained omnipresent. But Louverture commanded the political respect and the diplomatic engagement of the international regime's most powerful leaders. Through relational dynamism and strict personal discipline, Louverture strategically situated himself and his embattled colony to attract the attention and resources of Europeans who enslaved his fellow Africans.

EDWARD STEVENS AND TOUSSAINT LOUVERTURE

After the *Kingston* landed at Cap Français on the afternoon of 18 April 1799, Stevens sought out Toussaint Louverture. Le Cap was a bustling port city with more than twenty thousand residents—about the same size as Boston. The multicultural Cap Français boasted straight, paved roads, fine squares, churches, hospitals, cafés, a theater, and brothels. Visitors during the Ancien Régime described it as the Paris of the Antilles. Stevens came ashore with the mind-set that to succeed, "I should acquire the good opinion of the General and the principal

chiefs of the colony and establish myself in their confidence." He had determined to build relationships and understand the volatile dynamics within the Louverturian leadership. He went out of his way to express the "friendly disposition of the American government toward this colony."[16]

Louverture was in Gonaïves meeting with a British agent from Jamaica when he received word of Stevens's arrival. He curtailed the meeting and returned to Le Cap the next day. Dressed in a plain, neat military uniform, the general gave Adams's shadow minister a very favorable reception at the Government Palace. In one of the large reception rooms of white marble floors and columns with Louis XVI–style furnishings, Louverture presided over an initial meeting that included Stevens; the French Directory agent, Philippe Roume; and French budget directors Jean Dumaine and Joseph Antoine Idlinger. They discussed renewed Dominguan-American commerce. Louverture was "particularly pleased, with the President's humane permission to afford a temporary supply to the colony, at a moment when it was reduced to extreme distress." Adams's political gamble to send extralegal aid to Saint-Domingue indeed encouraged the Dominguan leader and his people to look favorably toward the United States.[17]

Louverture also expressed great satisfaction at the secretary of state's letter, which underscored "the attention which had been paid to [the Dominguan leader's] letter by the Executive of the United States." He engaged Adams's *porte-parole* with keen penetration, "boldness, good sense, and candor." According to Stevens, the seasoned general negotiated with zeal and "often anticipated the remarks I was about to make in the course of our conversations." The two "agreed that a proclamation should be published immediately in which the essential points required by the Government of the United States should be acceded to."[18]

Conversely, Roume, whom Stevens had met during a previous visit, opposed the U.S. conditions and derided any British involvement. He offered a draft proclamation that "contained several offensive expressions respecting the English Nation." Stevens found the language "totally inadmissible." Roume, however, insisted, "which very much displeased General Toussaint. I saw a storm gathering which I was afraid would burst on the head of the Agent." So Stevens gave Roume a copy of his written presentation and asked him and the principal officers to consider it more carefully. Upon Louverture's cue, the meeting recessed while the French representatives considered the American offer.[19]

With no one else in the room, Louverture reached out and took Stevens's hand. "With great warmth, he expressed his approbation of the firmness I had

shown opposing" Roume's draft of the public statement. According to Stevens, Louverture "assured me that it should be modeled just as I wished." If Roume returned and continued to oppose Stevens, Louverture offered to "send him away and publish [a proclamation] himself." Stevens "begged him not to proceed to extremities."[20]

Louverture and Stevens exhibited exceptional professional and personal respect for each other, reaching across national and racial lines as they sat alone in a room together, talking on 19 April. The black man and his parents had at one time been the property of Pantaléon II de Bréda on a plantation located just miles from where they sat. This man of no formal education was intimidated or unduly influenced by no one. He had killed or outflanked both white Europeans and adversaries of color time and again on the battlefield. He made a strong impression on everyone who encountered him. The white man, his hand enveloped by that of the ebony interlocutor, represented the American president. Though Stevens was an acclaimed physician trained at one of the world's best medical schools, in this setting he was the professional and social inferior of the black Dominguan. Such dynamics and racial intimacy would not—and could not—have occurred in the United States. Shaking hands with a black person as a sign of mutual honor and respect represented a gesture unthinkable to most white Americans.

The relationship between Louverture and Stevens epitomizes the complexity of race in American society of the 1790s. Developments in the colony under Louverture and American involvement in the Saint-Dominguan Revolution sparked discussions in the print media about the place of black people in the early republic. Benjamin Davies, editor of the *Philadelphia Magazine and Review*, described the stereotypically negative view of people in the African diaspora offered by Alexander Stanislaus, Baron de Wimpffen's *A Voyage to St. Domingo* as "intelligent and instructive . . . of sober and dispassionate investigation . . . that may give rise to argument and discussion." Author and editor Charles Brockden Brown offered a literary counterpoint, presenting readers of his New York–based *Monthly Magazine, and American Review* with the latest writings of German anthropologist Johann Friedrich Blumenbach. Starting with his doctoral dissertation some twenty years earlier, Blumenbach had argued for the natural variety of humans—that black people possessed humanity apart from and not inferior to white humanity. Not only did Blumenbach inform Brown's subscribers that "the negroes are not inferior to the rest of the human race," but the anthropologist also challenged them to look beyond

stereotypes to notice that "between one negro and another, there is much difference." Brown used Blumenbach's method of comparing humans in what became a best-selling novel, *Arthur Mervyn*, in which the protagonist examines the features of a monkey, a white Dominguan, and two black Dominguans and finds some similarities among all of them.[21]

These publications, acts of Congress, and local measures involving race and slavery led to extensive discussions about what place black people should occupy in American society. Beyond an academic exercise or dinner table debate, Stevens, sitting next to Louverture in the Saint-Dominguan palace, experienced firsthand Blumenbach's proposition that "the mental faculties of the negroes are equally numerous and incontrovertible."[22]

Louverture and Roume's disagreement over the American demands was short lived. The plenary reconvened later that day with the French agent yielding to the Louverturian and American propositions. Stevens sent a coordinated statement to Philadelphia the next morning for the president's approval. The experience confirmed for Stevens and removed any lingering doubts within the Adams administration that "the whole power [of the Dominguan government] is in the hands of Toussaint who knows how to exercise it, when it is necessary." Stevens thought it crucial that U.S. officials proceed with an understanding that "this colony cannot remain long as an appendage of France. The period is not far distant when it must be forever separated from the Mother Country." Stevens's conclusions found corroboration from other ministers abroad. From Berlin, John Quincy Adams reasoned that "St. Domingo, if not yet formally asserting independence, shows a disposition that will probably soon ripen to it." From London, Rufus King continued to express "my opinion in favor of the complete independence of the island and a free trade with it."[23]

Stevens understood from the first meeting that Roume "is a mere cipher. He is suffered to maintain the appearance of authority only from political motives." However, an outright rupture between Louverture and Roume at this early stage of Stevens's embassy did not serve American interests. Stevens heeded Hamilton's advice to do "nothing that can rise up in judgment" against the administration. The Americans needed the Dominguan administration to sustain the traditional French colonial arrangement, if only for show. Louverture played the role of governor (generally a military officer who controlled island militia), while Roume was cast as the appointed intendant, in charge of the judiciary. The Americans needed Roume to sell their ruse of trade-only interests just as much as the Dominguan leaders needed him to sell theirs of *fraternité* with the

French republic. Roume's title and signature on all documents signified to the U.S. and Atlantic world audiences that all actions were initiatives of France.[24]

Louverture and Stevens emerged from their first engagements with favorable opinions of each other and the foundation for a productive working relationship. Reflecting on his initial weeks in Le Cap, Stevens believed that he had accomplished his essential objective of gaining the confidence of Louverture and the Dominguan people. The envoy explained to Pickering, "You can have no idea what an effect my arrival has produced. Before that period everything was gloomy and desponding. Since *then* everything is bustle and activity. All ranks of the inhabitants look towards America as the source of riches and plenty. The popular opinion is *now* on our side."[25]

Stevens advised Pickering that it would be impolitic to disappoint the people after all they had endured to secure emancipation. But he also acknowledged his subjective vantage point: "Excuse me, Sir, for offering my opinion. The sincere wish I feel to see harmony and friendship reestablished between the Island and America has alone dictated it." The minister's analysis and his outlook for the future of Dominguan-American relations advanced beyond purely commercial interests. He exhibited compassion and respect for Louverture's leadership and the Dominguan people. He had presented to an anxious population the positive face of American society. To this effort of public diplomacy, Saint-Dominguan people of all colors had responded with enthusiasm and renewed vigor. He did not want to disappoint people who had wrenched themselves from slavery and looked toward a future of universal emancipation and perpetual liberty.[26]

Louverture shared Stevens's positive evaluation of the American's efforts. He commended to the president Stevens's genuine interest in working to reopen bilateral commerce and the sincerity he brought to the negotiations. Louverture and Bunel echoed Stevens's appraisal of the encouraging atmosphere being cultivated among Le Cap's residents. After joining the negotiations in May 1799, Britain's Thomas Maitland expressed to Pickering "the perfect candor and fairness, with which [Stevens] has conducted himself." His performance early on in Cap Français garnered presidential praise and boosted Adams's confidence in this diplomatic path: "Dr. Stevens' letters, public and private, have opened the politics of St. Domingo in a very intelligible manner. The whole is so natural that it is easily to be believed."[27]

In the midst of the positive start to bilateral talks, Louverture retained suspicions about British intentions in the colony. In addition, the necessity of feign-

ing loyalty toward France caused him to balk at U.S. demands for a publicized ban on French naval vessels from Dominguan ports. Stevens grasped the general's sensitive position and accepted private assurances that he would quietly rid the ports of French ships. He wrote to the secretary of state, "I really believe [Louverture] will be faithful to his promises. I must therefore recommend very strongly the renewal of the commerce, and *that immediately*." The president and the cabinet, however, refused to risk a foreign policy blunder on private assurances, insisting that Louverture's administration agree to a written ban on the presence of French ships in Dominguan waters. This act, a preemptive strike toward independence, would threaten the delicate balance of the general's multifaceted agenda.[28]

After evicting the French Directory agent, Theodore Hédouville, from Saint-Domingue in October 1798, Louverture had told both friends and detractors that he had no intention of separating the colony from France. He suggested instead that enemies had plotted against him using treacherous allegations regarding independence. Louverture enlisted his friend, Julien Raimond, a member of the French Legislative Council and former Directory commissioner to Saint-Domingue, to vouch for his pledge of patriotism. When Letombe, the French consul general in Philadelphia, expressed suspicions about Bunel's highly publicized visit to the United States, Louverture countered that the mission was intended to enhance French commercial interests. But Directory officials had long distrusted his pledges of loyalty. One observer suggested skepticism in an oversimplified version of Louverture's stance: he had made up his mind to establish an independent society of black people.[29]

French officials suspected the Adams administration of collaborating with the Louverturian regime to separate Saint-Domingue from the metropole. Under the watchful eye and well-informed direction of Letombe, spies had followed the Pickering-Bunel talks in Philadelphia and gathered intelligence on the Louverture-Stevens negotiations at Le Cap. News of U.S. and British meetings with the Dominguan commander in chief only enhanced suspicions of trans-Atlantic collusion against France. Louverture's precarious position relative to Paris did not deter U.S. demands for more tangible actions to ban French vessels from Dominguan ports. On 13 June 1799, in L'Arcahaie, Louverture, Stevens, and Maitland negotiated a secret tripartite treaty that granted all of Stevens's demands, though he did not sign the agreement. Louverture pledged that "there would be no expeditions against any possessions of His Majesty or *the United States of America* by the Troops of Saint-Domingue" and that he



Figure 6. *Treaty with Haiti*, n.d. On 13 June 1799, in L'Arcahaie, Louverture, Stevens, and Maitland negotiated a secret tripartite treaty in a setting similar to the one in the image. Copyright Bettmann/Corbis/AP Images.

would "defend [British and American ships] from all French privateers arriving in the Ports of Saint-Domingue."[30]

In exchange for banning French ships, Louverture insisted on measures to secure his tenuous rule. First, he requested that all allied ships, commercial and military, enter Saint-Dominguan waters at Cap Français or Port-Républicain before proceeding to ports under his jurisdiction. The commander in chief prohibited any ships from sailing to ports on the island's south side, which remained under the control of rival general André Rigaud. Second, Louverture required all French citizens to have a passport from the U.S. government before traveling to Saint-Domingue.[31]

The encouraging Louverture-Stevens collaboration enabled President Adams, under the authority of the Intercourse Act, to proclaim Dominguan-American commercial lanes reopened as of 1 August 1799. Stevens then transitioned to a more ministerial role. Permitting his junior colleagues in Cap Français and Port-Républicain to perform consular functions, Stevens increased his access to and solidified his relationships with Dominguan administration offi-

cials. He considered General Henry Christophe, military commander of Cap Français, a person of "coolness and good sense," and the two formed a productive working relationship. Though Stevens and General Moyse, who took over the Cap Français command, remained "upon the best of terms," their collaboration lacked the warmth that the American had known with Christophe. Stevens's diplomatic reporting provided the State Department its best on-the-ground intelligence about the island's rapidly evolving political and economic situations. Over the next two years, he and Louverture cultivated a relationship that rivaled in intimacy and trust any relationship enjoyed by an American minister and a foreign leader at the turn of the nineteenth century.[32]

THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN SAINT-DOMINGUE

General Louverture owned and maintained the two-story house of European-hewn stone with a gilded wrought balcony in Cap Français that became the official residence for Stevens and his family.[33] When in town, the American representative conducted much of his business at the residence and hosted foreign guests, local merchants, and U.S. ship captains. This embassy served as Stevens's base when conducting diplomatic operations across Saint-Domingue. As a military commander overseeing ongoing campaigns, Louverture moved frequently and normally resided not in Le Cap but at his plantation home in Ennery, just outside of Gonaïves. Although he was fifty-four years old, Louverture was known for his ability to cover many miles each day on horseback. Stevens often accompanied Louverture to or met him in Gonaïves, Port-Républicain, Léogâne, L'Arcahaie, Môle Saint-Nicolas, and other towns, and he spent nights with the leader and his family at the Ennery estate.[34]

Stevens's mobile embassy, despite its peculiar and expensive implementation, proved effective. His travels with Louverture across the colony provided the American envoy with incredible access to the Dominguan leader and yielded invaluable intelligence about social and agricultural conditions beyond Cap Français. Louverture provided Stevens with copies of detailed French plans to invade Jamaica from Saint-Domingue, an enterprise that Louverture adamantly opposed. He immediately released American vessels brought as prizes into Dominguan ports. Inspired by his time with Louverture, Stevens reported to Pickering, "I have the most perfect confidence in the attachment of Toussaint to the Government of the United States."[35]

Trips across wartime Saint-Domingue possessed risks. On one occasion,

Louverture summoned Stevens to a meeting in Léogâne. With the minister onboard the schooner USS *Experiment*, strongly armed barges bearing some five hundred Rigaudian pirates attacked the convoy in the Bay of Léogâne, where calm waters hindered the maneuvering of the larger U.S. ships. A fierce battle raged from morning until evening, during which time the enemy staged three daring assaults. The *Experiment* prevailed, killing scores of Rigaud's men, but not before the enemy captured two U.S. ships and killed an American captain.[36]

The Louverture-Stevens conference in Léogâne served an important political objective. During Louverture's extended absence from Le Cap, detractors of Dominguan-American diplomacy convinced him to question the U.S. commitment to his cause. En route to the meeting, Stevens wrote to Pickering, "I am at present bound to Léogâne to have a conference with General Toussaint on the various arrangements between this colony and the United States. I find an interview with him absolutely necessary. Much intrigue has been used and every engine set at work by the enemies of the United States to detach him from our government but in vain. I have no doubt that I shall arrange everything with him in the most amicable manner as soon as I can see him."[37]

After reaching Léogâne, Stevens explained to Louverture the president's firm but complicated foreign policy strategy regarding Saint-Domingue. "I tried to impress strongly on his mind that the arrangements made with St. Domingo were of a particular kind, adapted to the local situation and present political state of the colony, that [the U.S. administration] regarded it as altogether unconnected with any other country, and that an actual state of hostility might take place between France and America, without occasioning the least interruption of harmony between him and the Government of the United States."[38]

Louverture accepted Stevens's message, telling the American minister that despite attempts by others, "my confidence in you never wavered . . . and nothing will change that." In a separate meeting, Louverture commended Stevens's diplomatic style: "You have shown abundant interest in the reestablishment of order in this colony and [I] have not doubted for one instant your sincerity. . . . No one has been more just in their dealings concerning our secret treaty than you." In contrast, the British, cosigners of the tripartite treaty, had worked to weaken Louverture's government. But Adams's envoy, Louverture said, had "no need to present me with greater evidence of your interest" in Saint-Domingue's success "than you have already given me. . . . [Y]ou have assured me, because you have shown your interest in me by your deeds."[39]

Stevens's extraordinary cross-cultural diplomacy netted him valuable trust,

access, and a comprehension of Toussaint Louverture unmatched by any American. His successor, Lear, noted, "I have no doubt but Dr. Stevens possesses more knowledge of the true state of things here than almost any other man." Stevens understood Louverture's motives and objectives and witnessed firsthand the challenges of governing an embattled, multiracial, formerly enslaved population amid a revolution. His close proximity convinced the American that Louverture was the person to lead a productive, independent Saint-Domingue.[40]

Stevens also believed that the United States could broker lasting partnerships with Louverture: "I am convinced, were his power uncontrolled, he would exercise it in protecting commerce, encouraging agriculture and establishing useful regulations for the internal government of the colony." The minister characterized Louverture's administration not as a tyrannical, dictatorial junta but as a leadership model that instilled confidence in Saint-Domingue's frightened and unsettled people: "He is a man of great humanity, good sense, and integrity."[41]

Noticeably missing from Stevens's analysis of his extended time with Louverture are references to color. In the American's eyes, Louverture was a capable governor, not a capable black governor. Throughout his tenure, Stevens advised President Adams to prepare to support and collaborate with a sovereign Louverture, creating a partnership that would last well into the nineteenth century.

DOMINGUAN-AMERICAN TRADE

The Adams administration's diplomacy yielded the desired commercial objectives for the United States as well as Saint-Domingue. Saint-Domingue gave the United States an Atlantic market where it possessed commercial advantage over Britain. For Louverture, Dominguan-American trade accomplished immediate economic priorities—first, maintaining freedom, and, second, keeping the upper ranks of the army satisfied. Louverture used his new alliance with the United States to underwrite the first objective and, by implementing a pragmatic, controversial domestic agenda, to meet the second.[42]

Louverture's governing ambitions rested on his capacity to safeguard the emancipation of Saint-Domingue's black population. He and most observers reasoned that securing freedom required preparing the island's military for the eventual French invasion and attempt to restore slavery. Secretary Pickering shared the Dominguans' fear of French intrigue and believed that Louverture would expend every available resource to repel any attempt at reenslavement. Adams's proclamation to renew Dominguan-American commerce legitimized

bilateral trade and provided the Dominguan government access to much-needed foreign funds to finance its defense strategy.[43]

Over the next twenty-one months, commercial activity helped to restore tranquility to the island. In accordance with Louverture's domestic political and social agenda, his initiative with Adams worked "to promote the happiness and prosperity" of Saint-Domingue. Dominguan merchants exchanged the island's rich agricultural products for American specie and munitions. The growth of Dominguan government coffers from export and import duties was "amazing." Just prior to the tripartite treaty of 1799, a Cap Français writer lamented eying only "twenty small barks" in the harbor when "I used to count twelve or fifteen hundred large ships at anchor in the road." In the year following the Adams proclamation, nearly eighteen hundred American and British ships offloaded and took on cargo in Dominguan ports.[44]

All of this economic activity did not restore the island's commerce to its phenomenal prerevolutionary levels, but in the first year that Dominguan-American commerce reopened, the number of U.S. vessels surpassed the oft-cited benchmark of six hundred U.S. ships that visited Saint-Domingue in 1796. Within the first three weeks of renewed bilateral trade, Letombe felt it necessary to inform Paris about the increased number of American and British ships embarking from U.S. ports for Cap Français and Port-Républicain. Louverture's high-risk Atlantic diplomacy yielded worthwhile returns in light of the fact that Dominguan export agriculture was virtually dead when he took office. American diplomacy and trade from 1799 to 1801 stabilized the Louverturian regime, financed economic restoration programs, and bankrolled military preparations against the looming French invasion. The involvement of private traders and shippers—and the federal government—in the Saint-Dominguan Revolution on the side of black revolutionaries represented a complex financial strategy.[45]

Americans from both the North and the South traded with Saint-Domingue. Opponents and proponents of slavery participated financially in the colony's stride toward freedom. They supported the diasporic political initiatives based on their trust that the Louverturian regime offered potential earnings. Eighteenth-century U.S. merchants traded with friend and foe alike to make a profit. They saw in Louverture a man with extraordinary military talent, a desire to govern, and the ability to execute trade policies from which they could net handsome gains. Profit motive inspired both proslavery and antislavery action. Atlantic slaveholders defended African enslavement to guarantee economies of scale, while free white laborers supported racial discrimination for job

security. Likewise, profit from the Dominguan-American exchange motivated merchants across regions to trade with black revolutionaries, knowing that each transaction contributed to their move toward universal emancipation. Their commercial engagement represented a profiteering-led and in many cases coincidental abolitionary effort. Beyond the moral impulses of well-intentioned white Americans and Europeans who sought to assist black people out of bondage, Dominguans manipulated the Atlantic world market to secure their own freedom.

By the close of the eighteenth century, Dominguans of color did not solicit white people's affirmation of their right to be free and treated as equals. The revolutionaries had purchased their freedom and their rights through war. To secure these gains in the face of the predictable European menace, the Louverturian regime employed the political, diplomatic, and economic principles practiced by white Atlantic administrations. Louverture and his people did not need the Americans' abolitionist philosophy. They needed American money and weapons.

Louverture sustained successful trade relations and unified his fragile government by establishing a pragmatic, controversial economic policy that focused on rebuilding the island's agricultural infrastructure. Years of war throughout had destroyed plantations, and death and emigration had drained the colony of the members of the planter class who had managed the expansive crop production and distribution networks. The emancipation of 1793 had dismantled the chattel labor system overnight and left once-prosperous fields fallow and untended. Atlantic merchants and shippers had found other markets. Spanish Cuba replaced Saint-Domingue as the major supplier of the U.S. sugar market.[46]

Louverture had been a planter and slave owner prior to the revolution, a vantage point that enabled him to understand the importance of an agricultural sector to the security of his government and survival of his colony. In this way, he and other Dominguan leaders thought much like U.S. leaders shortly after the American Revolution. And like the United States, if Saint-Domingue could not maintain its economic independence, it would lose its political autonomy and any hope of political independence. Therefore, Louverture's domestic recovery plan focused almost exclusively on agriculture. This strategy, however, raised two disturbingly complex questions. First, how could a black-led government optimally recruit and employ the innovative brain trust of white former planters and émigrés after evicting them and confiscating their property? Second, how could the freedom of formerly enslaved black peoples be affirmed

while productively engaging them as free laborers on their former plantations under the supervision of their former enslavers?

Louverture's economic plan was, according to one scholar, "la poule aux œufs d'or du pays" (the hen that laid the golden eggs for the country). To engage former white plantation owners and managers in rebuilding the colony's economy, those who had remained during the revolution were permitted to retain their former plantations and to secure larger tracts. Moreover, Louverture sought to entice planters who had emigrated to return and oversee the reconstruction of a modified plantation system, enabling him to put to use their knowledge of crop production, marketing, distribution, fiscal administration, and foreign trade.[47]

Louverture had practiced a form of white planter–focused policy since the revolution's early days. To counter published accounts of horror and violence against white Dominguan residents, the regime placed positive stories in Atlantic newspapers regarding Louverture's solid character and respectful treatment of loyal civilians. He offered clemency to émigrés even though French policy called for émigrés who had supported the British invasion of Saint-Domingue to be considered traitors and the Directory punished them harshly. Rigaud accused Louverture of conspiring "with these enemies of France and receiving their ships into the ports under his territorial control." Promises of clemency and an economic recovery increased Louverture's credibility among white residents of the Atlantic world. Newspapers in Italy reported the general's incentives for émigrés to return under his protection, and the British representative in Saint-Domingue confirmed that "the white people that remained or have returned . . . have experienced as far as I learn or perceive, good treatment. . . . [A] considerable number are in possession (under certain restrictions), of their former properties." The new plantation-style regime also provided wealth to black military officers who owned vast tracts of land. Louverture and Generals Henry Christophe and Jean-Jacques Dessalines earned more than one hundred thousand francs per year and possessed multiple landholdings.[48]

The second part of the plantation plan cost Louverture support among the general black populace. He imposed a military-style regime with a firm chain of command. Generals of color took control of economic production in their military districts, with white planters assuming the role of noncommissioned officers. Black cultivators were for all intents and purposes draftees. According to Louverture's *arrêté*, "Plantation managers and directors and workers are re-

quired to carry out their responsibilities with precision, submission, and obedience, just like soldiers."[49]

The decree ordered black cultivators to remain on plantations and work the fields. They could not seek other employment or relocate without permission. Those caught escaping were arrested or placed in active army regiments. Each district commander held the planters in his area accountable for the ill conduct of workers on their plantations. Louverture implemented his labor regime like the general he was, commanding his nonmilitary troops and expecting their loyalty and obedience. Government officials and generals who did not execute these orders efficiently answered "to me personally."[50]

Louverture explained to Dominguans that safeguarding the freedom of all required him to curtail personal liberties. He tried to show disgruntled black laborers the precarious nature of their political and economic situation: "Just as an infant must learn to walk, it is necessary that you remain on your plantations and work productively." Agricultural work was the engine and protector of liberty.[51]

In 1793, while ascending to his leadership position, Louverture had proclaimed, "I want liberty and equality to reign in Saint-Domingue." As general in chief, he asked the public to understand his imposition of civil and military authority to increase agricultural production and to attract Atlantic trade: "The duties of my role require me to impose such obligations, and the *security of liberty* demands it." Scholars view Louverture's commercial policy as placing "the economic viability of Saint-Domingue above the criterion of universal emancipation." Louverture also may have understood that the emerging Saint-Dominguan society of color, in an Atlantic world hostile to its existence, required economic viability to safeguard universal emancipation.[52]

Louverture's policy of forced black labor, hardly distinguishable from slavery, affirmed his white American detractors' arguments against African freedom. Albert Gallatin maintained that "slaves just emancipated . . . if altogether independent, are by no means likely to apply themselves to the peaceable cultivation of the country, but will try to continue to live, as heretofore, by plunder and depredations." Dessalines, Louverture's deputy, supported the strict labor policies and made Gallatin's argument more succinctly: "Blacks don't know how to work if you don't force them."[53]

Louverture governed and grew the economy despite his jaundiced views that "since the Revolution, some people have [mistakenly] understood that freedom

was the right to remain lazy, to do evil with impunity, to scorn the Law, and to follow only their whims." Many black Dominguans resisted their leader's labor and migration ordinances, leaving Louverture in the untenable position of trying to harness the energies and expectations of liberty within a society of free black people that he had helped to bring about. He and the members of the former master class had to grapple with an empowered black population that did not sanguinely follow the directives to forfeit their personal freedom, including those ordering them to turn over the plantations of which they had only recently gained control and considered reparations for their past servitude.[54]

White residents of the Atlantic world applauded the Louverturian economy. His preferential treatment of émigrés and his respect for the rights of white Americans made a positive impression on the United States. From Port-Républicain, U.S. consul Robert Ritchie informed American readers that Louverture's leadership "has opened to us a communication with a rich country. I flatter myself our trade will be greatly benefitted." Such public praise for the Dominguan leader indeed prompted the return of many émigrés, including those who had sought refuge in the United States. However, the process of reinserting white planters into the majority-black agricultural society encountered problems. Returnees often found obstacles to reclaiming their property. John Thomas Carré, who had emigrated from Cap Français in 1793, faced these frustrations when he returned to Saint-Domingue as Edward Stevens's secretary in hopes of regaining his family's coffee estate. He ultimately left again for Philadelphia after failing in his efforts.[55]

Despite the volatility of the Louverturian recovery, the controversial economic plan had its intended effect. The colony as a whole benefited from the restoration of agricultural viability and the period of peace over which Louverture presided. He became accepted on the island and around the Atlantic world as the "legislator, pontiff, and sovereign" of Saint-Domingue.[56]

THE U.S. EMERGENCE IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD

The federal government's affirmation of Louverture's military, political, and economic successes—evidenced more clearly through Edward Stevens's diplomacy—provided a market within the Atlantic world wherein, for at least a couple of years, the United States enjoyed a preferential position over its European rivals. The tripartite treaty barred French armed and merchant vessels from Dominguan waters. Great Britain remained the absolute military power

in the Western Hemisphere, but the administration in Philadelphia, the U.S. embassy in Saint-Domingue, and American merchants cultivated a bilateral relationship of trust that outflanked British naval prowess. Stevens's closeness to Louverture induced the Dominguans to favor American trade.

At the same time, the Dominguan leader's distrust of British intentions regarding Saint-Domingue, which dated back to the British invasion of 1793, steadily deepened. After five years of fierce battles against His Majesty's forces, Louverture did not perceive the British as honest partners. They published the secret Louverture-Maitland armistice of August 1798 to weaken his domestic authority and undermine his pledges of loyalty to the metropole, an action, according to Stevens, that "injured Toussaint," who never forgave this betrayal. The Dominguans refused a permanent British agent, leaving the American representative to superintend much of Britain's commerce on the island.[57]

President Adams cautioned his cabinet that "the hopes of our merchants of great profit from the trade will be found too sanguine." He desired that the United States "do nothing [in Saint-Domingue] without the consent, concert, and cooperation of the British government." Adams, like Louverture, did not trust the British, but the U.S. president simply could not afford a confrontation with London over Saint-Domingue while he desperately sought peace with France. Therefore, the State Department repeatedly instructed Stevens to insist that Louverture work with Maitland, a requirement that created one of the few areas of tension between Louverture and Stevens.[58]

British intrigue on Saint-Domingue threatened Louverture's domestic support. He steadfastly refused to put Britain on equal footing with the United States. Stevens, who had at one time believed that "the views of Great Britain are exactly similar to those of the United States respecting this Colony," eventually saw—as Louverture had long before—that the British hoped to use their involvement in Dominguan affairs to keep Louverture weakened.[59]

The British had no intention of honoring the spirit of the tripartite treaty and in fact planned to use it to expand their hegemony in the Caribbean. They continued to molest both American and Dominguan vessels. Free trade would strengthen the United States and Saint-Domingue in the Atlantic mercantilist system, and Britain preferred that they remain in the weakened category reserved for Barbary deys: "nettlesome but useful." While seeming to cooperate with the United States, the British government planned to manipulate Louverture's embattled position to block American expansion in the West Indies. London had used this strategy effectively against American shipping in the

Mediterranean by allowing the Algerine fleet to be fitted in British ports and by giving these vessels the run of the English coastline to capture American ships.[60]

From the outset of U.S. engagement in the Saint-Dominguan Revolution, Adams's cabinet secretaries disagreed with his assessment that "the commerce of the island is not worth to us the risk of any dispute with [the British]." They saw Saint-Domingue as a viable economic battleground on which to elevate U.S. standing in the Atlantic world. Pickering crafted the Dominguan policy based on the belief that "the American commerce is to be on a footing equally free with that of the British." Navy Secretary Benjamin Stoddert countered Adams with the argument that "the vast importance of securing the West India Trade now and laying a good foundation for it in the future is so strong, that I almost consider it treason to employ a vessel elsewhere which can be employed in the West Indies." Treasury Secretary Oliver Wolcott understood that the British intended to exclude the United States from the lucrative Dominguan trade. Undaunted by such threats to American commerce, he suggested that it was "important not to miss the opportunity of extending the commerce and influence of the United States, and thereby impairing the European system in respect to colonies."[61]

Despite his pronouncements of prudence, the president fully endorsed his cabinet's assessment of Dominguan trade and the British. Instructing Pickering to work with the British, the president admitted that "my opinion is, that if the Powers of St. Domingo will not admit British ships of war or commerce into their port, the British government ought to be contented with sufficient assurances of the neutrality of that island, during the war between England & France, and not insist on defeating the connection between the United States & St. Domingo." Adams understood that Saint-Domingue presented him with a unique opportunity to equalize American power with that of the British in at least one spot on the globe. In the Atlantic fight for dominance in Saint-Domingue, all parties—American, French, British, and Dominguan—employed shifting levels of ruse and deceit. In this case, Adams effectively used diplomatic savvy to offset British military supremacy.[62]

Great Britain underestimated the geopolitical dexterity of its weaker partners, the United States and Saint-Domingue. In part, British officials misjudged the importance of Saint-Domingue to the Atlantic positioning of the United States and the energy that the Adams administration would expend to gain the upper hand there. Pickering confidently conveyed to King that in Saint-Dominguan relations, "We fear no rivals. Toussaint respects the British; he is

attached to us; he knows our position, but a few days' sail from St. Domingo, and the promptitude with which we can supply his wants." Accordingly, the first months of renewed Dominguan-American commerce affirmed and exceeded the cabinet's economic assessments. Within weeks of reopening bilateral trade, Stoddert reported to the president, "The object of our arrangement with Toussaint was to come in for a share with the British of the trade of Santo Domingo. The British [however] seem entirely excluded . . . and ships belonging to the French which were not to be suffered to enter the ports now sail under the protection of our Consul."[63]

Edward Corbett, the British agent who shuttled between Jamaica and Port-Républicain, reported as much to his home office: "In regard to the trade of this island, which is not inconsiderable, I have observed that the Americans, it appears to me, have acquired a degree of ascendancy that perhaps it was not originally intended they should enjoy, and while it not only militates against the fair pretensions and interests of the British trader, it gives them a degree of political influence which I do not hold it altogether proper they should possess." With incredulity, Corbett stated plainly the British views regarding Anglo-American cooperation in Saint-Domingue: "We should be principals in the business, and that [the Americans] should feel they are solely indebted to British connection for the benefits they derive from a certain freedom of commerce."[64]

At the close of the eighteenth century, Saint-Domingue represented the only place in the world where the United States held a political and economic advantage over the Atlantic powers. By the time of his annual address to Congress in 1799, the sometimes-reticent president acknowledged the commercial success of his risky Dominguan diplomacy. He used the occasion to address complaints by "friends of the government" who continued to consider irreconcilable "the project of renewal of commerce with the island" and his renewed mission to France. Helping to prepare the speech, Wolcott advised Adams that Louverture "has hitherto fulfilled his promises to the United States." With these thoughts in mind, the president ascended the dais at Congress Hall on 3 December 1799. With both Houses assembled and seated, he gave the last annual presidential address in Philadelphia. He announced that after the Dominguan government had given his administration assurances "that our commercial intercourse with some ports in the island of St. Domingo might safely be renewed, I took such steps as seemed to me expedient to ascertain that point [and] the result being satisfactory, I then . . . directed the restraints and prohibitions of that intercourse to be discontinued." The speech offered troubling accounts regarding his

controversial mission to France and continued British depredations on American trade. Saint-Domingue provided a much-needed bright spot in the year's tally of foreign affairs: "Since the renewal of [Dominguan-American] intercourse our citizens trading to those ports, with their property, have been duly respected, and privateering from those ports has ceased."[65]

The president's report on Dominguan-American commerce received a warm reception from the House of Representatives, which had passed the Intercourse Act only months earlier: "We learn, with pleasure, that our citizens, with their property, trading to those ports of St. Domingo with which commercial intercourse has been renewed, have been duly respected." The federal government's positive and profitable experiences with an emerging state of black citizens briefly supplanted the persistent print media story line of Dominguan horror and bloodshed. This positive spin on Dominguan-American relations resulted from Edward Stevens's work in Saint-Domingue. His close relationship with Louverture and intimate knowledge of the island's politics led him to advocate a more expansive American policy on which future and more permanent relations could thrive. Administration officials in Philadelphia concurred. Accomplishing this objective, however, would require a commitment of additional resources and white American personnel who could work closely with diasporic Africans as equals.[66]

CHAPTER FIVE

Allied Command

"Willing to Serve General Toussaint"

> I have given strict orders that understanding and intelligence may exist amongst all cruising vessels.
> —General Toussaint Louverture, 1800

On 11 July 1799, the cutter captained by Silas Talbot left the U.S. frigate *Constitution* moored in Boston Harbor to make the ten-mile journey to Quincy Bay. The seaman from Rhode Island arrived shortly thereafter at Peacefield, the lovely eleven-room home of President John Adams and his wife, Abigail. Talbot confidently approached the front door, dressed in his crisp blue jacket with tails and a double row of gold buttons and his splendid white breeches. The cocked hat tucked under his arm brushed Abigail's lilac bushes. The robust sailor cut an impressive figure as he entered the narrow entryway. He knew full well why the president had invited him to dinner.

Captain Talbot wore the subject of the dinner meeting on his shoulder: two gold epaulets identifying him as one of only six captains in the U.S. Navy. At Adams's insistence only a little over a year earlier, Congress had established the Department of the Navy. From the onset, one of the stickier issues concerned seniority. The question of whether Talbot or Thomas Truxtun should receive the third rank caused much division. Truxtun, a public hero who had captured the French privateer *L'Insurgente* just months before, convinced the secretaries of the Navy, State, War, and Treasury Departments that he should rank third and threatened to resign over the matter. Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Stoddert awarded Truxtun the coveted rank.[1]

Two days before his afternoon arrival at Peacefield, Talbot sent Adams a respectful ultimatum. He dutifully acknowledged his appreciation that he had received "command of so fine a ship as the *Constitution*." Yet he maintained,

"I will freely relinquish my present station and retire to private life if there is a desire, from political or any other motives, to place Captain Truxtun over me." This position presented a problem for Adams's Dominguan diplomacy. The administration's plan called for the navy to complement State Department outreach efforts toward Toussaint Louverture's government. The president committed the vast majority of a very small navy to the West Indies in support of accelerated trade.[2]

Adams took a strong interest in the American flagship off Cap Français. Which commander would protect trade and enhance bilateral relations? The dinner at Peacefield, where the president spent the summer recesses, would resolve the issue of command. If Talbot could not make the trip to Quincy, the president suggested, "I will meet you anywhere." The urgent request underscored the importance of the *Constitution*'s pending mission and Adams's insistence on Talbot at the ship's helm.[3]

For Talbot, the Peacefield dinner involved both military rank and personal honor. For Adams, the meeting concerned the future of the navy and the execution of his foreign policy toward Saint-Domingue. The two men sat together at the modest dining room table, and they likely talked about subjects common to New Englanders. Both had been born in Massachusetts, though Talbot later settled in Rhode Island. During the American Revolution, Talbot notched victories in several coastal skirmishes against British sloops and sustained severe injuries while commanding a fireship. In 1781, Talbot became a prisoner of war in Britain and sought assistance from Adams, then an American minister in France. Adams could not gain Talbot's release but sent him ten pounds from Adams's own pocket. In 1796, George Washington and Timothy Pickering appointed Talbot as agent for impressed seamen in the West Indies. During his two-year tenure, he traveled throughout the region, including Saint-Domingue, engaging hostile, recalcitrant British officials. He returned to the United States in 1798, when the newly established Department of the Navy offered him a command.[4]

Like Edward Stevens, Adams's de facto minister to the Louverturian government, Talbot possessed experience working in the West Indies in general and Saint-Domingue in particular, and this experience made him Adams's choice over Truxtun: "Truxtun is a new man in the service of the United States. Talbot has served them very long." After gaining the commander in chief's assurance of his rank and honor, the splendidly dressed officer left the dinner at Peacefield

Figure 7. USS *Constitution*, late nineteenth century. The world's oldest commissioned warship afloat, subsequently nicknamed Old Ironsides during the War of 1812, served as the flagship of the U.S. Navy at the Saint-Dominguan station from 1799 to 1800. Courtesy USS *Constitution* Museum, Boston.

to prepare his ship for the sea. Two weeks later, Adams sat in the corner of his upstairs study at the beautifully inlaid desk he had brought back from France and wrote a detailed letter informing Navy Secretary Benjamin Stoddert that the president had defied Stoddert and the rest of the cabinet on the matter of seniority among navy captains. Adams then went to his bedroom window to watch the *Constitution* sail down Boston Harbor in the noonday sun. A southwesterly breeze caught the topsails of the mainmast 220 feet above the deck, propelling the frigate east past the lighthouse. Commodore Silas Talbot, the president's man, steered the two-hundred-foot frigate to take up its position as the American flagship at the newly established Saint-Dominguan station.[5]

Adams allotted a major role for the newly minted navy in advancing American foreign policy objectives in Saint-Domingue. During the previous six months, he had dispatched a full squadron of armed vessels to take up positions around the island. The ships' captains cooperated with Stevens and collaborated with Dominguan officials to support Louverturian efforts to end the crippling civil war. Beyond their orders from Philadelphia, white officers dined in the home of a black official and presented Louverture with naval salutes of honor customarily reserved for Atlantic world leaders. Black and white Atlantic officers worked together in unprecedented fashions to stabilize and secure Louverture's government.

THE INFANT NAVY AS THE STRONG ARM OF DIPLOMACY

On 15 October 1799, the forty-four-gun *Constitution* arrived off the coast of Cap Français with a crew of five hundred sailors and marines. Commodore Talbot had never commanded a flotilla the size of the ten-warship Dominguan squadron. Within days, he met with the acting commodore and other captains to receive initial briefings. He learned that on 18 June, General André Rigaud and a southern Dominguan force of more than four thousand men had struck the first blow in what became a yearlong civil war. Several weeks later, Rigaud published a kind of declaration of war, citing the renewed Dominguan-American commerce as treacherous on the grounds that the United States "held hostile views toward the French Republic and supported the schemes of the British." Within days of the attacks, Stevens informed Philadelphia of these events and reassured concerned American leaders regarding Louverture's eventual victory: "When he commences his operations the contest will be but short . . . he is too powerful." Dispatches from Letombe's spies in Cap Français confirmed

Stevens's assessment. The French consul sent some discouraging news to Paris: "We conclude that this war, that this colony, is lost forever."[6]

The United States had long decided which side it would back in the intra-colonial clash, taking a stark binary view of the choice between two potential Dominguan leaders. On the one hand, the United States could not support Rigaud, who "would deluge the country with blood to accomplish [his rise to power], and slaughter indiscriminately white[s], blacks, and even the leading chiefs of his own colour." On the other hand, Louverture "is desirous of being confirmed in his authority by the united efforts of all the inhabitants, whose friend and protector he wishes to be considered." The American government looked upon him as "mild and humane," as someone who believed that "the authority he himself possesses is justly merited by the services he has rendered the colony." The United States affirmed and shared Louverture's self-assessment through its unequivocal support for his government in the Dominguan civil war—and more significantly in the larger Saint-Dominguan Revolution.[7]

The American contribution to the Louverture-Rigaud conflict vividly illustrates direct U.S. support for the revolutionary Dominguan regime. American merchants, more than the British who oversaw Jamaica's security, provided the northern Dominguan military with weapons. Treaty agreements with Great Britain prohibited the U.S. federal government from directly shipping arms to Saint-Domingue, but entrepreneurs such as Stephen Higginson endured great risk to profit from supplying Louverturian forces with much-needed armaments. For Higginson, "to furnish Toussaint with the means to suppress Rigaud, appears evidently for the interest of our Country." Philadelphia shipowner James Yard admitted sending "large quantities of arms and ammunition to Toussaint." Letombe cited the Americans' supply of "cannons, powder, and cannonballs" as evidence of U.S. support for Louverture in the civil war. According to Letombe, to achieve hegemony in Saint-Domingue, the U.S. Navy repaired Louverture's vessels and captured French ships supporting Rigaud.[8]

The Adams administration continued to cloak its diplomacy in the language of commerce. Yet the collaboration between allied military commanders and the extent to which the United States assisted the Louverturian military point to a more involved policy. To protect American trade—the primary rationale for U.S. involvement in the revolution—the U.S. Navy could have remained offshore, convoying merchantmen through dangerous passages and taking French privateers. Cursory communication between American commanders and Dominguan leaders would not have hampered the navy's capacity to safeguard

U.S. commerce. But the administration's orders to navy commanders from the beginning of Dominguan diplomacy called not only for protecting American commerce but also for cultivating harmony with Toussaint Louverture, his government, and the colony's largely African population. To protect the bilateral relationship and the revolutionary government with which the United States had forged trust and amicable collaboration, along with profitable commerce, the president authorized the use of military force.

The navy secretary had given Talbot a two-part mandate: protect American shipping and improve Dominguan-American political relations. He set out to give as much attention to the second part of his orders as to the first. On 20 December 1799, a beautifully clear day filled with fresh sea breezes, Stevens took a small craft out of Le Cap bay to the *Constitution*, which sat twenty miles offshore. The two men met in the commodore's stateroom and discussed at length ways to collaborate among themselves. They brainstormed ideas to assist Louverture in his war with Rigaud. After several such discussions, Stevens developed a high regard for Talbot as "so candid, so prudent and liberal that I am convinced that he will do everything that can contribute to the good of the service and for supporting the dignity and interest of the United States. It is a happy circumstance for me to have a man of his character to cooperate with."[9]

The initial Talbot-Stevens meetings portended the two men as an effectual foreign policy team. Each of their respective bosses at the Departments of Navy and State, who worked well together, had told his man to trust the other fully to advance American interests in Saint-Domingue. Stoddert encouraged his captain to work with Adams's minister, though "Doctor Stevens as you observe, has a difficult part to act and may be obliged to temporize and to do things not warranted by the arrangement with Toussaint." The secretary assured Talbot that he need not fear reprimand for unorthodox initiatives taken in the interest of the United States. The commodore possessed the president's "approbation of your measures and his entire confidence in your judgment to execute properly the difficult service assigned you."[10]

The cordial and confident working relationship between the American officials in Saint-Domingue spawned an unprecedented and regular three-way communication among Talbot, Stevens, and Louverture. They coordinated U.S. naval operations to circumvent the efforts of their two common enemies in the Dominguan civil war: Rigaud and the British. General Rigaud's resourceful fighters continued to capture American merchant ships. To defeat the south

Dominguan military required Louverture and Stevens to renegotiate sections of the tripartite treaty during a January 1800 meeting at Léogâne. The new agreement permitted the Louverturian navy to arm and expand its inventory of ships, two provisions prohibited under the original pact. The U.S. Navy also began to permit Louverture's vessels to cruise the coasts of Saint-Domingue.[11]

These ad hoc policy adjustments seemingly undermined early arguments by the administration in favor of Dominguan-American relations, which posited that disarming the Louverturian navy secured the shores of the southern United States. American officials in Philadelphia initially balked at the proposals to allow expansion of the Louverturian navy but eventually reached the same conclusion as their representatives on the ground in Saint-Domingue: more direct U.S. naval engagement in the Dominguan civil war was required.

The Royal Navy repeatedly confiscated Louverturian armed vessels with the goal of crippling Louverture's fighting capacity and slowing the growth of American influence in the western Atlantic. After several tours on station, Captain Alexander Murray of the USS *Constellation* reported, "We have no enemy so much to be shunned in this quarter, as the British, for they blockade all the passages, and let few of our vessels pass them." Murray noted that British admiral Sir Hyde Parker engineered this adversarial policy toward the American and Louverturian governments. In fact, Parker and the British governor of Jamaica, Lord Balcarres, deliberately worked to undermine the tripartite treaty.[12]

The navy secretary did not try to direct Saint-Domingue station operations from Philadelphia: "It is impossible to foresee from this Country at what particular spots, our vessels can be employed with most advantage." Stoddert empowered decision making at the station level and trusted Talbot's judgment, telling him, "You must consider yourself at full liberty at all times to follow your own judgment in employing the vessels under your command." For months prior to the commodore's arrival, Louverture and Stevens had requested that U.S. ships cruise the southern coasts to intercept aid to Rigaud. By the spring of 1800, the city of Jacmel had become a Rigaudian stronghold and the linchpin of south Dominguan resistance. To succeed, Louverture desperately needed to take the town. Stoddert informed Talbot of the new appreciation in Philadelphia that "the machinations against Toussaint seem to be increasing" and acquiesced to the need for more direct naval engagement in the Saint-Dominguan Revolution.[13]

JOINT COMMAND IN DOMINGUAN WATERS

Talbot took a liberal approach to advancing the administration's policy regarding Dominguan-American relations. He deployed his squadron to give the north Dominguan forces maximum assistance. Beyond Philadelphia's expectations, Talbot took the unprecedented step of placing white American naval captains under the orders of a black allied commander. In late January 1800, he instructed Captain Christopher Raymond Perry to take the USS *General Greene* to southern Saint-Domingue. Perry was to disrupt Rigaud's shipping lanes, which were used by a considerable number of American merchant vessels. Talbot cautioned Perry to avoid capturing Louverturian vessels "or do any one thing that may justly give cause to disturb the harmony between [Louverture] and the people of the United States." Beyond the limited scope of the written instructions, Perry and the *General Greene*'s crew correctly understood that "we were ordered by Commodore Talbot to make a cruise round Hispaniola . . . for the purpose of aiding General Toussaint in the capture of Jacmel."[14]

Perry rendezvoused with the Louverturian navy in the southern waters. There, Louverture planned a land assault on Jacmel and enlisted Perry's ship to provide coordinated cover fire from the harbor. The Dominguan general planned the attack; the American captain followed his orders. On the morning of 27 February 1800, as Louverture led two thousand north Dominguan troops against General Alexandre Pétion's entrenched army, Perry ordered the *General Greene*'s guns to "engage three of Rigaud's forts warmly for 30 or 40 minutes." The allied attack drove the Rigaudian army from its last stronghold. Talbot and Perry employed an American warship in the U.S. Navy's first military action on behalf of a foreign ally.[15]

The significance of this American military first comes from its timing. The U.S. federal government committed military assistance to a black revolutionary movement intent on universal emancipation at a time when white Americans wrestled with questions of enlightened republican slavery and believed in the innate inferiority of Africans. Around the same time that Captain Perry collaborated with Louverture, one writer believed that "in America, the current of opinion sits strongly against negro servitude" and that "the fundamental rules of our government have a real or apparent hostility with every species of slavery." Even though many Americans opposed slavery in 1800, Adams administration officials recognized the strength and savvy of slavery and of proponents of racial inequality. Many white Americans, like newspaper editor William

Corbett, decried the efforts of "philanthropic dreamers [to] tell us that we are all men, and all made by the same Almighty hand." Corbett and those who shared his views "never shall believe that whites and negroes were intended to live upon an equality with each other."[16]

Even with the President's House and the majority control of Congress, the Federalist Party, which boasted prominent antislavery proponents, had to contend with the real limits of government authority to influence American racial debates. One American "philanthropic dreamer" writing as "Z" shared his vision of a valley, "full of people of all colours, ages, sizes, and descriptions," in which each burdened traveler could reach a brighter setting if he or she would "bear ye one another's burdens." Z saw only a small number of white Americans willing to assist the Africans in the valley. Yet "as the numbers of those generous helpers increased, I felt a comfortable hope, that before all the blacks got out of the valley, the whites would fairly divide the burden, and the loads would be effectually lightened." The writer believed that a window for constructive discussions of race in the United States remained open. The lines drawn involving slavery and racial politics were not yet nearly as fixed as they would be following the Missouri Compromise of 1820.[17]

Some U.S. government and military officials were willing to carry out Adams's diplomacy and share the geopolitical burden of black Dominguans within the Atlantic world. These Americans, not altogether dreamers, understood well the liberality of the policy. They participated in the Saint-Dominguan Revolution. The Caribbean waters were distant enough from American shores to shield these white participants in a multiracial revolution from potential political and social repercussions. A Baltimore periodical printed Louverture's account of the *General Greene*'s role in his victory at Jacmel. Louverture announced directly to American readers that "so distinguished a trait of [bilateral] friendship calls for our grateful acknowledgements to that generous nation, already united to St. Domingo by the powerful ties of commerce and fraternity." However, when news of Jacmel's surrender reached American shores, few other media disclosed U.S. naval involvement. Thus, with so little reporting of U.S. engagement in the Saint-Dominguan Revolution, the eighteenth-century narrative of black inferiority and the American disbelief in the practicality of multiracial societies remained largely intact. Further, the federal government avoided raising general fears that it had backed out on its Union-saving pledge not to interfere in matters related to slavery. Perry's native Rhode Island, conversely, to this day proudly celebrates the captain's contribution to universal emancipation in

Saint-Domingue. A Newport monument commemorating the later naval service in Liberia of Perry's son, Matthew Calbraith Perry, reads, "Thus like his father, who aided L'Ouverture against Rigaud, he did service to the African Negro, very fitting for descendants of Quaker ancestors."[18]

Beyond the Jacmel bombardment, allied vessels collaborated "in compliance with a request from General Toussaint" to enforce an effective blockade that reduced the fashionable seaside town "to a state of starvation." A joint task force captured the Danish merchant schooner *William and Mary* as it tried to supply Rigaud's army. White American and black Dominguan sailors took the *William and Mary* and its crew into custody. That evening, the Danish captain, Jeppe Didricksen, dined aboard the *General Greene* with Perry and the white officers of the Louverturian vessel. During the dinner, Perry confided to Didricksen that the American frigate was "blockading the port and cruising on behalf of General Toussaint." According to one historian, "Captain Perry's blockage of Jacmel exceeded the implications of Talbot's orders and international law." The Dominguan captain kept three black *William and Mary* sailors of unknown origin onboard and refitted the schooner as a Dominguan warship. Perry took from the prize schooner a Dominguan mulatto man named Jim, "belonging to a Captain Benjamin Tatem," claiming that Jim was an American.[19]

It is unknown whether Perry's action toward Jim represented a gesture of emancipation, an instance of Atlantic-style impressment, or the return to a slaveholder of an enslaved person who had escaped. Whatever the case, the incident points to a need to examine Perry's conduct in Saint-Domingue. He changed his perception of Louverture and Saint-Domingue during his tenure on station. Perry initially did not support the president's Dominguan policy and did not trust Louverture. It is not clear that these views were racially motivated. In December 1799, Perry published a letter in a newspaper in which he wrote, "The political situation and conduct of the government of St. Domingo, I am sorry to say, wears daily more the appearance of duplicity and baseness, and I am fully convinced that the government will no longer regard their treaty than they find it absolutely to their own interest." To turn public opinion against the administration, Perry provided a list and descriptions of Louverturian armed vessels "you will be pleased to have published." In another published letter, Perry argued that "we well know there is no dependence on Toussaint or his administration."[20]

After his first meeting with Louverture in early 1800, Perry altered his disposition toward the mission and the man. Almost every historian of Ameri-

can involvement in the Saint-Dominguan Revolution has noted the *General Greene*'s unprecedented participation in Louverture's victory at Jacmel. Perry's command of white American sailors in collaboration with the Dominguan navy garnered some of the highest praise from Louverture. The general recognized "the signal and important services which the commander of the United States frigate *General Greene*, Mr. Christopher Raymond Perry, has rendered me; nothing could equal his kindness, his activity, his watchfulness and his zeal in protecting me. He has contributed not a little to the success, every effort being made by him to aid me in the taking of Jacmel." Louverture compensated the American captain for his service with ten thousand pounds of coffee from the captured *William and Mary*, valued at roughly twenty-five hundred dollars, to be spread among the *General Greene*'s crew.[21]

Talbot disagreed with Perry's acceptance of the coffee, and historians have interpreted Louverture's gesture as bribery. The episode is used to bolster the claim that the atmosphere in which white Americans and black Dominguans closely interacted "served to corrupt American naval commanders." This analysis implies that the barbarous black people of Saint-Domingue soiled the pure intentions of white people from the United States. To make such assessments on an evidentiary base of mostly anecdotes and accusations taints the unprecedented cross-cultural cooperation that existed between Dominguan and American military officers and attempts to delegitimize the willingness of professional American naval officers to serve under Louverture. Such interpretations also disregard a U.S. Navy court of enquiry's ruling that "Captain Perry never received any money or anything else, other than 10,000 lbs. of coffee from General Toussaint for services rendered him while cruising against Rigaud." The court did not consider Louverture's gift as bribery, corruption, or a violation naval regulations.[22]

Despite his initial misgivings about Saint-Domingue, Perry carried out Talbot's orders to assist the Dominguan navy and willingly served under General Louverture. Of the allied Jacmel victory, Perry wrote to the navy secretary, "I thought I could not serve my country better than aiding in reducing the power of Rigaud." After collaborating with the charismatic leader and seeing firsthand the courage of Dominguan soldiers, Perry reciprocated Louverture's gesture of appreciation. On 26 April, the American captain invited Louverture on board the *General Greene* with full honors. This extraordinary reception of the revolutionary leader on Perry's last day at the station did not serve trade interests as much as it sought to cement the bilateral and personal relationships fostered by

the Adams-Louverture diplomacy. The U.S. frigate, along with the *Boston* and the *Herald*, "dressed out and greatly decorated with colours" in the harbor of Cap Français, honored the Dominguan commander in chief and de facto head of state with a federal salute from the vessels' guns when Louverture and his party boarded Perry's ship.[23]

Louverture's visit was special. White American captains could have offered such an extraordinary honor to a person of African descent only beyond the borders of the United States. Back home in Newport, Perry attended religious worship in a church that relegated free black congregants to the balcony behind a frame, out of view of white parishioners. In Cap Français, he received a superior black officer aboard his vessel in a manner that commanded the entire city's attention.

To receive Louverture required Perry to remain on station in contradiction to Commodore Talbot's direct order that the *General Greene* depart for New Orleans. Louverture had asked Perry to postpone his departure for a couple of days. When the ship finally sailed, Perry ferried two Louverturian envoys to the United States as a last favor for the general, with whom the U.S. commander had formed a peculiar relationship.[24]

The *General Greene*'s tenure in Saint-Domingue not only provided the storied vessel an influential role in the country's revolution but also exposed Perry and his son, future commodore Oliver Hazard Perry, who served as a midshipman on his father's boat, to black-skinned men's willingness to fight for liberty. The ship's captain and crew returned to Newport in the spring of 1800, around the time their compatriots across the northern United States were reading about King Naimbanna II, the ruler of Robanna in Sierra Leone. Hannah More's popular pamphlet, *The Black Prince*, introduced Americans and Britons to this enlightened African king, who, like Louverture, doubled the territory under his control and incorporated men of other ethnic groups into his realm and personal bodyguard. The son whom Naimbanna sent to England possessed a "thirst of knowledge which was the leading feature of his character," and his "tenderness of conscience was very striking."[25]

In remarkable ways, Adams's diplomacy toward revolutionary black Dominguans mirrored the late eighteenth-century literary trend regarding depictions of African characters. More's pamphlet and other works offered to the white American middling classes a view of black people as fully human, no more stereotyped than the works' white characters. Life mirrored art in the Carib-

bean, as evidenced by white American diplomats' and naval officers' real-life treatment of black people in Saint-Domingue, which reflected social equality, respect, and deference.[26]

THE COMMODORE AND THE GENERAL

Commodore Talbot's decision to send Perry to southern Saint-Domingue in support of northern forces proved crucial in turning the civil war's tide toward Louverture. In response to that decision, Louverture expressed his gratitude to the squadron commander: "Your good intentions for the prosperity of this colony and that of your government load me with satisfaction." The fall of Jacmel, however, did not end the civil war. Louverture desperately needed to reestablish social order in the south and reassure the anxious population. The war-ravaged region suffered from "the most terrible famine," and "the hospital lacks the barest necessities." The British blockade in southern Dominguan waters prevented the Louverturian navy from assisting the citizenry or from supplying his land forces with arms and provisions. He sought help from the American navy. Talbot responded.[27]

Contrary to historical accounts that portray American naval officers as only concerned about trade in Dominguan waters, Talbot possessed and acted upon a sincere desire to provide the Louverturian government with direct American assistance. His decision to deploy U.S. ships offensively in the Saint-Dominguan Revolution did not go beyond the scope of the administration's policy. He operated in line with the navy secretary's directive of preserving good harmony with Louverture's regime. Talbot and Stevens worked together toward that end, engineering ways to support their Dominguan allies, with Adams's approbation.[28]

Louverture established Jacmel as his southern headquarters. He proposed a plan to circumvent the British navy and get supplies to the southern ports. He dispatched to Talbot a letter that forwent the language of commerce with which the Dominguan leader had framed previous communications. The missive seemed to convey increasing comfort with the bilateral arrangement and the personal relationship. In it, Louverture promised "to reciprocate the good offices which [the United States], a nation as great as it is just, has in a number of instances rendered to Saint-Domingue" and suggested that the two men work together "to strengthen more and more the tie which unites our two governments." The general in chief employed a notably personal tone with the

commodore: "I address myself to you with the utmost confidence: your goodness is known to me, and I flatter myself you will not refuse me. Your character strengthens my confidence in the success of my request."[29]

The plan called for sailing an armed Dominguan brig, loaded with provisions, under the American flag from Cap Français to Jacmel. Talbot and Stevens, however, thought the scheme "impracticable," that it "would not avail should it be attempted." The two men met aboard the *Constitution* to develop a more workable solution. Stevens explained to Talbot that Louverture "places great reliance on the succor he has demanded from us." Stevens felt personally compelled to avoid disappointing his reliable partner but left the operational formulation to Talbot: "If you can think up any plan which will serve him, without committing me, I will cheerfully cooperate with you in putting it into execution." Talbot, for his part, wanted to help Louverture meet his military objectives in the south as much as Stevens did. During an intense exchange of ideas, Talbot shared with his colleague an extraordinary admission: "I am willing to do all in my power consistently to serve the General."[30]

True to his desire, Talbot came up with a plan. He substituted Louverture's ruse with one of his own: "Send out from the Cape the brig, and the other vessels loaded as may be wished and when they are out at sea, I will take possession of them as prize, for want of requisite papers. The *Constitution* will go around to Jacmel with all such vessels, to get them safe into such port as the General may desire." Talbot conveyed the plan to Stevens in a letter that illustrated the growing closeness between the commodore and the general. Talbot understood the risks involved for him and the U.S. Navy in pulling off the maritime subterfuge to bypass the British. "This will give me some trouble: but I am willing to serve General Toussaint."[31]

Stevens appreciated the extent to which Talbot sought to relieve Louverture's supply problems but vetoed the plan as "inconsistent with the laws of the United States." He had hoped that Louverture would join them at Le Cap and that the three men could work together to devise a suitable scheme. But the general's military operations in the south prevented this meeting.[32]

Talbot wrote to the Dominguan leader with the bad news regarding Stevens's decision. Disappointed and exasperated, Louverture responded, "You write me, sir, that you will render me all the service in your power." The north Dominguan army depended on American promises of assistance, and Louverture expected Talbot to find a way to resupply the general's forces. Talbot ordered the *Herald* to join the *Augusta* and the *Experiment* in southern waters.



Figure 8. Silas Talbot, n.d. The U.S. naval commodore in Saint-Domingue collaborated with General Louverture and allied commanders of color to secure Dominguan freedom despite Talbot's personal views regarding slavery. Courtesy Library of Congress Collection, Washington, D.C.

Louverture appreciated the extra gunship but was not satisfied, insinuating that Talbot was reneging on the promises he had made. Louverture pressured the American commander to support the army's southern campaign: "You flatter me with the hope that you are going shortly to send the *Boston* frigate of thirty-two guns; may you soon be able to realize it; God grant, likewise, to favor my expectation."[33]

Until a plausible plan for supplying the forces in the southern theater could be adopted, Louverture wanted U.S. captains to stop seizing his ships. In his request to Talbot, he stressed, "Good harmony is necessary, and I flatter myself that our effects shall be mutual in the maintenance of it." Talbot responded to the general in chief's growing frustration with an order to the squadron: "You will not detain any Vessels sailing with a passport from General Toussaint, although not accompanied with a passport from the American Consul General." Although American ships could not supply the Dominguan army in the south, Talbot used the powers and trust given him by the president to allow Louverturian vessels to aid their commander and compatriots. His orders regarding passports unilaterally changed U.S. maritime policy in Saint-Domingue.[34]

Talbot and Louverture engaged in frank and sometimes tense communications regarding the resupply issue. With mutual respect, the two commanders found a way temporarily to overcome the diplomatic hurdles to achieving a military objective. The commodore worked well with Louverture and suggested that U.S. captains follow his example: "I hope and trust . . . that you strive to render General Toussaint all the service in your power, consistent with our relations with other powers." One historian describes Talbot's repositioning of U.S. ships and his orders to squadron captains as illustrating the reach of Louverture's influence over American naval operations around Hispaniola.[35]

Talbot spent his last few months as commodore in Saint-Domingue devising a viable way to respond to Louverture's repeated requests for southern logistical and material support. Without steady resupply, the population there suffered and the position of occupying forces weakened. At one point, Louverture sent Talbot a rather terse communication: "I have written you three letters requesting that you send armed ships to the south because Rigaud continues to receive arms and ammunition." He asked Talbot to disrupt the supply line as a last favor before departing Saint-Domingue. In swift response to this biting rebuke and request, two letters arrived at Louverturian headquarters informing him of the American's intention to assist.[36]

On 16 July 1800, the *Constitution* was moored in the harbor at Cap Fran-

çais. Talbot invited General Moyse, commander of Saint-Domingue's northern region, aboard for a meeting. At eight o'clock in the morning, the American flagship welcomed the black general aboard with a sixteen-gun salute. The two men met in the commodore's spacious quarters, where they focused on Talbot's plan to intercept ships resupplying Rigaudian forces and to resupply the north Dominguan army in the south.[37]

At two o'clock that afternoon, Talbot, marine commander Daniel Carmick, and the members of the *Constitution*'s officer corps went ashore in response to "a very polite note from General Moyse inviting me and my officers to dine with him." The six servicemen strolled along Le Cap's boulevards, enjoying the moderate sea breezes on a hazy day. They stopped by Stevens's residence, and he accompanied them to Moyse's home. After they were seated for dinner, their host quickly squashed the American assumption that Dominguans "did not drink much at table." Wine flowed generously to complement the meal. American lieutenant Isaac Collins became so drunk that "he once fell partly out of his seat and would have tumbled on the floor if [Moyse's] Adjutant General had not took hold of him." The commodore and his men were "mortified beyond description at Lieutenant Collins's behavior."[38]

It remains unknown what the American officers thought of the gathering or their fellow guests as they bid farewell to Moyse and the other Dominguans between five and six o'clock that evening. Only Talbot recorded his thoughts on the afternoon. What did the Americans talk about on the return walk to the *Constitution*? Stevens had already grown accustomed to attending lavish, multiracial dinners and receptions hosted by black people, but one can only imagine what the white American sailors thought as they sat around the dining table. The dinner party had some thirty Dominguan guests of color, leaving the white Americans in the novel position of being the racial minority among a group of equals. In fact, the *Constitution*'s junior officers were not the equals of their Dominguan counterparts in military or social rank. Their host, General Moyse, a former slave, possessed massive landholdings, commanded thousands of multicultural troops, and exercised tremendous authority over hundreds of thousands of citizens. His guest list that evening included only people "of the first in rank at the Cape, both civil and military."[39]

More than a courtesy call, the Talbot-Moyse dinner served as a last strategy session for the commodore as station commander. A week later, Talbot dispatched the USS *Trumbull* to southern Saint-Domingue to counter a twenty-gun Rigaudian brig that menaced the Louverturian navy. Talbot ordered the ship's

captain, Master Commandant David Jewett, to "render General Toussaint all the service that may be in your power to further his operations against General Rigaud who is in fact [not only Louverture's but also] one of our most cruel and barbarous enemies." Prior to sailing south, however, Talbot wanted Jewett to "run in at the Cape and take on board some powder belonging to General Toussaint." The quantity of powder destined for Louverturian troops was larger than the *Trumbull*'s magazine, but in accordance with the ruse Talbot and Moyse had devised over dinner, the Dominguan general supplied Jewett with empty casks in which to put the powder, and the filled casks were stored in the ship's bread room. Jewett then sailed off the coast of Jacmel, and a small Louverturian craft came out to relieve the *Trumbull* of its illicit cargo. Again, Talbot had used his final orders unilaterally to circumvent American law to keep his promises to Louverture.[40]

This exhibition of Talbot's professional respect for the Dominguans and the honorable fulfillment of his promises prompted an exceptionally intimate tribute from the normally stoic Louverture: "I could not appreciate more the diligence it took on your part to send me the ships that you had promised me to aid my operations in the south. The announcement of your departure pains me; that is to express to you how much all that you have done for Saint-Domingue means to me."[41]

Talbot's command on Saint-Domingue likewise garnered full approbation from Philadelphia. Stoddert, who had earlier risked losing Talbot to resignation over the seniority question, wrote to his commander, "No services you could have rendered could have been more useful and more important to your country than those you have meritoriously performed in protecting our commerce in laying the foundation of a permanent trade with St. Domingo."[42]

IMPERFECT EQUALITY ON THE ATLANTIC

In 1800, the American public did not know the full extent of U.S. military and diplomatic involvement in the Saint-Dominguan Revolution. The young nation's citizens, intellectuals, families, and churches continued to grapple with the place of slavery and racial equality in their republican structure. The American naval officers and sailors on the Saint-Dominguan station came from this confused atmosphere. These men, from every region and varied levels of American life, regardless of policy rhetoric, likely figured out that their actions on behalf of the Louverturian military would lead to the emergence of an inde-

pendent African-led nation in the Caribbean. The officer corps submitted their services and their talents to the command of an allied black military officer.

Within U.S. borders, however, there was little room for racial equality, let alone a situation where a black man outranked a white man of stature. But Talbot, Perry, and other U.S. sailors did not make their lives onshore. They oriented their life toward the sea, a place governed not by eighteenth-century American social codes and mores but by different guidelines and directives. Black and white men routinely worked and slept together on naval and merchant vessels. The transoceanic movement of cargo aboard wooden vessels, employing the choreography of linens, ropes, and pulleys to manipulate the winds' propulsion, required specific skills. Shipowners and captains sought proficiency and rewarded advancement in these skills. In their watery world, talent mattered more than race.

Many shipboard customs reflected a race-blind hierarchy. Probably the most illustrative such situation occurred when white captains handed command over to an enslaved or free black pilot to navigate some of the largest Atlantic vessels securely to and from treacherous coastlines. Before Talbot, Perry, and other American captains brought their warships into port at Cap Français or Port-Républicain, a Dominguan pilot ascended the main deck and told white officers and sailors when to tack or wear ship, when to shorten sail, and where to let go the anchor. In a strange twist of irony, this Atlantic seafaring workplace permitted a black "seaman" to oversee a lower ranking white "boy."

The progressive social structure of early Atlantic sea life did not result from antislavery sentiments or egalitarian initiatives. The small size of navy and merchant ships made segregation impractical. The integrated mode of maritime life prepared the soldiers and sailors on the Saint-Dominguan station to work together. There, black and white Atlantic officers engaged one another and cultivated warm, productive relationships. They strategized together, deferring to the expertise of the other. The Americans, for their part, carried out their country's foreign policy on a more interactive level, beyond strictly following orders from Philadelphia.

White captains and black officers operated in Saint-Domingue under what historian Jeffrey Bolster calls "status etiquette." The Americans acted and interacted with the Dominguans in ways that would not or could not have been possible in the United States. Sea training and shared circumstances equipped the allied military men to look beyond skin tones to respect each other's ranks. In the American and Dominguan militaries, an officer was an officer and an

order was an order. Sailors and soldiers learned the hard way that swift, severe punishment followed the failure to obey an order. Status etiquette within military and naval structures created its own hierarchical distinctions. The elites (officers both black and white) remained distinctive from "the people" (sailors and soldiers, again both black and white). White American sailors serving in Saint-Domingue followed the orders of a superior black officer because military rank and the respect it commanded trumped civilian racial protocol.[43]

Louverture did not hesitate to give orders to white men of all ranks. After all they had accomplished, he and his deputies neither accepted nor tolerated the argument that Africans were inferior. He had been killing men of all colors for nearly a decade. His skills had propelled him rapidly through the Spanish and French military systems. By 1800, he sat alone at the military and political helm of a multiracial society. Under these circumstances, when he gave an order, he expected obedience. Like other late eighteenth-century Atlantic leaders, Louverture demanded strict compliance from American, British, and French officials in his territory, as U.S. consul Robert Ritchie learned shortly after arriving at his post in Port-Républicain. Unfamiliar with the island's extralegal workings, Ritchie denied docking clearance to a ship loaded with food and provisions desperately needed by the Dominguan army. When Louverture learned of the incident, he sent the new consul a blunt note. He understood that Ritchie, a shipowner, held important influence in Philadelphia, so the Dominguan leader began his communication by explaining his own standing in the U.S. capital. Though he closed the note with a polite "Your very humble servant," Louverture gave the American a direct order to "instantly" get the ship's captain to return to port and offload the provisions.[44]

White American captains and sailors serving on the Saint-Dominguan station gained a once-in-a-lifetime glimpse of a European-inspired society of the Atlantic world populated and governed by black people. The effects of the multicultural encounters on their racial views remain unknown. German immigrants and the sons of Hispaniola's wealthiest white planters served in Louverture's regimental band and his two-thousand-strong bodyguard regiment. Louverture and his general staff commanded thousands of multiracial troops in a manner that garnered support and loyalty throughout the population. His public duties as the de facto governor-general inspired receptions at the palaces in Cap Français and Port-Républicain similar to the levees Washington and Adams held at the President's House in Philadelphia. At Louverture's events, multinational, multiethnic residents of different social classes gathered together, hoping to get

a brief word with the black leader. In Cap Français, one of the Caribbean's most cosmopolitan cities, Louverture often dropped by the downtown Hotel de la République and mingled politely with Americans and Europeans. To reach the seat of Dominguan power, Louverture had militarily and politically bested white Europeans such as Étienne Laveaux, Léger Félicité Sonthonax, Theodore Hédouville, Thomas Maitland, and Philippe Roume as well as rival Dominguans of color. In the course of governing a colonial revolution and solidifying ties with the United States, commanding Talbot, Perry, and Stevens would have registered as relatively unremarkable episodes.[45]

On the American side, Commodore Talbot did not hesitate to collaborate with the Dominguans to safeguard their freedom. He honored General Moyse with a federal salute aboard the *Constitution* and dined at his home. Talbot placed American ships under the command of a black allied commander. Yet Talbot's personal thoughts and actions illustrate the irony and inconsistency of eighteenth-century multicultural relationships. According to his biographer, Talbot, like most white Americans of his time, tolerated and supported slavery as necessary for U.S. viability in the Atlantic commercial regime. He reflected little on slavery's moral or human implications. In the 1780s, the soaring profits to be gained from the South's growing need for chattel labor moved him to purchase a half interest in a commercial slave ship. On one voyage, his boat, *Industry*, left Africa with nearly two hundred black people, only to dump half of them into the ocean before arriving in Providence.[46]

Talbot dabbled in the enslavement of Africans for much of his adult life. During the American Revolution, he possessed an African named Sigby. In 1778, as the tide of war began to swing against the Americans, General Washington agreed to Rhode Island's plan to raise a 178-man Continental Army regiment of black soldiers, among whom was Sigby Talbot. According to Rhode Island law, an African who was mustered would receive remuneration equal to white American soldiers and "would be immediately discharged from the service of his master or mistress and be absolutely free . . . as if he had never been encumbered with servitude or slavery." For the loss of Sigby's servitude, Congress paid his former enslaver one hundred pounds.[47]

In 1797, Captain Talbot purchased another young man, William Roberts, while in Jamaica as the American agent for impressment. The irony of going to Jamaica to free white Americans and returning with an enslaved black man apparently escaped Talbot. Roberts accompanied the commodore aboard the *Constitution* throughout his command on the Saint-Dominguan station, mean-

ing that at the same time that Talbot was working with Saint-Domingue's black people to guarantee their freedom, he deprived Roberts of that same freedom just offshore. While the *Constitution* moored in Le Cap's harbor and Talbot dined at Moyse's home, Roberts remained onboard, yards away from the land of emancipated Africans. Roberts likely attended to Talbot and Moyse during their morning meeting in the commodore's stateroom.[48]

Talbot's slave ownership and his share of culpability for the loss of one hundred Africans thrown off the *Industry* were by no means the most egregious acts of white Americans toward Africans of the diaspora. His example, however, illustrates vividly the complex inconsistency of eighteenth-century white American thought regarding slavery and race. Talbot's behavior demonstrated both the hope and the disappointment of eighteenth-century racial relations. Bolster notes a similar episode in which "three white sailors from the brig *Neptune*, after being befriended in 1787 by a Georgian slave named Charles, 'thanked him, and shook him by the hand'—a gesture unthinkable to most white Americans." Such "unthinkable" episodes illustrate the limitations of status etiquette with regard to multicultural relations. Even as black and white sailors lived together in close physical proximity in harsh conditions, unbridgeable gaps remained between them.[49]

The Louverture-Talbot collaboration in the West Indies did not translate into tangible revisions of the commodore's attitudes regarding Africans in other parts of the Atlantic world. Modern American sociological analysis of ethnic relations explains Talbot's contradictory behaviors as a viable way of peacefully achieving objectives in an atmosphere filled with racial tension. Bilateral, multicultural relationships that developed on the Saint-Dominguan station, founded on the basis of status, did not necessarily imply friendship or likability. The formalized nature of early Atlantic military traditions, diplomatic protocol, and the confined space of seafaring vessels necessitated cooperation despite racial and cultural differences.

Talbot effected some important cross-cultural achievements in support of the Saint-Dominguan Revolution while participating in and supporting slavery in the United States. Sociological research explains that certain conventional patterns of behavior existed within status etiquette between maritime members. These patterns facilitated productive Dominguan-American military engagements. The same patterns, however, also served "to maintain a high degree of role-distance, thus minimizing personal involvement and reducing the likelihood of status-injury." Accordingly, Talbot engaged Louverture on a close level

while continuing to believe in African inferiority. Cross-cultural interaction was important to the success of his mission. The common interests and congruent values of military life shared by American and Dominguan officers were not enough to eradicate some strong incompatibilities and oppositions based on conflicting views of race and power distribution. In short, white Americans and Dominguans of color employed "aversive but valuable" relationships that sidestepped "unwanted tensions" and racial oppositions as a means of establishing and nurturing "mutually necessary quasi-impersonal cooperation."[50]

FREEDOM FOR MANY, NOT FOR ONE

Toussaint Louverture triumphantly entered the southern city of Les Cayes on 1 August 1800 and declared an end to the crippling civil war. The *Constitution* and Commodore Talbot played a major role in the north Dominguan army's victory. As the ship prepared to depart, an unnamed Dominguan pilot took command in Le Cap's harbor, directing the ship through the bay and into Caribbean waters. After the pilot disembarked, Talbot turned the American flagship north toward its home port, Boston, where the commodore's mission had begun just over a year earlier after his dinner with the president at Peacefield. Talbot had honorably executed his orders as commander of the U.S. naval station at Saint-Domingue. He had worked closely with Stevens to advance the administration's economic, military, and political objectives. He had utilized professional, decisive planning to enable his limited number of ships to protect U.S. shipping and assist Dominguan forces.

Throughout the mission, Talbot had embraced open-minded, creative thinking to collaborate militarily and to cultivate productive relationships with Louverturian officials. His distinguished service affirmed the president's belief that he was the right person to lead American military operations in revolutionary Saint-Domingue. The directives he had handed down from the *Constitution*'s deck were laudable. Beyond the official orders, the navy secretary deemed Talbot's collegial interactions and correspondence with Dominguan officials meritorious, "causing, the American character to be respected by the just, temperate judicious course by which your conduct has been marked during the whole time of your command at St. Domingo."[51]

Talbot received similar accolades after returning to the United States, and he enjoyed the gratitude of the colony's predominantly black leadership and population. However, one black resident of the Atlantic world did not benefit

from Talbot's service: William Roberts, who remained enslaved. His existence and service did not merit inclusion on the *Constitution*'s muster roll. The commodore's achievements in the Saint-Dominguan Revolution helped to secure the emancipation of a half million Africans but did not move him to grant freedom to Roberts.

Roberts never accepted or reconciled himself with enslavement. When the *Constitution* docked at Boston harbor, Roberts used the crew's disorderly disembarking to jump ship. Antislavery sentiment among locals allowed him to evade capture. But Talbot was committed to keeping Roberts in bondage, ordering the *Constitution*'s second in command, Lieutenant Isaac Hull, to track down Roberts. As black Atlantic contemporaries successively repelled reenslavement in Saint-Domingue, a lone African resisted captivity in Massachusetts. The manhunt lasted several weeks before ending just a few miles south of Boston in the town of Dedham, where Hull discovered Roberts in hiding.

Talbot never freed Roberts. When the commodore retired, he settled in New York City, where Roberts attempted to take advantage of the state's gradual manumission law to acquire freedom. Talbot, however, doused Roberts's hopes. As the deadline for freedom approached, Talbot shipped Roberts to Bardstown, Kentucky, where he presumably lived the remainder of his life in slavery. It is hard to understand what would motivate a white American whose identity and livelihood did not depend on slavery to help one black man in Saint-Domingue prepare to govern an entire island yet remain committed to the perpetual enslavement of one black man in the United States.[52]

CHAPTER SIX

The United States and Hispaniola

"On a Permanent and Advantageous Footing"

> Time and experience hath evinced to us the importance, of a close and firm Friendship between our Countries.
> —Captain Alexander Murray, 1800

William Roberts made his way west toward Kentucky to spend the rest of his life in slavery as Toussaint Louverture headed east toward the city of Santo Domingo. The former Spanish colonial capital lay 175 miles from Cap Français, along the island's southeastern coast. Louverture set out after receiving word that his military had secured that portion of the island. His march across Santo Domingo was a consequence of General Moyse's well-executed military campaign that had easily overwhelmed the demoralized Spanish territorial forces. The fighting had lasted but weeks and involved only a few skirmishes. The Spanish forces hardly put up a fight. By late 1800, when cross-border hostilities commenced, the Dominguan revolutionary army had been on fields of battle nearly nonstop for a decade. Hardly six months earlier, the army had emerged victorious in a yearlong civil war against the southern Dominguan army. The victory over General André Rigaud had secured the western part of Hispaniola for Louverturian rule.[1]

The Spanish army in Santo Domingo, conversely, consisted of a paltry force of twelve hundred men. They had not engaged in active combat since Spain ceded the colony to France under the 1795 Treaty of Basel. Since that time, France's disinterest in the Caribbean and successive military engagements on the European continent allowed Spain to retain nominal possession of Santo Domingo. For six years, colonial governor Don Joaquín García y Moreno and the remaining wealthy island residents continued a precarious existence. They prepared for an eventual cession, not knowing what lands they would retain

and how long slavery in Santo Domingo would persist. They especially feared the rule of Africans, refusing to live in a multicultural Atlantic society with relative racial parity and without slavery. However, with France engaged in wars across Europe, they understood that no white Atlantic help would arrive in time to discourage a land grab by the Dominguan leadership. U.S. assistance provided to Louverturian forces in their defeat of the southern Dominguan army further discouraged Santo Domingo's propertied classes.[2]

The victory over Rigaud cleared a path for Louverturian control over all of Hispaniola, though uncertainty remained about when such rule would be established. Louverture answered that question on 25 January 1801, when he rode into Santo Domingo, embodying the stark Atlantic world contrasts of the Saint-Dominguan Revolution. Louverture arrived atop his favorite horse, Bel-Argent, arrayed in a crisp French military officer's uniform with a yellow African-inspired handkerchief knotted about his head. He proclaimed the taking of Santo Domingo in the name of emancipating the island's remaining enslaved population. African-descended residents of the eastern part of the island had been expecting the general for some time and greeted his arrival with acclamations of allegiance, the merry peal of bells, and the thunder of cannons. Within the Spanish capital city, Louverture found triumphal arches erected in his honor and the entire municipality decorated with garland and banners. By this time, Americans had read extensively of Louverture's military prowess. Public demonstrations of African dominance of the island no longer garnered major newspaper coverage in the United States. Nevertheless, the triumphant entrance into Santo Domingo City in January 1801 represented a singular success for Dominguan-American diplomacy.[3]

The year 1800 is commonly considered revolutionary in American history because of the epic election between John Adams and Thomas Jefferson. It also proved revolutionary beyond the domestic political theater. The year marked the culmination of a foreign policy initiated by Timothy Pickering, authorized by Adams, and executed by Edward Stevens to advance the territorial expansion of America's revolutionary counterpart in the western Atlantic world. A Marshall plan and bipartisan legislation maximized U.S. trade relations with a prospective nation governed by emancipated Africans in the diaspora. Throughout 1800, U.S. officials in Philadelphia and Cap Français initiated measures to entice Louverture toward expanding his regime, encouraging Dominguan annexation of Santo Domingo. In February, Congress passed legislation for expanded U.S. trade with Saint-Domingue. Louverture responded by consolidating his power

and preparing to invade Santo Domingo. In the summer, the change of U.S. naval commodores brought a diplomatically savvy commander to the Saint-Dominguan station, and the number of vessels under allied command grew. In autumn, Secretary of State John Marshall signaled to Louverture that the United States welcomed Dominguan control over all of Hispaniola. By year's end, the Adams administration was headed toward an ignominious end despite important diplomatic victories in France and Saint-Domingue. To the south, Louverture began marching east.

CONGRESS AND LOUVERTURIAN EXPANSION

To sustain profitable and productive Dominguan-American relations, the Adams administration needed Congress to reauthorize the Intercourse Act of 1799. Since its enactment, the law had served as an important Quasi-War weapon. It forbade U.S. trade with France except at ports the president deemed secure from privateering. Adams considered only two ports within the entire French empire secure: Cap Français and Port-Républicain in northern and western Saint-Domingue, respectively.

Without reauthorization, the Intercourse Act was set to expire in March 1800. In January, Treasury Secretary Oliver Wolcott began lobbying members of Congress to renew the law on the basis of the nation's wartime footing vis-à-vis France. Wolcott argued that renewal "ought to be considered, in connection with other measures, as part of the system of [hostile] resistance," with the ability to "powerfully influence the conduct of French colonies."[4]

The House of Representatives began deliberating the bill's renewal on 11 February. The opening arguments signaled that proponents possessed a grander vision for the legislation, seeking to enlarge its scope in relation to Saint-Domingue. Maryland Democratic-Republican Samuel Smith, chair of the Committee of Commerce and Manufactures, championed the legislation on the floor. The bill's seventh section touched off an intense debate. It read: "That the whole of the island of Hispaniola shall for the purposes of this act be considered as a dependency of the French Republic."[5]

Fellow Democratic-Republicans Albert Gallatin of Pennsylvania and John Nicholas of Virginia opposed the Intercourse Act, just as they had in 1799. In this case, they rejected section 7's designation of eastern Hispaniola as a part of Saint-Domingue. Gallatin and Nicholas understood the Franco-Spanish Treaty of Basel's cession of Santo Domingo to France and objected to the insult

to Spain that might result from an American assumption that Hispaniola was French despite the continuing presence of a Spanish government and population. Gallatin and Nicholas mustered enough votes to strike the section. Smith, however, caucused overnight with Federalist supporters and reinstated the contentious clause on a majority vote the following day.[6]

The procedural tussle among Democratic-Republican members of the House arose nearly a year before the Dominguan government consolidated power across Hispaniola. The Adams administration and congressional proponents of the Intercourse Act declared all of Hispaniola to be French territory as part of a broader strategy in the western Atlantic world. The Americans staked out an innovative stance regarding Hispaniola in part as a response to France's repeal of decrees threatening American shipping in December 1799. The confiscation of U.S. ships and goods by French privateers in the Caribbean posed significant risks to the American economy. By 1800, the two nations had been waging the frustrating Quasi-War for almost three years. In addition, the administration and Congress deemed Hispaniola French as a means of encouraging Louverture to invade Santo Domingo. They hoped the Dominguan military could expel Spain and take the entire island under its control. Louverture's control of all of Hispaniola, combined with France's pledge to ease its obstruction of American commerce, would give the United States the benefits of an enlarged trading area.

Beginning with its initial engagement with the Louverturian regime in 1798, the Adams administration had structured its policy of Dominguan engagement with one hand holding up commercial interests and the other, behind its back, stroking political ties. Sections of the renewed Intercourse Act continued this diplomatic scheme. Democratic-Republican senator Charles Pinckney of South Carolina, a cousin of Federalist South Carolinian representative Thomas Pinckney, argued this point when the bill reached the upper chamber. Pinckney served as the Senate's one-man opposition to the bill, mostly on constitutional grounds. In arguing against section 7, he suggested that perhaps the bill—and its backers—sought to promote a premature Louverturian annexation of Santo Domingo. Instead of unilaterally assigning territories to certain nations, the United States should leave "the change of rulers and laws to be the criterion with us for judging to what power a territory belongs." Pinckney's assessment was exceptionally accurate. The administration and its congressional supporters had decided they wanted Toussaint Louverture to control Hispaniola.[7]

The Americans had invested money and arms in securing and strengthening



Figure 9. *A Map of the Island of Hispaniola or St. Domingo*, 1758. In 1800, the U.S. government encouraged Toussaint Louverture to expand his regime so that he controlled the entire island of Hispaniola. Courtesy Map & Imagery Library, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida.

Louverture's position. They had strong expectations that his government would implement laws favorable to U.S. diplomacy and trade on the second-largest island in the Caribbean. They wanted the French and the Spanish off the island. Harmonious Dominguan-American cooperation in economic and military matters had provided the United States a kind of favored-nation status. Administration officials reasoned that if Louverture tripled the size of the territory he controlled, they could substantially increase the number of ports open to American shipping.

Section 10 of the modified Intercourse Act caused further debate. It suggested that consular officers to Saint-Domingue "shall be allowed an annual salary" of three thousand dollars. Gallatin asked his Democratic-Republican colleague to explain why the bill established salaries for American consuls in Saint-Domingue when the federal government did not provide salaries to consuls anywhere else in the world. Smith responded that Saint-Domingue "was very different from other consulships; there it required only a common merchant to manage the business relating to shipping, sailors, &c., but in [the case of Consul General Stevens], ministerial powers, for negotiation, was contemplated."[8]

Smith's speech represents the only public acknowledgment by a U.S. official that Adams's policy in Saint-Domingue anticipated more than commerce. Administration supporters intended section 10 as both a remedy for a problem and a proactive step toward future policy. The debated section permitted the

president and Secretary of State Pickering to keep their verbal pledge to Stevens that he would receive the pay and eventual rank of a minister plenipotentiary to Saint-Domingue. Adams had sent Stevens to Cap Français as a minister to the Louverturian government in the guise of a consul, a position in which by law, he could not receive a salary. He had served in Saint-Domingue at his own expense since April 1799, with no remuneration for his work.

Section 10 also anticipated Louverture's conquest of the entire island. Questions remained about when Louverture would declare Saint-Domingue independent. Until that time, the United States could not send a declared minister to a colony. Therefore, Congressman Smith argued, a person qualified to negotiate as a chief of mission must be employed and appropriately compensated. Smith's job description referred retroactively to Stevens: "It could not be expected that any man would go to reside in a [tropical] climate which endangered his life, without a compensation somewhat adequate to the profits he could make by engaging in commerce."[9]

After the lively and enlightening debates, both houses renewed the Intercourse Act, the House by a vote of sixty-eight to twenty-eight, and the Senate by a vote of nineteen to ten. These tallies reveal an evolving attitude toward Dominguan-American relations. Fourteen House Democratic-Republicans voted for the bill, a sharp increase from the five who had sided with the administration a year earlier. President Adams signed the renewed law on 27 February. Fittingly, on the same day, in Saint-Dominguan waters, the USS *General Greene* provided cover fire for Louverture's storming of Jacmel, which hastened the end of the Dominguan civil war.[10]

The consequences of an expanded Intercourse Act for volatile conditions in Saint-Domingue did not escape the scrutiny of the French government. In quick succession, Philippe Letombe, the French consul general in Philadelphia, and Alexis Giraud, the French consul in Boston, dispatched translated texts of the legislation along with their analysis on the modified sections to Foreign Minister Talleyrand. For Giraud, who had earlier served as a Directory commissioner at Cap Français, the new law exposed the hidden aims of U.S. foreign policy in Saint-Domingue. Section 10's language regarding consular salaries corroborated the French government's suspicions about Stevens "being endowed with powers and the portfolio" of a minister. Letombe understood that of the changes in the revised legislation, section 7 "is the most important, in that it considers the entire Isle of Saint-Domingue as part of the French dominion." The new designation would permit the extension of U.S. trade to all

Hispaniola. He suggested that the Louverturian government had coordinated with the Adams administration in drafting the revised section. The bipartisan legislative changes bolstered French concerns that the United States intended to prepare to establish an embassy in Saint-Domingue, a clear indication of American support for an independent island.[11]

LOOKING EAST FROM CAP FRANÇAIS

The revised language of the Intercourse Act and the actions of Stevens encouraged Louverture and the Dominguan administration in their expansionist plans. After news of the law and the modified U.S. view of Saint-Dominguan territory likely reached Cap Français, Louverture appealed to Philippe Roume, the French agent in Cap Français, for official sanction to occupy Santo Domingo and expand his power across Hispaniola. The men had for months been waging a war of words over the true administrative power in Saint-Domingue. Since Louverture had appointed Roume in December 1798 to replace Theodore Hédouville as the French agent, an understanding had existed throughout the Atlantic world regarding the Dominguan power structure. Louverture controlled a colony in a state of revolution, and Roume provided the political cover of French legitimacy for Louverture's (sometimes treasonous) actions. Tensions between the revolution's leader and the French stooge presented themselves internally from the start. But during the Louverture-Rigaud civil war, fissures within this strained relationship become more apparent.

Around October 1799, Louverture made several moves toward Santo Domingo that signaled his future intentions. He replaced the adversarial General François-Marie Perichou de Kerversau as the French commander in Santo Domingo with General Antoine Chanlatte. Both generals supported Rigaud during the military conflict, but Louverture considered Kerversau a more formidable long-term threat. American officials in Philadelphia learned of Louverture's interest in expanding his authority into Santo Domingo from Stevens's dispatches. Along with the intelligence summary, Stevens reported that he had authorized a U.S. Navy ship to carry Chanlatte to his Santo Dominican headquarters to "prove to [Louverture] my wish to comply with everything that could contribute to his interest."[12]

Philadelphia and Cap Français did not jointly design a collaborative scheme that would give Louverture control over all of Hispaniola. Instead, events suggest that the two governments employed a kind of call-and-response diplo-

macy. After learning about Louverture's ambitions toward Santo Domingo in late 1799, the Adams administration and congressional officials inserted section 7 into the Intercourse Act as an incentive for Louverture to increase his territorial regime. The Americans wanted to demonstrate support for Dominguan control of all of Hispaniola, which they believed would occur either with or without their consent. U.S. support for Louverturian actions offered negligible risks as well as the potential for commercial and political rewards.

The timing of Louverture's action was important. Adams had few domestic or international achievements on which to launch a viable bid for reelection. The United States remained tense and torn over the Quasi-War. Franco-American peace talks had not yet begun; neither the war's end nor its actual beginning were in sight.

By 1800, American foreign policy toward Saint-Domingue had become a bright spot for Adams and the United States in the Atlantic world. Since the commencement of diplomatic engagement two years earlier, U.S. trade volumes and profits at port cities all along the Eastern Seaboard had increased. State Department and navy personnel in Cap Français had subsequently advised department heads in Philadelphia that Louverturian forces would defeat Rigaud in a military showdown. Adams committed the new U.S. Navy to ensure Louverture's victory. U.S. representatives on the island likewise proffered predictions of a Dominguan declaration of independence. While Britain and France continued to harass U.S. shipping, federal officials reasoned that expanding Saint-Dominguan territory under a Louverturian administration would increase the number of friendly ports and expand American influence. The idea of an independent Hispaniola offered an embattled Adams and an emerging United States a sphere of the Atlantic world in which they dominated their storied European rivals.

The historical record points to Louverture's desire to take Santo Domingo as a defensive measure. Following Napoleon's 18 Brumaire coup d'état (9 November 1799) in Paris, chatter abounded that the first consul planned to send a force against Louverture from the east. Another rumor during the civil war counted fifteen thousand soldiers arriving from Guadeloupe to reinforce the Rigaudian army. It is unlikely, however, that Louverture had actionable plans for a military campaign against Santo Domingo in the spring of 1800. He had led successive military conflicts for the better part of a decade. In addition to tactical doggedness, he possessed a keen sobriety in battle that generally pre-

vented him from overreaching militarily and politically. He did not intend to invade another colony—particularly on the basis of rumors—while fighting a civil war and losing ships to the British. Moreover, had Louverture believed the reports of Guadeloupe-based troops landing to attack his eastern flank, he would not have waited for Roume's *arrêté* to take Santo Domingo as a militarily defensive measure.[13]

Louverture's repeated demand for Roume's civilian approval of military actions represented a synchronized power play against France's authority. He began planning to take Santo Domingo while still engaged in the civil war with Rigaud. To move swiftly after victory in Saint-Domingue to territorial expansion across Hispaniola, Louverture orchestrated calls against Roume regarding Santo Domingo to correspond with military successes against southern Dominguan forces. The first public demand for an *arrêté* to invade Santo Domingo occurred in December 1799, after Louverture had sent a naval squadron that he believed would finally crush Rigaud at Jacmel. However, the British thwarted Louverture's planned victory by intercepting and confiscating the Dominguan ships. The next Roume-Louverture dispute occurred in March 1800, after the Dominguan army and the U.S. Navy conquered Jacmel. The general in chief confined the agent and his supporters as "prisoners" to the Government House.[14]

Louverture's overall plan did not yet call for the annexation of Santo Domingo. He pivoted toward eastern Hispaniola as a nod to U.S. officials, who believed that the Intercourse Act could serve mutual Dominguan-American interests. So in April, after news of the Intercourse Act likely had arrived at Le Cap, Louverture's administration deftly turned to the Dominguan public after Roume's second refusal to issue an *arrêté* and announced that Roume "had lost their Confidence, and that the mal-Administration of the Colony, the Dilapidation of the public Funds, and the Continuance of the War in the South were all owing to his *Weakness, Treachery and Indecision*." The general in chief portrayed the French agent as obstructing a revolutionary desire to free Africans enslaved across the border. This shrewd maneuver strengthened Louverture's hand. It allowed the Dominguan administration to concoct a popular mandate from the majority black population for total Louverturian rule. General Moyse again imprisoned the French agent, this time at Haut du Cap, just outside the capital. Military leaders organized a mass rally of thousands from across the colony to converge on Roume's holding quarters. The crowd's stage-managed

populist revolt sought to deprive France of its long-standing colonial authority. The protesters shouted that "they want no more agents [from Paris], and that they will not receive any in the future."[15]

The protests went on for days. Organizers sent a delegation to Jacmel demanding that Louverture return from the warfront and be "invested with the civil and military authority over this colony by the unanimous consent of its inhabitants." Several days later, the general entered the Dominguan capital not at the head of an army—to which, by this time, the Atlantic world had become accustomed—but rather as a political victor, prepared to submit to Dominguan popular will. He had notched an accomplishment that Atlantic observers had anticipated for some time: usurpation of French authority. With this entry into Le Cap, Louverture demonstrated his preeminence in Saint-Domingue. The transfer of power signaled Louverture's plans to control all of Hispaniola under one government.[16]

Roume published an *arrêté* endorsing the Dominguan invasion of Santo Domingo after Louverture threatened a third arrest and imprisonment in a more hostile location. During a 24 April Louverture-Stevens meeting, the Dominguan leader "renewed in very strong terms his ardent desire to do everything which can preserve the existing harmony between this colony and the United States." Stevens emerged from the tête-à-tête convinced that "this is perhaps the most favourable moment that has occurred since the renewal of [bilateral] intercourse to place our commerce on a solid and permanently advantageous footing." Events of this period prompted Stevens to compose some of his most candid dispatches to the State Department: "While I was uncertain of the real intentions of Toussaint, I was loath to say anything to you about them. Now I think I know them, it is my duty to announce them to you. He is taking his measures slowly but securely. If he is not disturbed he will preserve appearances a little longer. But as soon as France interferes with this colony he will throw off the mask and declare it independent."[17]

Stevens offered Philadelphia officials important on-the-ground intelligence: "Policy, perhaps, may induce [Louverture] to make on open Declaration of Independence before he is compelled. But this apparent and temporary attachment to the Mother Country will only ensure the separation of the colony more effectually." For Stevens, the Dominguan leader's military and political steps seemed to lead to one path: independence. An independent Hispaniola meant increased commercial profits and greater diplomatic stature for the United States in the western Atlantic world.[18]

The administration was pleased by Stevens's reports of Saint-Domingue's political situation. Attorney general and secretary of state ad interim Charles Lee, a slaveholder from Virginia, who stepped in after Adams fired Pickering on 12 May 1800, apprised Stevens that "from the proofs you have given of your ability, diligence, and prudence," the president "has no doubt you will [continue to] do everything in your power for greater [U.S.] security and advantage." Lee confirmed that "the political change which [your reports] mention to have taken place in Saint-Domingue is considered greatly important in its consequences. It gives the President much satisfaction to learn that General Toussaint continues in his friendly dispositions to the United States."[19]

GOVERNING IN REVOLUTIONARY TIMES

Adams and Louverture shared the unenviable task of transitioning themselves from revolutionaries to governing officials. They needed to lead their populations from a state of war to some sense of postrevolutionary normalcy. Not altogether unlike the Adams presidency, Louverture's governorship faced the challenges of competing in the hostile Atlantic world of European empires and managing a domestic population experiencing liberty for the first time. His administration restored competitive, economic viability to war-ravaged Saint-Domingue, but this success came at the cost of freedoms in mobility, social development, and professional advancement for his African compatriots. As the political head of a military government, Louverture enjoyed the authority and the means to enforce his will on a reluctant Dominguan citizenry for the good of the revolution.

Federalist officials in the Adams and Washington administrations spent the 1790s trying to impose their view of American liberty on an equally reluctant American citizenry. Iconic figures of the American Revolution established the ruling party over the first three national elections and nurtured their British-inspired belief that the people's votes acted as the guarantor of public liberty, but otherwise, elected officials should be left to govern. As vice president, Adams published the controversial *Discourses on Davila* in defense of nature's chain of being and universal order. He unwisely argued that "among men, all are subject by nature to equal laws of morality, and in society have a right to equal laws for their government, yet no two men are perfectly equal in person, property, understanding, activity and virtue—or ever can be made so by any power less than that which created them." He advocated a society in which the elite and

virtuous ruled and the American individual "knows his place in the opinion of society." Lacking Louverture's absolute authority left Adams no way to impose this out-of-step position on the American populace. Instead, such public pronouncements—despite being commonplace among the leading elites of both political parties—opened the Federalists to Democratic-Republican characterizations that they were a party of monarchists in the mold of the former British tyrants. In the 1800 election, this flawed understanding of the evolving American population left Adams and his advisers vulnerable to Jeffersonian charges of elitism and made them slow-footed in their response to crises that spawned offshoots from the same republican ideology they had espoused as revolution-era freedom fighters.[20]

By the end of the decade, the Adams administration came to see the Dominguan administration as much less hostile and not prone to the savagery that had been feared. In reports to Philadelphia, Stevens characterized Louverturian governance not as a tyrannical, dictatorial junta but rather as a leadership model that instilled confidence among a frightened and unsettled people. Louverture, Stevens wrote, "is a man of great humanity, good sense, and integrity." Both Adams and Louverture faced challenges to their governmental authority. As Louverture battled to quash the Rigaudian attempt at territorial separation, Adams encountered a German American rebellion effort in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, led by John Fries.[21]

Following the examples of the Shays and Whiskey Rebellions, the participants in Fries's Rebellion resisted the federal government's enforcement of the 1798 Federal Direct Tax. In the spring of 1799, some 150 men, acting under an ill-conceived cloak of constitutionality, intercepted a federal marshal transporting tax evaders to Philadelphia. Using violence and intimidation, the rebels forced the release of their arrested neighbors. In response, the president ordered Secretary of War James McHenry to deploy federal troops to western Pennsylvania to assert federal control. The bulk of insurgents surrendered voluntarily. Three of the leaders, including Fries, were convicted of conspiracy and treason and sentenced to death. When polled, the entire cabinet recommended that the president allow the executions to proceed. In a conciliatory gesture similar to Louverture's actions toward Rigaudian rebels, however, Adams commuted the conspirators' sentences.[22]

The two administrations also shared a similar need to address issues of domestic public order. In reality, the Americans' sense of insecurity, relative to the real and present threats faced by their Dominguan counterparts, was over-

blown at best. Notwithstanding, the U.S. government had some real problems in the 1790s: the novelty of the American republic; the horrendous bloodletting on the European continent; the deadly encounters of U.S. merchantmen with European and Barbary privateers; the increasingly bellicose Franco-American dialogue; southerners' heightened fears of black revolution; Native American unrest; and homegrown white insurrectionists. The Federalist-led Congress sought to quiet some of the domestic unrest by passing the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. Adams signed the bills into law, but they immediately became extremely unpopular. Democratic-Republican opponents viewed the legislation as a series of unconstitutional maneuvers to stifle political dissent and criticism of the Adams administration. Federalist litigants used the acts to convict dozens of resident aliens and Americans, including journalists, the Fries rebels, and a sitting member of the U.S. Congress. In response, Vice President Thomas Jefferson and James Madison secretly drafted the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, which advocated the equally unpopular proposition that states could nullify the federal legislation.[23]

The Adams administration perceived Louverture's government as grappling with similar challenges as relative newcomers amid centuries-old Atlantic powers. The Federalists' attempt to quell domestic rebellion and political outcry using the Alien and Sedition Acts doomed their political survival and Adams's presidency. Ironically, Americans gave Louverture high marks for the capacity to enforce his political will to effect tranquillity between opposing groups in Saint-Domingue. The priority accorded to security remained one of Louverture's strongest political assets. From his time as an adjutant to Governor-General Étienne Laveaux in the mid-1790s, he had meted out swift and severe punishment against "méchants," "mal-intentionnés," and "gangrenés"—residents of all colors who disturbed the public order. His laws declared anyone who attempted to arouse the black laborers in revolt or to rebuff his agricultural policy as "an enemy to general freedom and equality."[24]

In addition to security concerns, Louverture's government managed issues ranging from public finance to family matters to religious faith. After taking Jacmel, Louverture declared policies to govern a greater Hispaniola. Addressing issues of religion and work ethic, he ordered that "all Dominguan inhabitants must work" and deemed "laziness the mother of all evils." He instructed parents to "teach their children with wisdom and raise them in the fear of the Lord." Dominguan officials worked to restore the Atlantic world's faith in the island's financial solvency, issuing regulations for repaying international credi-

tors and local businesses with government contracts. The cadre of multiracial government officials appreciated the island's desperate need for continued lines of public credit to finance its way back to commercial and fiscal viability. They enacted laws to stop arbitrary sequestration of white émigrés' property and restructured property and production taxes on planters and merchants.[25]

One of Louverture's priorities remained social harmony among the multiracial population. His labor policies restricted residency of black free laborers to the plantations where they had been enslaved. This constraint on mobility tempered that subgroup's expectations and increased incentives for efficient production. He instructed his regional commanders, "The establishment of constitutional order promised a happy future for Saint-Domingue." He appreciated that thoughts of revenge for past slavery and continued social subordination to white Dominguans have "persuaded the blacks to want to cut the throats of the whites." Ill-intentioned white Dominguans compounded the problems of agricultural production with verbal harassment of workers, taunting "You think you are free. Nevertheless, you are forced to remain on my land. I will supervise you as I did before and show you that you are not free." Louverture enacted a zero-tolerance policy for such harassment and other obstacles to labor efficiency with prescribed punishments related to age, gender, and financial wealth. In addition, he ordered military commanders to redouble their reconnaissance efforts and bring to justice any black Dominguan planning attacks against white Dominguans.[26]

The government's policies, however, seemed to favor white citizens, causing the island's black population simultaneously to adore and to resent their leader. White Dominguans, for their part, came to trust and depend on Louverture for their protection and prosperity. Stevens informed American leaders in Philadelphia that the general's "humane and mild conduct has rendered him respectable to the [white Dominguans], and they now look up to him." His moderate, revenge-free policies toward white planters and business prompted émigrés to return from across the Atlantic world and support the Louverturian administration. Louverture received approbation and encouragement from the Americans: "The attention of the General-in-chief has been, altogether, turned towards the establishment of such wise and salutary regulations as must, eventually, tend to promote the happiness and prosperity of St. Domingo." From the time of Joseph Bunel's 1798 visit, the Americans had shown confidence in Louverture's capacity to govern. Merchants and expatriates in Le Cap had reported on the rising general's moderation and political savvy. Still, Louverture's

ability to reestablish the economy, to manage multiracial tensions amid civil war, to secure public order, and to temper domestic fears of Atlantic nations surprised and pleased the administration.[27]

THE MARSHALL PLAN FOR SAINT-DOMINGUE

By the summer's end, Louverture marked the civil war's cessation with yet another triumphant march. This time the setting was the southern city of Les Cayes. There, he exhibited his full control of Saint-Domingue and soon commenced plans to subdue the eastern section of Hispaniola. After Roume issued the *arrêté* for Louverturian annexation of Santo Domingo in late April, General Pierre Agé embarked from Jacmel to the Spanish colonial capital with a small Dominguan force and a letter seeking a peaceful transfer of power. Governor García received Agé "with great civility, and consented to deliver up the Spanish part of the island as soon as he can obtain a sufficient number of vessels to carry off the Spanish inhabitants that may wish to depart." In a dispatch to Philadelphia, Stevens correctly concluded that the evacuation plan would take at least six months. García was stalling for time in the vain hope that Napoleon's impending invasion would disrupt the Dominguan takeover.[28]

The U.S. Navy transported troops and supplies to eastern Hispaniola, positioning them for a future military push. Captain Alexander Murray, commander of the Saint-Dominguan squadron, continued Talbot's practice of collaborating closely with Louverture and putting U.S. vessels under Dominguan authority. Shortly after arriving on station aboard his flagship, the USS *Constellation*, he opened a correspondence with the general in chief "to offer you my most zealous services in cooperation with you in the meritorious cause in which you are now engaged to bring about order, peace and harmony in the Island of Hispaniola." To demonstrate that the change in naval command did not signal a revision of U.S. policy, he pledged "to render you every service in my power and hope to convince you that no salutary regulation that hath been adopted by my predecessor shall be in any measure changed."[29]

In fact, Murray expanded the scope of Talbot's last orders. Murray did not wish to "relinquish the main object of showing our zeal and good intentions towards Toussaint." The new commodore fully backed the Louverturian effort to govern the whole of Hispaniola and to that end placed navy captains and ships under the "full direction" of the Dominguan commander in chief. Murray also ordered the USS *Trumbull* to prepare for a cruise to Santo Domingo

"should Louverture deem it necessary for you to go there." Louverture conveyed his appreciation for the commodore's "laudable instructions for preserving a good understanding between the respective officers of this Island and the United States; it being the means of rendering both countries happy." Murray understood the relative liberality of his actions and the potential to overstep his authority, explaining to Navy Secretary Benjamin Stoddert his hope that the joint action with Louverture "will not be deemed inadmissible or verging beyond my powers, [but] as a simple commander of the naval service, I feel the dignity and prosperity of my country so much at heart that I may be deemed officious in meddling with diplomatic functions, but be assured my intentions are pure and sincere."[30]

Despite his fears of misinterpretation, Murray's sentiments toward Louverture and perspective on Dominguan-American relations found strong support in Philadelphia. In June 1800, President Adams appointed John Marshall to succeed Pickering at the Department of State. Adams had fired the architect of Dominguan-American foreign policy the previous month for plotting with Alexander Hamilton to have Adams replaced as the Federalist presidential candidate in the upcoming election. Unlike Adams's forced but functional relationship with Pickering, the president and Marshall trusted and respected each other. The two men had collaborated closely throughout Adams's presidency, and in 1801, Adams appointed Marshall as chief justice of the Supreme Court, positioning him to become the longest-serving and one of the greatest high court jurists in U.S. history. In 1797, Adams had tapped Marshall as a commissioner to Paris, an appointment that resulted in the XYZ affair. After Marshall returned from Paris, he won election to the House of Representatives from Virginia's Thirteenth Congressional District. While there, he drafted a glowingly positive response to the president's 1799 State of the Union address. Also in the House, Marshall voted to renew and revise the Intercourse Act, permitting the administration to expand Dominguan-American commerce and relations.[31]

Marshall was a Virginia slaveholder who immediately followed Lee, another Virginia slaveholder, at the head of the State Department. Like Lee during his interim tenure, Marshall continued the administration's diplomatic trajectory of strengthening ties with the multiracial revolutionary colony. Marshall responded in a Pickering-esque manner to Louverturian calls for expanded U.S. shipping to an increased number of Dominguan ports. Stevens reported to Marshall in August 1800 that Louverture confidently controlled southern Saint-Domingue.



Figure 10. John Marshall. The slaveholding Virginian expanded America's presence across Saint-Domingue during his tenure as secretary of state. He later became the longest-serving Supreme Court chief justice in U.S. history. Courtesy Library of Congress Collection, Washington, D.C.

Based on this news, Marshall advised the president of "the General's wish that our commerce may now be extended to that part of the island."[32]

After voting for the bill to expand American trade to all of Hispaniola, Marshall became the point man for the administration's policy of expanded bilateral relations. The new secretary, in fact, sought to move American diplomacy beyond the scope of Louverture's request. Beyond opening the southern Dominguan ports, he drafted a proclamation citing congressional authority to extend U.S. commerce to every port in Hispaniola. In managing this posture, Marshall proved himself a consummate politician. He understood that his status as both the newest cabinet member and the one with the closest relationship to the president could breed distrust among his cabinet colleagues. He avoided the caustic interdepartmental intrigues of his predecessor and advanced his position in a transparent fashion. Marshall convened and polled the cabinet on the expansion of Dominguan-American trade. When he forwarded the coordinated draft proclamation to Peacefield on 6 September, Marshall assured Adams that "the heads of departments are all of opinion that this should be done." The president signed the order.[33]

The timing of Marshall's plan to broaden Dominguan-American relations illustrates the alliance's importance to the federal government. The Adams-Louverture alliance meant more to the United States than diplomatic leverage to secure a peaceful end to the Quasi-War with France. The United States exhibited few signs of lowering its profile in Saint-Domingue to allay French concerns regarding Dominguan-American relations. Secretary Marshall strengthened U.S. foreign policy toward Saint-Domingue as peace talks between American commissioners and their French interlocutors drew to a close in Paris. The Franco-American peace agreement transpired only three weeks after Adams's proclamation offered Louverture a tangible incentive to extend his rule from Môle Saint-Nicolas in the island's northwest to Saona Island at the southeastern tip.

Negotiations to end the Quasi-War between France and the United States began in earnest on 2 April 1800 at the Parisian home of Joseph Bonaparte, Napoleon's older brother and the head of the French delegation. As the talks got under way, the existence and persistence of Dominguan-American diplomacy reverberated among French government ministries. One week into the negotiations, Talleyrand consulted Marine Minister Pierre Alexandre Forfait on France's options to disrupt the rapprochement between Adams and Louverture. Forfait could offer little hope of leverage in the western Atlantic world. The

time had passed when France could influence outcomes on the island: "General Toussaint Louverture alone and his authority" had solidified political control over domestic governance and guided the colony to a secure position between Atlantic world powers. In analyzing Dominguan-American engagement, Forfait emphasized Stevens's overt control in matters relating to colonial governance and the dominance of U.S. naval vessels in Saint-Dominguan waters.[34]

Letombe provided an equally grim prognosis: "The colony will soon be Afro-American, with all its produce going to the United States." Louverture was getting closer to the Americans while feigning loyalty to France. The consul cautioned Talleyrand against attempts to regain the colony with the revolutionary regime there intact. Using a historical analogy to underscore the point, the French consul compared Louverture's "Machiavellianism born in the forests and on the burning sands" of Saint-Domingue to the treachery of "the Huron 'Le Rat' [Chief Kondiaronk] who in Canada during the 1690s deceived French and British military commanders."[35]

For Talleyrand, Saint-Domingue still proved important to French foreign policy. Instructions to the negotiators at Mortefontaine, a village about twenty-five miles northeast of Paris, included a "third objective demanding the most serious consideration"—American involvement in the Saint-Dominguan Revolution over French objections. The foreign minister deemed Dominguan-American diplomacy as a campaign of offensive warfare, hostile to French trade. He criticized the Adams administration for publicly receiving Bunel and other Louverturian envoys "as if they had been sent by an independent power to treat with them." Negotiators were to protest "the scandalous spectacle of an American minister in Saint-Domingue granting or denying French merchants the right to trade in a French colony."[36]

The Foreign Ministry instructed its delegation to use the Quasi-War talks to evaluate France's capacity to disrupt Dominguan-American relations and to get the United States to admit fault for interfering in French colonial affairs. If the Americans proved unwilling to negotiate, "the point must be debated with zeal, to command our pecuniary position, absolutely refusing [to concede] any actual and real acquisitions" by the Americans. The State Department, conversely, provided U.S. commissioners Oliver Ellsworth, William R. Davie, and William Vans Murray only a packet of background documents on U.S. actions. The delegation possessed no authority to negotiate regarding Saint-Domingue. U.S. ministers categorically defended "an unembarrassed intercourse between the United States and the French West India islands" as beneficial to both enti-

ties. At some point during months of wrangling over competing interpretations of former treaties and international law, Saint-Domingue became a nonissue. The peace treaty was signed on 30 September 1800.[37]

The president and his cabinet had no plans to diminish American relations with the Louverturian government. Since reopening bilateral trade in the summer of 1799, Adams instructed his foreign policy team to effect Dominguan diplomacy "as if no [Franco-American] negotiations were going on." By 1800, Saint-Domingue had become a key part of the larger U.S. plan for growth in the Atlantic world. From Cap Français, Stevens continued to advocate for sustained and strengthened relations with the Louverturian government, pushing the idea with Marshall as he had with Pickering. The civil war's end and Roume's demise provided Stevens's argument with renewed vigor: "The present moment is very favourable for obtaining from [Louverture] such additional privileges as would place our commerce on a permanent and advantageous footing." Marshall shared the envoy's view regarding the "present moment" and "advantageous" prospects and moved to secure the favored U.S. position on the island. In December 1800, Marshall raised rather than lowered the American profile in Saint-Domingue. He dispatched fellow Virginian Bartholomew Dandridge and Henry Hammond of New York as consuls to Les Cayes and Cap Français, respectively.[38]

The secretary continued Pickering's practice of direct cabinet-level communications with the Dominguan government. For his part, Louverture became understandably anxious in the wake of the Mortefontaine accord. On 26 November, three weeks after a Baltimore newspaper announced the "Glorious News" of a Franco-American peace settlement, Marshall wrote Louverture to assuage any doubts regarding the American commitment: "Be assured, Sir, of our sincere desire to preserve the most perfect harmony and the most friendly intercourse with St. Domingo, and that we shall rejoice at every occasion of manifesting this disposition compatible with those fixed principles, which regulate the conduct of our Government." The letter made no mention of France or the recently signed peace agreement.[39]

The U.S. collaboration and communications with Saint-Domingue in 1800 reveal administration preparations to embrace an independent Louverturian nation-state as a neighbor. Adams and his advisers intended U.S. policies to extend into an expected second presidential term, beyond the hostilities of the Quasi-War. Weeks after word reached the United States of the Mortefontaine agreement, the navy secretary renewed orders to commanders on the Saint-

Dominguan station to "hereafter cultivate a good understanding with General Toussaint & the people of St. Domingo." He did not pull ships off the station "in the present state of uncertainty as to our situation with France." Instead, Stoddert advised commanders only that "should it be officially announced in St. Domingo that there is peace between the United States and France, you will cause cruising against [French ships] to cease on our part." The administration apparently had no immediate plans for an American military drawdown on the island.[40]

Marshall's plan for Saint-Domingue called for the expansion of Dominguan-American commercial ties after the cessation of Franco-American hostilities. Stevens had briefed the secretary that Dominguan officials had planned to separate from France, writing, "The black Chiefs now talk loudly and openly against having any connection with the Mother Country." Marshall had no more knowledge than Pickering had had about when Franco-Dominguan connections would sever completely. He, like his predecessor, believed that separation was inevitable. Marshall had followed Louverturian military acumen against European powers. Administration officials were persuaded the Dominguans would resist Napoleon's military threat to reassert colonial control. If past was prologue, they had little reason to think that France would reduce the revolutionaries to slavery or reestablish colonial submission.[41]

The Marshall plan did not anticipate a subjugated colony of Hispaniola as a commercial safeguard in the wake of a Napoleonic expedition. It likewise did not intend for the United States to accept a subordinate role to Britain in Saint-Domingue as a backdoor maneuver to improve Anglo-American relations. Instead, expanded Dominguan-American ties affirmed the administration's consistent policy trajectory. The president had sent Stevens to Cap Français as a de facto minister, anticipating that he would become the de jure minister at independence. U.S. involvement in Saint-Domingue facilitated a string of military, political, and economic advances for the Dominguan government and population.

The administration had decided before the Peace of Mortefontaine that the United States and an independent Saint-Domingue would make their way together in the Atlantic world. The upstart republic and the revolutionary colony collaborated together against hostile nations during a decade of Atlantic revolutions and upheaval. The two governments strengthened each other's economic positions and reinforced one another's political postures. Saint-Domingue gained foreign aid and export revenues to feed its starving population and to

acquire much-needed arms and munitions. American ships departing Dominguan ports bound for Atlantic destinations with products made by free rather than enslaved workers affirmed Louverturian stringent economic policies. Increased commercial collaboration invigorated Dominguan agriculture, garnered Louverture's government new lines of investment, and encouraged war-weary expatriates to return. The de facto U.S. recognition and the political alliance increased Louverture's domestic and Atlantic stature and strengthened the revolution's resolve.

In Saint-Domingue, the United States found a unique Atlantic setting where its influence helped to dictate the outcome of wars and trade policies with far-reaching implications. Amid revolution, the Americans shrewdly cultivated an environment of political and commercial dominance over the bullying and condescending British. The infant U.S. Navy allied with its meager Louverturian counterpart to outmaneuver British blockades, captures, and impressments. The Dominguan ports of Le Cap, Jacmel, Jérémie, and Port-Républicain provided U.S. northern merchants and southern agriculturalists friendly markets for necessary imports and exports. An independent Hispaniola under a Louverturian administration offered the United States an area of ascendancy, a bastion of diplomatic dominance, albeit small, over its superior Atlantic world rivals.

Atlantic leaders, Adams included, could not direct Louverturian policy. However, the president's transracial diplomacy had earned him some successes in Hispaniola and fostered Dominguan goodwill toward the United States. Officials in the Adams and Louverture administrations had forged productive, working relationships based on professional respect and mutual interests. These elements of diplomatic pragmatism and personal engagement offered the United States political and economic influence it possessed nowhere else at the turn of the century.

EMANCIPATION ON HISPANIOLA

In late November 1800, on the same day that Marshall penned his letter of support to Louverture, the latter commenced his campaign to take Santo Domingo. Moyse arrested Roume for the last time, eliminating the final French obstacle to Louverturian governance. Moyse proceeded across the eastern border with ten thousand troops. Governed under Spanish law, Santo Domingo still employed slavery and operated a steady trade in enslaved Africans. Human traders in

the Spanish territory kidnapped free Dominguans and sold them into slavery through Puerto Rico and other islands. Louverture pledged to eradicate the island's last vestiges of slavery.

In January 1801, Moyse and his army swept easily through Santo Domingo. They secured safe passage for the general in chief's triumphant march. Louverture entered ceremoniously and received the keys to the city from Governor García, the general's onetime Spanish military commander. In one of his first meetings with the governor, Louverture addressed the trading of kidnapped Africans and kept his pledge to end human trafficking. With little ceremony, he unilaterally proclaimed freedom for Santo Domingo's remaining enslaved Africans. As Virginia and other U.S. states grappled with the presence of enslaved and free black people in a republican system intended for white Americans only, Louverture swiftly eradicated slavery. It is both historic and poetic that the first government of diasporic Africans to abolish slavery in the western Atlantic world did so on the island where Columbus's landing ushered in centuries of white domination and black subjugation.[42]

Louverture effected Hispaniola's emancipation with the assistance of bipartisan, transregional collaboration of politicians in the slaveholding United States. Historians have long noted the involvement of American Federalists in the Saint-Dominguan Revolution. However, members of Congress from both parties championed the renewed Intercourse Act of 1800. The U.S. Congress—albeit with a Federalist majority—passed the bill that connected Americans to Louverture's greater Hispaniolan regime, which began by abolishing slavery. Adams's foreign policy toward a multiracial revolutionary population had weathered political opposition in the heated February 1799 congressional debates to win over a greater share of Democratic-Republican support a year later. Within the Federalist administration as well, heterogeneous interests converged to craft and execute effectual Dominguan diplomacy. Northern antislavery men such as Adams and Pickering partnered with slaveholders such as Stoddert and Marshall to engage the Louverturian government of black men. The Adams administration passed no legislation that moved the United States closer to domestic emancipation, but the president and his foreign policy team shared some responsibility for the emancipation of some twenty thousand Africans in Santo Domingo and the advancement of universal emancipation on Hispaniola.[43]

In the revolutionary year of 1800, Louverturian military successes, profitable U.S. diplomacy, and Marshall's plan for bilateral relations came together to affirm Adams's diplomacy. Positive results encouraged the administration toward

a permanent American footing in an independent Hispaniola. These factors combine to highlight eighteenth-century white Americans' contradictory views toward the African diaspora. In December 1800, as Moyse's troops took control of Santo Domingo, a Philadelphia newspaper announced the arrival of an emissary "sent by Toussaint Louverture, with dispatches for the government of the United States." The same newspaper reported that white residents of Charleston had gathered to witness the public execution of an enslaved black man convicted of murder and sentenced "to suffer death by being burnt alive." Again, the irony is thick. American money, military, and manpower advanced the abolition of slavery beyond U.S. borders, while black people stateside were denied basic Eighth Amendment protections against cruel and unusual punishment.[44]

Despite presiding over a government whose Constitution sanctioned slaveholding, Adams and his administration carved out a relatively progressive foreign and racial policy that prepared the United States to engage the Atlantic world's first black nation-state. Peace with France had been reached. The legislation, the minister, and the military were all in place. The diplomacy had been under way for two years. The positive, profitable results of Dominguan-American relations had tempered much of the U.S. press's insulting descriptions of the Saint-Dominguan population of color. Louverture's long-awaited declaration of independence remained the last major hurdle to normalized bilateral relations. The Federalists' defeat in the 1800 presidential election, however, denied Adams and Louverture the opportunity to receive letters of credentials from each other's ministers plenipotentiary. Ironically, the political machinations of Hamilton and Pickering, the architect of Dominguan-American rapprochement, caused Adams's loss. Bilateral relations held the potential to shape strong diplomatic ties between the first two republics of the western Atlantic world. Yet after surviving the Peace of Mortefontaine, Dominguan-American diplomacy and the bright possibilities for future transracial relations died on the altar of American popular democracy.

CHAPTER SEVEN

After Adams and Louverture

"Great Changes Likely to Take Place"

> Has the change in administration destroyed all your Ships?
> —Governor-General Toussaint Louverture, 1801

The presidential campaign of 1800 devastated John Adams's political future and historical legacy. Thomas Jefferson's Democratic-Republican supporters labeled Adams a tyrant, a monarchist, a womanizer, and a lunatic. They campaigned on collective opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts and cries of political arrogance. Partisan newspapers attacked his personal character, portraying him with "neither the force and firmness of a man, nor the gentleness and sensibility of a woman." Adams's politically self-destructive Federalist Party lambasted him for political missteps and public relations blunders. The vitriol of his own party stemmed from the second (successful) peace mission to Paris and a lack of party loyalty.[1]

Neither party attacked the president for his diplomatic engagement with a black revolutionary leader, although news stories involving Saint-Domingue did appear. James Lyon at the Richmond-based *National Magazine* published extensively on Adams's foreign policies. In one article, disgruntled Federalist Tench Coxe criticized Adams's diplomacy toward Hispaniola for collaborating with the British and interfering in French affairs. Another essayist, "Agricola," caricatured the Adams alliance with "the negro chief Toussaint" as a hostile "provocation to France" in a partnership with Britain. Yet southern Democratic-Republicans made no mention of the transracial diplomacy that moved the revolution of Africans toward independence. The paucity of election-year political rhetoric regarding the Adams-Louverture alliance reveals an important transition in American thinking toward events on Hispaniola. In the early 1790s, white Americans almost universally rejected the Saint-Dominguan Revolution.

By decade's end, their dismissals had evolved into a tempered acceptance that black power had displaced white power in a western Atlantic slave society.[2]

On 16 December 1800, Adams read the disappointing news: he had lost. The electors of South Carolina split their votes between the Federalist and Democratic-Republican candidates, denying Adams a second presidential term. Jefferson and Aaron Burr of New York each received seventy-three electoral votes nationally. The House of Representatives cast its vote, and Jefferson became the third president of the United States. Adams found governing as a lame duck tiresome and unruly, especially with his wife, Abigail, already back in Quincy, Massachusetts, preparing for his return. He wrote to her, "The burden upon me in nominating judges and consuls and other officers, in delivering over the furniture, in the ordinary business at the close of a [congressional] session, and in preparing for my Journey of 500 miles through the mire, is and will be very heavy."[3]

Abigail, the president's dearest friend, closed a note to him, "I wish you well through the remainder of your political journey." His final weeks of presidential duties did not include Saint-Domingue. Like the members of his foreign policy team, Adams recognized that the approach to Dominguan-American diplomacy that had prevailed from 1798 to 1801 had effectively died with his defeat. Outgoing federal officials' concerns regarding their personal futures left no time for hurried policy initiatives that the Jefferson administration would likely annul. After a predawn departure from Washington, D.C., on Jefferson's inauguration day, John and Abigail were reunited at Peacefield. Adams retired, never to pen the name Louverture again. He mentioned Saint-Domingue briefly, many years later, in correspondence to defend his diplomacy against a critic of his Quasi-War leadership.[4]

LIFE IN THE UNITED STATES AFTER DIPLOMACY

John Adams engaged in his most sustained presidential discussion of slavery just weeks before leaving the White House. In response to two abolitionists who had sent him an antislavery pamphlet, the president staked out a sober position on the provocative issue. The firmness of his complex stance resembled his approach to the dynamic variables of Dominguan-American diplomacy. He brandished his disapproval of slavery while continuing to deflect direct association with the abolitionist cause: "Although I have never sought popularity

by any animated speeches or inflammatory publications against the slavery of the blacks, my opinion against it has always been known, and my practice has been so conformable to my sentiments that I have always employed freemen, both as domestics and laborers, and never in my life did I own a slave." Adams supported emancipation but like many members of his generation, thought it "must be gradual, and accomplished with much caution and circumspection."[5]

Adams answered from the position of someone who had studied the issue intensely from a foreign policy perspective. His understanding of the Saint-Dominguan Revolution led him to conclude, "Violent means and measures would produce greater violations of justice and humanity than the continuance of the practice. [No abolitionist] would be willing to venture on exertions which would probably excite insurrections among the blacks to rise against their masters, and imbue their hands with innocent blood." After three years of engagement with an Atlantic leader of color, Adams's appreciation for the suffering of enslaved Africans had not deepened much beyond that of his days as a Massachusetts circuit lawyer.[6]

As he prepared to return home as an elder statesman, he maintained a Eurocentric, idealistic view that "there are many other evils in our country which are growing (whereas the practice of slavery is fast diminishing)." After equipping the Dominguan military to sustain African emancipation and bolstering the Louverturian government's viability, Adams viewed slavery in the United States with puzzling nonchalance. He considered inattention to education and general debauchery as "more serious and threatening evils than even the slavery of the blacks, hateful as it is."[7]

But America's burgeoning abolitionist community wanted action. For Adams, "serious and compassionate consideration of friends" on the slavery question was "as far as my means and opportunities can reasonably be expected to extend." Geographical demarcation from the slave societies of the American South and the Caribbean offered Adams detachment from the problems of human bondage. His defeat by Jefferson relieved Adams of the complexities of conducting diplomacy that abetted an African-inspired march toward universal emancipation. No longer burdened with navigating hostile Atlantic world politics, he settled quickly into a pastoral postpresidency. Adams enjoyed the company of his books and presided over the family farm. In August 1804, as Jean-Jacques Dessalines declared himself emperor of Haiti, the sixty-nine-year-old "monarch of Peacefield" and his Quincy friends worked on the property, trans-

ferring "one load [of hay] from the road to the ditch and from the cart to the pasture lane" and "ploughed a ditch and brought the earth into the yard and 32 loads of mud from the cove."[8]

Secretary of State John Marshall likewise moved on to other endeavors with no subsequent mention of Saint-Domingue. In February 1801, Adams appointed Marshall chief justice of the Supreme Court. Marshall finished out his term at the State Department and began his tenure at the high court, which lasted until 1835. In his three-plus decades on the bench, Marshall heard no cases that addressed Saint-Domingue or Haiti. In retirement, Marshall returned to Virginia, steadily profiting from chattel labor in Fauquier County and employing enslaved Africans at his Richmond estate.

Marshall's successor at the State Department, James Madison, began to dismantle Marshall's plan for closer relations with Saint-Domingue within a week of Jefferson's inauguration. After meeting with the new French consul general to the United States, Louis-André Pichon, who expressed France's "dislike of the title of Consul [General]" for Edward Stevens, Madison nominated Tobias Lear of New Hampshire as U.S. commercial agent to Saint-Domingue. Madison likewise demoted Bartholomew Dandridge at Port-Républicain from consul to commercial agent. By design, Dandridge and Lear's appointments explicitly lacked any hint of government-to-government engagement. Madison instructed U.S. minister to France Robert Livingston to inform the French government "that no letter was addressed to the Chief of the island, either from the President or from the [State] Department."[9]

The amended title and its implications were not lost on Louverture. In the summer of 1801, when Stevens introduced Lear to the governor-general, Louverture immediately asked why Lear's commission did not include "a letter from the President or from the Government." After maintaining such close relations with the Adams administration, the diplomatic snub of Jefferson's policy offended and disappointed Louverture. With a lifetime of understanding the thinking of slaveholders like Jefferson and Madison, Louverture concluded that "his colour was the cause of his being neglected" and initially refused to receive Lear. After considering his options in the new Atlantic world, Louverture requested that Lear return the next morning, when, flanked by Moyse and Henry Christophe, the Dominguan leader officially accepted Lear's commission. Jefferson later reasoned to Madison that the Dominguan general's "offense at our sending no letters of credence with Mr. Lear is not regular. Such letters are

never sent with a consul, nor to a subordinate officer. The latter point, I doubt not, is that of the offence."[10]

No official correspondence between the Jefferson and Louverture administrations ever commenced. Washington took a new position toward the Saint-Dominguan government. From Le Cap, Lear reported that Stevens's diplomatic work and Louverturian governance had created a profitable environment for the United States. "The productions of this island even in its comparatively neglected state are immense, and the consumption of our articles great indeed." Like many others of the Atlantic world, Lear found Louverture to be "certainly an extraordinary man . . . adored by all the inhabitants of all colours . . . who has shown his determination to be just."[11]

Edward Stevens departed Saint-Domingue for the United States on 18 August 1801, aboard the *Amphitrite*. Unlike his administration colleagues, Stevens did not immediately transition to other endeavors. Recollections of his days engaging Louverturian diplomacy remained with Stevens for nearly the remainder of his life. He reunited with Joseph Bunel a couple of years later in Philadelphia.[12]

The spring of 1802 found Stevens in Washington explaining his complicated embassy to Jefferson officials. He lobbied for the remuneration at the rank of minister that Pickering had promised. Albert Gallatin, now the secretary of the treasury, and Madison denied him the rank and the commensurate salary. Pickering provided letters to help his former envoy appeal the decision, describing Stevens's position as a de facto "minister" with responsibilities for negotiation and collaboration with the Louverturian administration. Until the end of his life, Pickering defended Stevens's appointment as legitimate given the context of the Quasi-War and the Saint-Dominguan Revolution. "He was considered ministerial; altho' the well known state of things at the time did not admit of a formal, diplomatic mission. He was therefore designated as Consul General of the United States to the Actual Government in that Island." The appeal dragged on into 1804, when President Jefferson, in a detailed memorandum on U.S. diplomacy and executive power, conceded to Stevens a compensation package at the rank of chargé d'affaires.[13]

In that same year, Edward and Hester Stevens sailed for St. Croix, never to return to the United States. Back home, the couple resided briefly on the same street on which they had grown up. They later moved into a home Hester received as a gift from her grandmother. Stevens resumed his medical work and

began to practice maritime law. Extensive experience with trade issues during his tenure in Hispaniola provided the physician with an intricate knowledge of admiralty laws, the prizes in privateering, and a wide range of Atlantic commercial affairs. Samuel Newton, Hester's stepfather and the island's largest slaveholder, retained the former diplomat to represent shipping interests that transported sugar between Christiansted and Copenhagen. On Newton's behalf, Stevens exchanged frequent correspondence regarding crop prospects, bills of lading, insurance, and castaway ships with Gouverneur, Kemble, and Company, one of the leading commission merchants in New York.[14]

Stevens never lost his passion for medicine. His son, James, followed in his father's professional footsteps, graduating from medical school in Edinburgh and returning to St. Croix. Working with Dr. James Carden, the two men provided medical care to more than twenty-one hundred of the island's enslaved Africans on sugar plantations. In the 1820s, decades after his Atlantic-world travels and revolutionary diplomatic service, Stevens operated a small island medical practice similar to the one he had managed in the 1780s.[15]

After singlehandedly recalibrating U.S. foreign policy toward closer ties to the Louverturian government and its multiracial population, Edward Stevens returned home and became a slaveholding plantation owner. Hester was related to some of St. Croix's most prominent planter families—the Kortrights, Hendrichsens, and Heyligers. By 1816, the couple moved from Christiansted to the island's western planting region and acquired the estates of Castle Burk, Upper Love, Brooks Hill, Little La Grange, Oxford, and Grove Place, which totaled more than sixteen hundred acres and required the labor of nearly seven hundred enslaved Africans.[16]

Why would Edward Stevens, who had opposed slavery since childhood, had helped to guarantee African emancipation in Saint-Domingue, and had forged an intimate relationship with Toussaint Louverture, engage in slavery during his later years? Slaveholding signaled status in St. Croix. As young lads playing on the Christiansted streets, he and his friend, Alexander Hamilton, had dreamed of becoming great men. Each had encouraged the other toward professional success. Hamilton found his fame and fortune in the American Revolution and the creation of the U.S. federal government. Stevens had gained prominence as a West Indian physician and enjoyed notoriety during the Philadelphia yellow fever crisis. He became America's point man during the Saint-Dominguan Revolution. But his ambitions had not waned as he aged. Back in St. Croix, his

hopes for greatness continued to thrive, this time with the financial backing of his wife's fortune.

Stevens became an affluent man and invested heavily in his estates. After the cessation of the Napoleonic Wars, the Atlantic world sugar market collapsed. Plummeting commodity prices in the early 1820s bankrupted about 10 percent of St. Croix's plantations. The Stevenses were forced to auction off four estates after they failed to pay the taxes. Following this commercial calamity, Stevens revived his petitions to the federal government for a reevaluation of his diplomatic tenure. Arguing that the Jefferson cabinet had unduly deprived him of merited compensation, he approached the administration of President John Quincy Adams. In 1825, Stevens's longtime friend and the architect of the U.S. Capitol, William Thornton, contacted Secretary of State Henry Clay to advocate for appropriate reimbursement. Thornton explained that the needed documentation for the claims had been destroyed when the British burned the Treasury Department during the War of 1812. Pickering again joined the campaign to support Stevens's claims. Though at eighty years old, Pickering's memory was not always acute, "I perfectly remember that his appointment . . . was considered ministerial [and] during two years and six months . . . among a race of uninformed men, just emerging from a state of abject slavery . . . must necessarily have been incomparably more laborious than those of any chargé des affaires at any European Court." Stevens lost his appeal. Clay refused to act and suggested that Stevens "could not obtain a further consideration of this claim except through the Congress."[17]

The Grove Place estate remained in the Stevens family. Edward Emerson, brother of Ralph Waldo Emerson, made several visits to the Stevenses' home there in 1831. Emerson thought highly of the former doctor-diplomat, though he heard gossip that Stevens had financial troubles and that he and Hamilton were illegitimate half-brothers. Emerson and Stevens discussed the doctor's student days at King's College, medical opinions on nutrition and digestion, and Stevens's personal problems with gout. Three years later, Stevens died at Grove Place at the age of eighty. The American Philosophical Society noted his passing, but few in the United States knew of his life or his death. On St. Croix, however, locals and American expatriates remembered Stevens as a U.S. diplomat who had "exerted great control over the great men & affairs of this region, e.g. Christophe & Toussaint."[18]

Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Stoddert agreed to serve in the Jefferson

cabinet until the Senate confirmed a successor. Three weeks after the inauguration, the president "determined to call home all our ships in the West Indies." Stoddert therefore ordered Commodore Silas Talbot, who had returned to the Caribbean, to pull his squadron off the Saint-Dominguan station. Stoddert's order to dismantle the first U.S. overseas naval station, which he had industriously established and sustained over the previous three years, was his final act as secretary. Stoddert returned to private life in the tobacco trade in Germantown, Maryland. Ordering U.S. ships off the Saint-Dominguan station was also the last operational directive of Commodore Talbot's storied career. He brought the USS *Constitution* into Boston Harbor on 14 June. The president invited Talbot to keep his rank in a downsized navy under incoming secretary Robert Smith. Talbot declined and resigned his commission. A group of Philadelphia merchants offered him a share and command of a merchant vessel ferrying coffee from Saint-Domingue, but the fifty-year-old captain preferred retirement in a refurbished New York City townhouse to commercial seafaring.[19]

Of all Adams's cabinet secretaries, none had done more to establish and advance Dominguan-American diplomacy than Timothy Pickering. His humiliating dismissal from the State Department in May 1800 did not silence him on issues of bilateral relations and universal emancipation in Saint-Domingue. Like others in the defeated administration, Pickering returned to his home base of political and economic security. He represented Massachusetts in the U.S. Senate beginning in 1803. There, Pickering spoke out for normalized commercial ties with the Republic of Haiti his foreign policy had helped to establish. In an extraordinary 1806 letter to President Jefferson regarding the administration's plans to embargo Haiti, Pickering asked rather pointedly, "Are these men, not merely to be abandoned to their own efforts, but to be deprived of those necessary supplies which for a series of years, they have been accustomed to receive from the United States, and without which they cannot subsist?" The oft-bombastic senator outlined more than a Federalist argument favoring Atlantic trade. The secret, nine-page note indicted the Virginian for policymaking through a racial lens, treating the Haitians, although they were "in the actual possession of independence," as French property. He suggested that Jefferson viewed the Haitians as "guilty indeed 'of a skin not colored like ours.'" He expressed disappointment that the administration would not engage Haiti. Pickering scornfully reminded the author of the Declaration of the Independence that like Americans, Haitians were "by a great National Act declared free [and] resolved to live free or die."[20]

Well into his later years, the architect of Dominguan-American diplomacy retained sincere esteem for the Saint-Dominguan Revolution and the Louverturian government. Writing in the 1820s, Pickering still referred to Toussaint Louverture as "an extraordinary man."[21]

AMERICANS (WARILY) WARM TO BLACK GOVERNANCE

Dominguan-American diplomacy resulted from risky cooperation between leaders of two governments overseeing racial and cultural transformations within their populations. U.S. politicians needed Toussaint Louverture at the helm of the Hispaniolan government to sell their unimaginable diplomacy to an initially skeptical populace. White Dominguan refugees arrived throughout the 1790s and told their American counterparts inflated tales of black savagery that affirmed the false sense of superiority harbored by white residents across the Atlantic world. To account for defeat at the hands of Africans, white men in the taverns of Philadelphia, Charleston, and Wilmington derided the opposition, the new masters of Saint-Domingue, as cannibals, unchained tigers, and savages. They spoke of white babies held aloft on spikes and—to really get white men's blood boiling—of white women raped by black men. French partisan Louis Dubroca offered Atlantic readers a mélange of grotesque images of white people "sawn in two, or mutilated in every limb, or burnt over a slow fire, or hung by the feet to a tree and flayed alive." U.S. newspapers and literature portrayed refugee accounts of exaggerated, isolated incidents as widespread, commonplace occurrences. For white Americans with hardening racial attitudes, the caricatures quickly became emblematic of the Saint-Dominguan Revolution.[22]

Louverture vehemently protested the exorbitant tales of African mayhem and murder that infiltrated the Atlantic world. To the Directory, he acknowledged that soldiers and militiamen had committed "many mistakes and even terrible crimes" in the midst of revolution. He refused, however, to accept moral condemnation from the same white officials who had seized power in Paris following the Reign of Terror: "The fury of the two parties has been equal in Saint-Domingue; and if the excesses of the blacks in these critical moments have not exceeded those committed in Europe, must not an impartial judge pronounce in favor of the former?"[23]

The turbulent decade closed with Americans' public criticism of Louverture and the Saint-Dominguan Revolution lessened in volume and softened

in tone. By 1800, some white Americans felt secure enough to speak positively regarding Hispaniola. A periodical in Upstate New York reprinted a Fourth of July speech in which the speaker, presumably a white American, linked liberty in the United States with freedom within the African diaspora. He extolled as righteous the violence that emancipated enslaved peoples: "Already has the voice of thy tears and blood reached heaven! Guadeloupe and S. Domingo have seen their race revenged, and their chains broken on the tyrants' heads." The orator rejected American proslavery thought and offered solidarity with the Black Atlantic march toward universal emancipation. "Yet O! our brother, curse us not—some of us have principles of justice and bowels of compassion—we will raise thee to freedom, if we do not restore thee to thy long lost Africa!"[24]

Newspaper editors in New York and Philadelphia balanced negative depictions of black revolutionaries with portrayals of Dominguan fighters as "brave," "patriots," and "soldiers of liberty." Americans read Louverture's praise of his countrymen for "your conduct, your submission, your moderation, and that bravery you have ever displayed in defending the sacred cause of liberty." They learned how the general advised his troops to "regard every citizen as a brother, without distinction [and] never harbor for a moment the rankling spirit of revenge." After successive triumphs, Louverture ordered his men to "the temple of our God" to give "thanks to Almighty God for his infinite mercies," for "it is to God that you are indebted." Religious language likely resonated with American readers, inviting them to contrast the offerings of Christianity in the Saint-Dominguan Revolution with the atheism of the French Revolution. One periodical explicitly made the comparison: "It is a wonderful circumstance, in the history of French personages, since the revolution, that Toussaint, the sable general in St. Domingo, should be the first to restore the observance of the Christian Sabbath, and to abolish the atheistical decade."[25]

Americans of all regions also came to appreciate Louverture's governing style. He increased agricultural production, maximized commercial profits, and harmonized multiracial existence in a former slave society. White Americans, including slaveholders, evaluated Louverture based on his creation of political strength and economic stability, at least in comparison to other Atlantic leaders. The Reverend Alexander McLeod told parishioners at New York's First Reformed Presbyterian Church that in light of Louverturian successes and leadership, "The inferiority of the blacks to the whites has been greatly exaggerated. . . . And great must be his prejudice who can deny to the black Toussaint the qualifications of a warrior and a statesman." Louverture's presence at the

head of the Saint-Dominguan Revolution provided Americans cover to adopt a favorable view of distant Africans in the diaspora.[26]

White Americans considered Louverture through the lens of race as not only "like a white man" but as an Africanized version of J. Hector St. John Crèvecoeur's "new man." In 1782, the French American writer had established the American as a new man who acted on new principles, entertained new ideas, and formed new opinions. This new man was "either a European, or a descendant of a European, hence that strange mixture of blood, which you will find in no other country." The African blood of Toussaint Louverture necessitated a modification of Crèvecoeur's Eurocentric definition. Throughout the 1790s, Louverture proved his indomitable capacity to resist tyranny, to shape his surroundings, and to create history. He exhibited nature's endowment of an autonomous will with human agency like no other black person the white Atlantic world had encountered. Americans characterized Louverture as the Caribbean counterpart of George Washington. In military accomplishments, political acumen, and economic prowess, few white men of the Atlantic world could compare to Louverture's achievements.[27]

For leaders of the American South, Louverture's domestic and international policies revealed the once-feared former slave as neither a radicalized nationalist nor a racial ideologue. According to one historian, "Taken together, Louverture's actions as governor of Saint-Domingue, far from turning Saint-Domingue into a revolutionary hotbed of emancipation, instead crafted a system in which the rhetorical rejection of slavery was balanced by the needs of plantation agriculture and Louverture's political ambitions." Newspapers reported civil unrest among the island's black residents voicing anger against economic policies favoring white émigrés. The restricting of free black Dominguans to plantation life provided vindication for southern slaveholders. In 1800, around the time the Commonwealth of Virginia hanged the leaders of Gabriel's Rebellion, Saint-Domingue's government put down an uprising and executed twelve black conspirators. Slaveholding Americans gleaned from Louverture's emphasis on economic stability and public order that a strong white police force keeping black people in check could prevent race wars in a free, multiracial society.[28]

Southerners touted the treatment of Dominguans as a twisted kind of endorsement for African slavery. They co-opted Louverture as an unwitting fellow in the agrarian capitalist argument against emancipation and to discredit the idea of multicultural existence in the United States. Proslavery southerners were willing to affirm a black man's capacity to govern with discipline and re-

publicanism as a way to bolster their slavocratic policies. Louverturian leadership forced even Jefferson to acknowledge that in Saint-Domingue, "the blacks are established into a sovereignty *de facto* and have organized themselves under regular laws and government." Southern slaveholders who dismissed Africans as inferior could identify with Louverture. He employed European reason and pragmatism to implement sound policies. He did not fit prejudiced stereotypes. His hard-nosed commercial polices transcended racial characterizations. Louverture did not—as they expected—govern with race-laced vitriol and passion. His capacity to coax white people of the Atlantic world to view him as in some ways "like us" illumines why federal officials and southern leaders supported Louverturian governance of a free society of color in Saint-Domingue while opposing abolition in the United States.[29]

Further, Americans of the South and the North respected people who shared a revolutionary appreciation for violent resistance to tyranny. Louverturian commercial prowess resonated with white Americans. Black Dominguan soldiers could be seen as imitating U.S. patriots in their willingness to use violence in the pursuit of liberty. In Louverture's defiant declarations to the French empire, Americans could not help but hear echoes of their own glorious past: "To restore slavery in Saint-Domingue would be to attempt the impossible; we knew how to face danger to win our liberty, and we will know how to face death to keep it." Louverture's awesome displays of eighteenth-century masculinity eerily endeared the diasporic African to Americans. By the late 1790s, the black Dominguans' pledge to shed their own blood for the cost of freedom hearkened Americans back to the pivotal moment in the 1770s when they, too, had risked all in resistance to political slavery. Abraham Bishop, a most vocal American supporter of the Saint-Dominguan Revolution, consistently highlighted the inescapable congruence between the Africans' revolutionary rhetoric and the potent Patrick Henry–inspired mantra "Liberty or Death."[30]

The two populations' unique experiences of revolution provided a sense of shared identity that transcended race: New World versus Old World. White Americans embraced violent resistance as a prerequisite to freedom. They believed that freedom had to be earned through action and sacrifice. Their own victory over British "slavery" influenced the view that Africans in the United States could not be *given* their freedom. White people should not *free* black people. Unearned emancipation was not freedom. White Americans had fought for their freedom; Africans had to fight for theirs. Americans found absolu-

tion in the twisted analysis that Africans in the United States deserved to be enslaved unless they rose up to kill their white American oppressors.[31]

In an ironic way, the successful military aspects of the Saint-Dominguan Revolution bolstered the American argument that black peoples bore responsibility for securing their own freedom. White Americans' respect for Louverture and the revolutionary Dominguans did not transfer to black people in the United States. Through the lens of American revolutionary thinking, these two groups of diasporic Africans were different. According to Philadelphia publisher Mathew Carey, those who do not fight for freedom and equality "merit chains." Many Americans from New Hampshire to Georgia supported and encouraged the African march toward universal emancipation in Hispaniola while simultaneously fearing the domestic threat of black rebellion. Paradoxically, white Americans respected and supported black Dominguans for precisely the same reasons that they feared the U.S. African population: the collective courage to kill for freedom.[32]

White Americans viewed the early republic as their nation—a white nation. John Adams signed the Naturalization Law of 1798, which reserved citizenship for "white persons." They defined national belonging on the basis of skin complexion, among other factors. The invention of an Other was common practice in Anglo-Atlantic nation building. The Other served as a subjective determinant of who was one of Us and who remained Them. Not all Others were equal. The differences in views toward and treatment of people of color in the United States and those of Saint-Domingue illustrate Americans' capacity to assign varying categories of Otherness to peoples within the same race.[33]

Scholar Michelle Wright delineates differences in early Americans' racial taxonomies to reconcile their subjective, inconsistent views. Geography served as the most important determination in classifying intraracial Otherness. The Africans in the United States—in the "home space" of the colonizers—represented the dangerous and corrosive being of the Other Within. Jefferson's *Notes on Virginia* cast blackness under the metaphor of a veil, as a natural phenomenon that marked African inferiority. The American invention of the "Negro" within U.S. borders came to characterize the ever-present, cancerous threat to a virtuous white republic. Jefferson viewed black people, free or enslaved, as a domestic threat to democracy and as president sought alternative territories for their forced deportation.[34]

Conversely, white Americans viewed Africans of Saint-Domingue as the

less threatening Other Without, residing in a "third place." The Caribbean Sea safely separated white Americans from this group's sordid blackness. Dominguan military and political successes presented uncomfortable challenges to the white Atlantic belief in European power over Africans through inherent racial superiority. But after Mortefontaine, Africans of Hispaniola ceased to threaten American liberty. Nevertheless, both Others Within and Others Without were black. Americans viewed Black Others as merely variations on the theme of alterity. If white Americans did not remain vigilant, the common trait of natural violence could spread from Saint-Domingue to the southern states. These two forms of Others resulted in disparate actions toward Africans in different places and underscore the depth of inconsistency within eighteenth-century American racial thought.[35]

THE ATLANTIC EMBRACE OF LOUVERTURIAN LEADERSHIP

Beliefs regarding black inferiority and the Other varied widely among white people across the Atlantic world. Many viewed Toussaint Louverture as a hero. His revolutionary fervor resonated among white residents in two unlikely locations. In Spanish Town, the first lady of Jamaica, Maria Nugent, overcame real and present fears of being murdered by black rebels to embrace Louverture's revolutionary leadership. In 1801, she and her husband, Governor George Nugent, became secondary actors in the Saint-Dominguan Revolution, hosting the Dominguan envoys, including Bunel, at their home for dinners. Louverturian diplomacy with the initially apprehensive governor netted both colonies a commercial treaty.[36]

Maria Nugent never owned Africans, but she also was no egalitarian or abolitionist. She sat atop a slave society that enslaved some three hundred thousand Africans. She believed "that the blacks are human beings, or have souls" but would have preferred to remain in London "instead of playing the Governor's lady to the blackies." She thought that "the slaves are extremely well used" and referred to black babies as "little monkeys."[37]

News reports from Saint-Domingue in late 1801 that told of social unrest and the killing of 370 white inhabitants saddened and shocked Nugent: "How dreadful, and what an example to this island." She suffered from vivid nightmares of dying at the hands of vengeful Africans. The "wretched country" of Jamaica "is devoted to the same destruction that has overtaken St. Domingo." She slept under armed guard when rumors spread of local African revolts. De-

spite her fears, Nugent gained a surprising appreciation for Louverture and his revolutionary leadership. She engaged in numerous, lengthy dinner-table discussions about the Saint-Dominguan Revolution with Louverturian emissaries, Napoleonic representatives, and members of her husband's war council. From the sum of these and much personal reflection, Nugent concluded that Louverture "must be a wonderful man, and I really do believe intended for very good purposes."[38]

Across the Atlantic, in Napoleonic Italy, rebels on the peninsula came to share Nugent's assessment of Louverturian leadership. Italian approbation had been a decade in the making. At the outset of the Saint-Dominguan Revolution, Italians, like most white inhabitants of the Atlantic world, viewed the black freedom fight with contempt. They modified this perspective after the French army invaded Italy in 1796 and they found themselves under the yoke of Napoleon's European dominance. They appreciated more readily the right of a people—black or white—to fight to secure freedom. After Louverture had taken de facto control of the Dominguan government, the *Gazzetta Universale* reported that the revolutionary colony now "enjoyed the most perfect tranquillity." Italians, like Americans, began to temper their criticism of the Louverturian administration by the decade's end.[39]

In the early nineteenth century, Italy was a collection of independent territories lacking national cohesion. Many initially greeted the Corsican commander as a republican liberator against provincial overlords. They quickly become disillusioned with high taxes to fund French military expeditions. French revolutionary thought and Napoleonic overreach sparked talk among serious reformers about a unified Italy with a distinctive societal identity. Southern Italians working in Milan encountered the ideas of patriots such as Filippo Buonarroti, Gasparo Angiolini, and Ugo Foscolo. In the cultural center of Florence, Vittorio Alfieri, in Louverturian fashion, encouraged Italians of every region to come "together and [learn] to bury their differences." French authorities and Italian sympathizers arrested resistance leaders. Yet the idea of a unified nation resonated with Italian patriots. Newspapers, pamphlets, and political clubs in northern Italy became vehicles of anti-French thought and resistance.[40]

Reports of Louverturian governance and Saint-Dominguan victories over European armies, including the French, arrived on the peninsula in the midst of a nationalistic upsurge. As Italian resistance gained momentum, rebels read of Dominguan revolutionary control over Hispaniola. In 1802, Italian writer Carlo Mantegazza traveled to Saint-Domingue, publishing his research there in

a book in which he deemed Louverture "a hero" who possessed "all the qualities that constitute a head of state: wisdom, good conduct that endeared him to the population, and his military talents, courage and intrepidity." Under his leadership, "the blacks have returned to work; the crops were blooming, and justice was very well administered."[41]

Around the same time, another book about Toussaint Louverture appeared in Italy. This work, written by a contemporary black author for European readers, probably sought to discourage Italian rebels from uniting against French occupation. In his stated objective of removing Louverture's "veil of lies," the author wrote disparagingly about the Saint-Dominguan Revolution and attempted to discredit the Dominguan leader as hiding his true intentions "under a cloak of virtue." However, the author was forced to concede that Louverture was regarded throughout the Atlantic world "as the guardian of Saint-Domingue, admired as a man of state, a shrewd politician, and a brave soldier." Ironically, in an effort to defame, the anonymous detractor penned a succinct compliment of Louverture: "There has never been a man of his color to reach such an eminent position of power." Like Nugent and Mantegazza, the author displayed a healthy respect for Louverturian leadership. A book intended to tarnish the Atlantic-world image of the Saint-Dominguan Revolution inadvertently lionized its leader: "All who work closely with him recognize the combination of virtue, political and military talents."[42]

LOUVERTURE'S END HAILS HAITI'S BEGINNING

Atlantic confidence in Louverture's crisis management in the midst of social unrest and civil war did not allay American concerns regarding the form of an independent Saint-Dominguan government. Adams had maintained measured skepticism about the capacity of a once-enslaved military commander with no formal education to lead a functional government. Treasury Secretary Oliver Wolcott further offered the president a view that echoed assessments by Pickering and Rufus King: "From the nature of things, such a government as [Louverture] maintains must be arbitrary and fluctuating." Wolcott proposed that U.S. politicos exercise restraint and dexterity in their policymaking toward Saint-Domingue. Pickering had previously endeavored to influence the structure of a Louverturian government. He sought a design from Hamilton, who advised, "No regular system of liberty will at present suit St. Domingo." Hamilton in-

stead suggested, "The government if independent must be military—partaking of the feudal system." The secretary of state presumably conveyed that message to Louverture through Stevens.[43]

As members of the Adams cabinet retired or pursued new ventures, very different futures awaited their counterparts in Hispaniola. On 4 February 1801, the seventh anniversary of emancipation and a month before Jefferson's inauguration, Louverture convened a multiracial Constitutional Assembly that included delegates from both the formerly French and Spanish parts of the island. The assembly adopted the Constitution of Saint-Domingue in May. Louverture signed it in July. Title I proclaimed the entire island of Hispaniola a unified country, Saint-Domingue. Title II codified a commitment to emancipation: "There cannot exist slaves on this territory, servitude is therein forever abolished."[44]

To what extent Louverture heeded Hamilton's advice on public administration remains murky. Since 1797, the Dominguan government had maintained a military character, with commanding generals acting as district governors. The Constitution of 1801 clearly possessed elements of Hamilton's "very crude" draft for executive leadership and public finance. Title VIII embodied the American prescription for military-style administration, including the appointment of Louverture as governor for life. Article 57 reflected Hamilton's suggestion that "duties of import and export, taxes on lands and buildings [are] to constitute the chief branches of revenue."[45]

Pickering and Hamilton's insistence on offering the Dominguan regime a constitutional schema reflected the condescending political views of High Federalists toward all others, including people of color. Louverture's governance demonstrated an astute temperament and political agility. The U.S. president and other officials, both in the United States and elsewhere, had misjudged the Dominguan's aptitude for domestic administration and Atlantic politics. In contrast, Monsieur Pascal, a disloyal aide to Louverture, warned Napoleon's government against costly miscalculations in a secret memorandum in which Pascal intimated that "the estimations in France of General Toussaint's character and capacity are overly contemptuous." On the contrary, Pascal suggested, Louverture "was more patient than insensible, more prudent than passionate." A decade of leading a revolution with enslaved Africans and suffering successive European betrayals had rendered Louverture mentally impenetrable. "No one in the world possesses his mastery of the mind coupled with a political education that has achieved so much." Despite strong French sympathies, Pascal,

similar to the anonymous Italian detractor, gained an evolving respect for the revolutionary leader after working closely with him. Pascal doubted if anyone in the Atlantic world could control or outmaneuver Louverture.[46]

Yet from the high-water mark of Hispaniolan politics represented by the Constitution of Saint-Domingue, Louverturian governance began a steep and steady decline. The unpopular labor policies, though economically successful, gradually created an atmosphere of discontent among the black leadership. This sentiment cost the governor the unquestioned loyalty of one of his longest-serving generals. On 29 October 1801, a revolt of black cultivators shouting "Death to all the whites!" broke out in the northern military district, one of the island's most productive regions. The insurgents killed several hundred white Dominguans. Suspicions of the rebellion quickly turned toward General Moyse, the district commander, who possessed a visceral resentment toward white people and openly disagreed with Louverturian labor policies. The district's black population loved Moyse for his support and his bold refusal to enforce the governor-general's prescribed punishments. Scant evidence suggested that Moyse led or planned the revolt, but he did very little to stop or punish the perpetrators. Louverture held Moyse personally responsible, concluding that he acted during the unrest as "the spirit and the chief." His actions set back Louverturian efforts to maintain order and temper racial animosities. Philadelphia Quaker Elizabeth Drinker read in newspapers the "shocking" (though inaccurate) news that Moyse supporters had captured and assassinated Louverture. The opposite, in fact, had occurred. Louverture, in stark contrast to Adams's response to Fries's Rebellion, ordered the summary execution of Moyse and hundreds of black insurgents.[47]

Louverture felt betrayed by the racial rampage. He published a dictum to deter future violence against white Dominguans in which he chastened the population: "Throughout the Revolution, I have made every effort to return happiness to my country, to ensure the freedom of my fellow citizens." He insisted that Dominguans of color follow his example regarding racial harmony and "not be guided by passions or follow destructive inclinations." Because of intolerance, Louverture warned, Moyse "had perished miserably. A similar end awaits all who wish to imitate him." The governor-general's desperate need to control all aspects of society moved Hispaniola toward dictatorial rule, a trajectory that exacerbated the racial frustration and treacherous ambitions among Louverturian lieutenants.[48]

The seeds of dissent among the Dominguan military leaders matured with

disastrous results after Napoleon's army landed at Cap Français on 3 February 1802 under the command of General Charles Victor Emmanuel Leclerc. Drinker learned from Philadelphia's newspapers that "a French fleet of 20,000 men arrived off Cape Francois, the Negroes would not suffer them to land, they however made the attempt, the town was set on fire by the blacks—shocking doings." After reports of Leclerc's expedition reached Jamaica, Maria Nugent recorded in her journal that "those poor wretches in St. Domingo prey upon my spirits." The U.S. and British governments offered no support to Hispaniola, though American merchants continued to trade with the island. Jefferson acquiesced to the invasion. African military victories and an improving multiracial society illustrated the shortcomings of his racial theses.[49]

By the summer of 1802, the Saint-Dominguan Revolution took a dramatic turn. Many Louverturian generals, among them Jean-Jacques Dessalines and Henry Christophe, defected to the French army. They attacked former officers and comrades of color to gain power and to ingratiate themselves with Leclerc. Louverture's behavior and decision making during this period became enigmatic and irregular. He had long been known for his extreme precautions regarding operational security and boasted a professional, well-trained personal security force. Yet in a bewildering episode of deception on 7 June, the general was betrayed, arrested, and swiftly deported to France. For ten years, Louverture had reigned as one of the Atlantic world's elite military leaders. Somehow, in one fell swoop, he had been deposed.

Out of this unsettling nadir in Saint-Dominguan history sprang the liberating drive toward black independence. Louverture's deportation and the resulting redefection of many black military leaders to the Dominguan side enabled radical revolutionaries and the black masses across the island to pursue an independent black nation-state. Throughout his administration, Louverture, for all his accomplishments and skills, had not declared Saint-Domingue independent from France, though the Atlantic world, the United States, France, and the Dominguan population had long awaited such a declaration. Toussaint Louverture had remained committed to liberty for people of color in Hispaniola, but he apparently believed that the best way to achieve that liberty was under the auspices of the white government in Paris.

Napoleon published an *arrêté* reestablishing slavery in the Caribbean. Generals Dessalines, Christophe, and Alexandre Pétion, a mulatto, broke ranks forever with the French and joined the relentless, little-known radical revolutionaries and the island's population of color to march for universal emancipa-

tion under a Black Atlantic nationalist agenda. This coalition gave birth to the Haitian Revolution. In 1803, the combined armies of black and mulatto Dominguans permanently evicted the French from the western third of Hispaniola. This decisive military victory by former slaves derailed Napoleonic ambitions in the West Indies. France had intended to reestablish Saint-Domingue as a Caribbean commercial center with French Louisiana as a supply post, sending agricultural products to feed black labor forces across the region. The loss of Saint-Domingue destroyed all hopes of reestablishing the French empire in the western Atlantic world. As a consequence and as a means to pay the mounting military costs of ongoing European warfare, Napoleon sold Louisiana to the United States.[50]

On 1 January 1804, Saint-Domingue, at one time the pearl of the French Antilles, ceased to exist. Dessalines declared the nation independent under its pre-Columbus Arawak name, Haiti. Dessalines served as governor-general, then emperor. Two years later, rivals assassinated him, plunging the world's first black nation-state into racially divided rule under Christophe in the north and Pétion in the south. In 1820, President Jean-Pierre Boyer reunited the country; five years later, he obtained official recognition from France after paying 150 million francs in reparations for the revolution.

General André Rigaud was not present to witness Haiti's birth. After his post-civil-war exile, he returned to Saint-Domingue as Leclerc's lackey. He had hoped to gain an important post in a French administration en route to ruling the island. When Leclerc could no longer exploit the mulatto population against Louverturian forces, the French army shipped Rigaud back to France as a prisoner. The general never surrendered his ambition to lead the island, and he returned to his power base in southern Haiti as the nation plunged into turbulent years of political instability. In 1810, the citizens of Les Cayes proclaimed Rigaud president and general in chief of the state of the south. He died there the next year of natural causes.[51]

Joseph and Marie Bunel made some difficult postindependence decisions. In 1802, Leclerc arrested the couple for failing to renounce the revolution. He also hoped to exploit their wealth to finance his expedition. Leclerc's successor, General Donatien Rochambeau, deported Joseph to France; Marie emigrated to Philadelphia. Joseph subsequently joined her there, and the two lifelong merchants established a mercantile house. They enjoyed an upscale lifestyle for an interracial couple in an increasingly segregated city. Although they could not celebrate independence with their fellow Haitian revolutionaries, the Bunels

maintained commercial and personal ties with the nation's first two leaders. By 1810, they returned to Haiti, where Joseph died five years later.[52]

Of all the major participants in Dominguan-American relations, the story of Toussaint Louverture had the most tragic ending. No other human did more to bring about the Atlantic world's first African-led nation with a multicultural population. Yet Louverture did not live to see Haiti's birth. Following his arrest on 7 June 1802, French soldiers escorted him and his family to France as prisoners. He never again saw either his family or his homeland, and he requested but never received a meeting with Napoleon. He also did not receive a public trial. Instead, the first consul ordered Louverture transported directly to a castle-prison, high in the snowcapped Jura Mountains, on the eastern edge of France, bordering Switzerland. There, in isolation, with no support system, Louverture drafted a seventy-five-page memoir intended to vindicate his actions. Napoleon did not read it.[53]

Both Louverture and Rigaud were imprisoned at the Fort de Joux penitentiary, though not at the same time. Louverture's confinement was brief. After seven months in a frigid twelve-foot by twenty-foot cell with but a window embrasure, the fifty-nine-year-old revolutionary governor-general died on 7 April 1803 of a respiratory infection. In a final, futile bid to obliterate Louverture's legacy from Dominguan hearts and from his deserved place in the annals of history, French officials discarded his body in an unmarked mass grave that to this day has escaped discovery.[54]

VIVE LA RÉVOLUTION!

Elizabeth Drinker received news of Louverture's death on 17 June 1803. She reflected that evening on the newspaper's report before penning her sentiments. "My heart is heavy; as the saying is—star light—'Toussaint Louverture, the celebrated African Chief, is dead. He died in prison, without a friend to close his eyes, and without ever having been visited by his Wife and Children, who were taken with him from St. Domingo.'" She sincerely lamented the loss of a black man she had never met. Her words indicted the cruel, dishonorable fashion in which the French had overseen his death. Drinker had followed the Saint-Dominguan Revolution and successive transformations on Hispaniola since 1791. She had chronicled segments of the general's rise. And like so many of her hue across the Atlantic world, Drinker came to admire and respect Louverture.[55]

A younger Thomas Jefferson famously wrote in 1787, "The tree of liberty

Figure 11. *Toussaint L'Ouverture Meurt dans la Prison*, n.d. The Dominguan governor died in prison as U.S. officials involved in Dominguan-American diplomacy retired or entered other ventures. His former lieutenants declared independence on 1 January 1804. Courtesy Library of Congress Collection, Washington, D.C.

must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots & tyrants." Unbeknownst to Jefferson, Louverture shared his affection for the "tree of liberty" symbolism. On 8 June 1802, viewing Cap Français for the last time from the deck of *L'Héros*, Louverture invoked the image to warn his French captors against underestimating the power of principles in the Saint-Dominguan Revolution: "In overthrowing me, you have only cut down the trunk of the tree of liberty of the blacks in Saint-Domingue: it will spring back from the roots, for they are numerous and deep." Even Louverture could not realize how deep those roots ran.[56]

Secretary of State Madison once dismissed the Adams-Louverture alliance as merely temporary. Death and desecration, however, could not halt the paths toward a greater Atlantic presence for their countries that Adams and Louverture had forged together. The Adams administration had sustained the Louverturian regime and the Saint-Dominguan Revolution's march toward universal freedom. It is unlikely that the Haitian Revolution could have been born and black independence won without arms, investment, and amity secured through twenty-one months of Dominguan-American diplomacy.

In spite of the political turmoil and natural disasters of its first two centuries, Haiti continues to stand as the flagship memorial to Toussaint Louverture. It also stands as a legacy to the courageous foreign policy of John Adams. Haiti's postindependence domestic infighting kept it from remaining relevant. European and American disdain for the black nation's existence relegated the once prosperous colony to the status of pariah, isolated on the periphery of Atlantic commerce.

Dominguan-American diplomacy from 1798 to 1801 encouraged the United States toward its ambitious destiny. Amicable ports across Hispaniola offered trade gains that helped to expand U.S. commerce and stature. In Louverture's Saint-Domingue, Americans enjoyed naval and commercial supremacy over the Europeans. Young officers Stephen Decatur, Oliver Hazard Perry, and Isaac Hull gained formative combat experience on the Saint-Dominguan station and went on to become naval heroes in the Barbary Wars and the War of 1812. The Haitians' defeat of France allowed Jefferson to purchase the Louisiana Territory—a gift from Adams and Toussaint Louverture.

The unlikely alliance between white Americans and black Dominguans long before emancipation and equality took hold in the United States illustrates the human capacity to circumvent racial conventions. Transracial diplomacy did not strike a direct blow at American slavery. However, it brought black people

and white people to a place of understanding before people of any color truly believed that such barriers could be breached. In Saint-Domingue, white Americans and revolutionaries of color employed extraordinary measures to accomplish their objectives. Both sides exploited geographic distance from U.S. racial tensions to draw unimaginably close to their counterparts of differing complexions. Officials displayed few hesitations about working as allied equals. Naval officers and crewmen acted under the dictates of maritime status etiquette to craft military strategy and effect joint operations across racial lines. The strides toward freedom of the Saint-Dominguan Revolution, made possible by cross-cultural collaboration, energized opposite sides of American debates over slavery right up to the Civil War and the Emancipation Proclamation.

The unofficial character and short duration of the alliance between Adams and Louverture obscured its contemporary importance and its historical relevance. The two leaders collaborated to achieve the interests of their respective governments. Their major achievements occurred through subterfuge and remain hidden. Their relationship ended with Adams's humiliating defeat and was followed quickly by Louverture's unceremonious death. The two revolutionaries nevertheless deserve historical commendation for their extraordinary engagement. Their two governments—one black, one white—jointly possessed the potential to shape subsequent independence movements and racial conflicts across the western Atlantic world. That was not to be. After John Adams and Toussaint Louverture, the two nations never again shared equal footing.

NOTES

Abbreviations

AA	Abigail Adams
Adams Works	John Adams, *The Works of John Adams*, ed. Charles Francis Adams, 10 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1851–65)
AH	Alexander Hamilton
AHR	J. Franklin Jameson, ed., "Letters of Toussaint Louverture and of Edward Stevens, 1798–1800," *American Historical Review* 16 (1910): 64–101
BS	Benjamin Stoddert
CT	Charles Talleyrand
DCH	Despatches from U.S. Consuls in Cap-Haïtien, Haiti, 1791–1906, National Archives, College Park, Md.
ES	Edward Stevens
Hamilton Papers	Alexander Hamilton, *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, ed. Harold Syrett, 27 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961–87)
HMC	Haiti Miscellaneous Collection, Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, New York Public Library, New York
Debates	*Debates and Proceedings of the Congress of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Gales and Seaton, 1851)
HSP	Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia
JA	John Adams
JM	James Madison
LCRK	Rufus King, *The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King*, ed. Charles R. King, 6 vols. (New York: Putnam's, 1894–1900)
Madison Papers	James Madison, *The Papers of James Madison: Secretary of State Series*, ed. Robert Brugger, 9 vols. (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1986–2011)
MAE Records	Records of the Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, France, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
Memoirs	George Gibbs, ed., *Memoirs of the Administrations of Washington and John Adams*, 2 vols. (New York: Van Norden, 1846)

Naval Documents	U.S. Department of the Navy, *Naval Documents Related to the Quasi-War between the United States and France*, 7 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1934–37)
OW	Oliver Wolcott
Pickering Papers	Timothy Pickering Papers, Humanities, Social Science, and Education Library, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Ind.
PL	Philippe Letombe
RK	Rufus King
ST	Silas Talbot
TJ	Thomas Jefferson
TL	Toussaint Louverture
TP	Timothy Pickering

INTRODUCTION. The Atlantic World

1. JA to AA, 5 March 1797, in *Adams Family Papers*; McCullough, *John Adams*, 467–71; Page Smith, *John Adams*, 2:917–20.

2. AA to JA, 12 March 1797, in *Adams Family Papers*; John Adams, "Inaugural Speech," 4 March 1797, in *Adams Works*, 9:105–10.

3. Korngold, *Citizen Toussaint*, 131; Beard, *Toussaint L'Ouverture*, 86.

4. Works on the Saint-Dominguan Revolution and the Haitian Revolution include Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*; Fick, *Making of Haiti*; Geggus, *Impact of the Haitian Revolution*; C. L. R. James, *Black Jacobins*; Popkin, *You Are All Free*. On debates over Louverture's involvement in the initial uprising, see Popkin, *You Are All Free*, 8.

5. Precisely when Louverture joined the march for freedom remains a mystery. His name does not appear on Yves Benot's list of leaders who emerged during the insurrection's first weeks after 22–23 August 1791—Boukman, Paul, Jeannot, Jean-François, and Georges Biassou (Geggus and Fiering, *World of the Haitian Revolution*, 99–110; Bell, *Toussaint Louverture*, 22–26; Nemours, *Toussaint Louverture*, 22–54; Pluchon, *Toussaint Louverture*, 22–28).

6. For the impact of the Saint-Dominguan Revolution on U.S. discussions of race and slavery, see Clavin, *Toussaint Louverture*; Hunt, *Haiti's Influence on Antebellum America*.

7. DeConde, *Quasi-War*; Ott, *Haitian Revolution*; Logan, *Diplomatic Relations*, 89; Kagan, *Dangerous Nation*, 46. For additional scholarship on U.S. relations with Saint-Domingue, see Egerton, "Empire of Liberty Reconsidered"; Wills, *"Negro President"*; Matthewson, "Jefferson and Haiti"; Hickey, "America's Response"; Matthewson, "George Washington's Policy"; Montague, *Haiti and the United States*; Tansill, *United States and Santo Domingo*; Lecorps, *Politique Extérieure de Toussaint-Louverture*; Treudley, "United States and Santo Domingo."

8. For the three historiographical pillars, see DeConde, *Quasi-War*; Gordon Brown,

Toussaint's Clause; Matthewson, *Proslavery Foreign Policy*; Wills, *"Negro President"*; Egerton, "Empire of Liberty Reconsidered."

9. Geggus and Fiering, *World of the Haitian Revolution*; Gaspar and Geggus, *Turbulent Time*.

10. Melish, *Disowning Slavery*; Richard S. Newman, *Transformation of American Abolitionism*; Rael, *Black Identity and Black Protest*. For other instructive works on U.S. race and slavery that use comparative, transregional methods, see David Brion Davis, *Inhuman Bondage*; Finkelman, *Slavery and the Founders*; Furstenberg, "Beyond Freedom and Slavery"; Litwack, *North of Slavery*; Sweet, *Bodies Politic*.

11. For Dominguan-American relations, see Matthewson, *Proslavery Foreign Policy*; Gordon Brown, *Toussaint's Clause*; Scherr, *Thomas Jefferson's Haitian Policy*.

12. Krenn, *Color of Empire*, 105; Dubois and Scott, *Origins of the Black Atlantic*, 2.

13. Genovese, *Roll, Jordan, Roll*, 3; Nesbitt, *Universal Emancipation*, 2; Dain, *Hideous Monster of the Mind*, viii.

14. Garrigus and Morris, *Assumed Identities*, 8; Sobel, *World They Made Together*, 5.

15. Horton and Horton, *In Hope of Liberty*, 155; Jack P. Greene and Morgan, *Atlantic History*, 154.

CHAPTER ONE. Saint-Dominguan Revolution

1. "An Act for the Relief of Joseph Robert Eustache Bunel" (in "Laws Passed Session 1805/06") suggests that Bunel was in the state in the early 1790s. For race relations in Philadelphia, Nash, *Forging Freedom*, 1–37.

2. Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*, 32–33; Ott, *Haitian Revolution*, 5–9; C. L. R. James, *Black Jacobins*, 46–50.

3. JA to Samuel Adams, 18 March 1780, in John Adams, *Papers*, 9:59; Ott, *Haitian Revolution*, 7; DeConde, *Quasi-War*, 91.

4. PL to CT, 20 December 1798, MAE Records, 50:361.

5. Jean Baptiste Ternant to George Washington, 24 September 1791, in Washington, *Papers*, 9:15–19; Jean Baptiste Ternant to Armand Marc de Montmorin, 28 September 1791, in Frederick J. Turner, *Correspondence*, 2:45–51; *Gazzetta Universale* (Florence), 19 November 1791.

6. Thelwall, *Incle and Yarico*, 48; George Thacher to Sarah Thacher, 21 October 1791, George Thacher Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; Diary Entry, 15 September 1791, in Drinker, *Diary*, 1:471; *Times* (London), 1 September 1791.

7. *Argus* (Boston), 25 November 1791; *American Museum, or Universal Magazine* (Philadelphia), March 1791, 153.

8. David Brion Davis, *Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution*, 136; Berlin, *Many Thousands Gone*, 228–55; White, "Limits of Fear," 362–97; Fehrenbacher, *Slaveholding Republic*, 135–50.

9. See Matthewson, *Proslavery Foreign Policy*; Gordon Brown, *Toussaint's Clause*.

10. *Pennsylvania Gazette* (Philadelphia), 2 January 1799.

11. Egerton, "Empire of Liberty Reconsidered," 310; Matthewson, *Proslavery Foreign Policy*, 19–36, 97–138.

12. Nash, *Forging Freedom*, 72; Winch, *Gentleman of Color*, 6, 152; Lawler, *President's House Slavery*.

13. Egerton, "Empire of Liberty Reconsidered," 314; Wills, *"Negro President,"* 519; Gordon Brown, *Toussaint's Clause*, 137; Matthewson, *Proslavery Foreign Policy*, 66–67.

14. General Ferrand to Denis Decrès, 10 April 1805, in Bonaparte, *Correspondance*, 378; Matinée, *Anecdotes*, 65. See also Girard, "Trading Races."

15. See *Salem (Mass.) Gazette*, 29 December 1798; *Centinel* (Boston), 17 December 1798; *Massachusetts Spy* (Worcester), 17 April 1799, 16 January 1799; Ronald Angelo Johnson, "Revolutionary Dinner," 119–20; TP to RK, 15 December 1798, TP to John Quincy Adams, 1 February 1799, Pickering Papers, reel 37, 372, reel 10, 305; ES to James Yard, 22 August 1799, DCH, reel 1; Tansill, *United States and Santo Domingo*, 45; TJ to Nicholas Lewis, 30 January 1799, TJ to JM, 30 January 1799, in Jefferson, *Papers*, 30:663–65.

16. *Registres Paroissiaux, Pont-Audemer*, 20; Girard, "Trading Races," 354–55; Gordon-Reed, *Thomas Jefferson and Sally Hemings*, 62, 166–69; Jordan, *White over Black*, 136–78; Morgan, *Slave Counterpoint*, 398–420; Genovese, *Roll Jordan Roll*, 413–31. For an instructive discussion of eighteenth-century biracial love and marriage, see Gordon-Reed, *Hemingses of Monticello*, 354–75.

17. General Ferrand to Denis Decrès, 10 April 1805, in Bonaparte, *Correspondance*, 378; Matinée, *Anecdotes*, 65; Gordon-Reed, *Thomas Jefferson and Sally Hemings*, 59–77, 105–33; *Debates*, 5th Cong., 3rd sess., 2752.

18. Geggus, *Haitian Revolutionary Studies*, 157–70; Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*, 62–88; C. L. R. James, *Black Jacobins*, 38–41, 70–75.

19. Girard, "Black Talleyrand," 87–124.

20. "An Act for the Relief of Joseph Robert Eustache Bunel," in "Laws Passed Session 1805/06"; Louis Ambrose Grandjean d'Aubancourt to Marie Françoise Bunel, 18 September 1804, "Nègres et Négresses de Madame Bunel," 6 December 1802, both in Bunel Papers, Arthur C. Bining Collection, HSP; de Cauna, *Toussaint Louverture*, 100.

21. TL to John Hollingsworth, 6 January 1799, in *Naval Documents*, 2:216; Girard, "Rebelles with a Cause," 67, 81; Ardouin, *Études sur l'Histoire d'Haïti*, 3:44; Henry Christophe to Marie Bunel, 12 June 1810, Marie Christophe to Marie Bunel, 3 September 1810, Louis d'Aubancourt to Marie Bunel, 18 September 1804, all in Bunel Papers; Pluchon, *Toussaint Louverture*, 187–88; Tansill, *United States and Santo Domingo*, 45; *Columbian Centinel* (Boston), 2 January 1799.

22. PL to CT, 20 December 1798, MAE Records, 50:361; *Philadelphia Gazette*, 20 December 1798; TL to JA, 6 November 1798, DCH, reel 1.

23. TP to Jacob Mayer, 24 December 1798, DCH, reel 1; PL to CT, 20 December 1798, MAE Records, 50:361. For a solid summary of the decline of U.S. relations with France, see DeConde, *Quasi-War*, 3–73.

24. For Adams's speech, see *Debates*, 5th Cong., 3rd sess., 2420–24.

25. *Philadelphia Directory* (1798), 113; Burke and Patterson, *Homes of the Department of State*, 21–24; Toogood, *Historic Resource Study*; TP to TL, 4 March 1799, DCH, reel 1.

26. PL to CT, 6 January 1799, MAE Records, 51:15; *Debates*, 5th Cong., 3rd sess., 2490.

27. For a summary of Washington's policy, see Matthewson, "George Washington's Policy," 321–36; Gordon Brown, *Toussaint's Clause*, 45–65.

28. Fick, *Making of Haiti*, 137–56; C. L. R. James, *Black Jacobins*, 95–107; Anna Julia Cooper, *Slavery and the French and Haitian Revolutionists*, 96–99.

29. "Observations on the French Part of Hispaniola . . . ," 15 October 1798, DCH, reel 1.

30. Richard Yates to TP, 30 April 1798, DCH, reel 1.

31. RK to TP, 14 July 1798, in *LCRK*, 2:367–68; John Quincy Adams to William Vans Murray, 14 July 1798, in John Quincy Adams, *Writings*, 2:336.

32. JA to TP, 17 April 1799, in *Adams Works*, 8:634–35.

33. JA to TP, 2 July 1799, in ibid., 8:661; DeConde, *Quasi-War*, 133–37; Egerton, "Empire of Liberty Reconsidered," 314–21; Wills, *"Negro President,"* 39; Gordon Brown, *Toussaint's Clause*, 146–49; William Bingham to RK, 8 December 1798, in *LCRK*, 2:481–83. For more regarding U.S. officials' views on Saint-Dominguan independence, see Ronald Angelo Johnson, "Revolutionary Dinner," 126–31.

34. Perkins argues, "Every nation views others in the world through a prism shaped by its own experience" (*Cambridge History*, 12, 15).

35. Ferdinando Galiani, 24 October 1784, in *Stati Uniti a Napoli*, ed. Spikes, 25–28; Alexandre Hauterive to Pierre-Auguste Adet, 1 July 1797, MAE Records, 48:3.

36. Gilbert, *To the Farewell Address*, 72–75; Fitzsimmons, "Tom Paine's New World Order," 570–75; Lambert, *Barbary Wars*, 59–65; Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 12. See also Kagan, *Dangerous Nation*, 57.

37. AA to JA, 22 September 1774, in *Adams Family Correspondence*, ed. Butterfield et al., 1:161–62; Gelles, *Abigail and John*, 76–77.

38. TP to RK, 8 March 1785, RK to TP, 15 April 1785, in *LCRK*, 1:42–46; Waldstreicher, *In the Midst*, 311; Murrin et al., *Essays on Liberty and Federalism*, 20–47; Finkelman, *Slavery and the Founders*, 13–33.

39. Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*, 76–88; Wills, *"Negro President,"* 30, 38.

40. Densmore, *Red Jacket*, 44.

41. TP to Anthony Wayne, 8 April 1795, 14 May 1795, 15 April 1795, in Wayne, *Anthony Wayne*, 400, 403, 406, 422.

42. John Thayer, "A Discourse Delivered at the Roman Catholic Church of Boston," 8 May 1798, in *Political Sermons*, ed. Sandoz, 1350–51.

43. PL to CT, 20 December 1798, MAE Records, 50:361; Richard Yates to TP, 30 April 1798, DCH, reel 1; TL to John Hollingsworth, 6 January 1799, in *Naval Documents*, 2:216.

44. TP to Jacob Mayer, 30 November 1798, DCH, reel 1; TP to William Smith, 13 February 1799, Pickering Papers, reel 10, 380–81; PL to CT, 20 December 1798, MAE Records, 50:362; *Centinel* (Boston), 17 December 1798; *Debates*, 5th Cong., 3rd sess., 2752.

45. Waldstreicher, *In the Midst*, 314.

CHAPTER TWO. U.S. Involvement

1. *Philadelphia Magazine and Review,* 1 January 1799.

2. *Debates*, 5th Cong., 3rd sess., 2564.

3. PL to CT, 6 January 1799, MAE Records, 51:15; Lawler, "President's House in Philadelphia," 5–95.

4. TL to Joseph Bunel, 6 January 1799, Historical Manuscript and Autograph Collection, Folder 102, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York. The French term *promission* has ties to the Venetian Republic, referencing authoritative contracts made in the name of the Doge.

5. TL to JA, 6 November 1798, DCH, reel 1. Use of "good intelligence" conveys the idea of "agreements, an accord, a union of sentiments" (TL to Joseph Bunel, 6 January 1799, Folder 102, Historical Manuscript and Autograph Collection, Roosevelt Library; White, *Encountering Revolution*, 34–46).

6. For historical claims that the Adams-Bunel meeting was the first presidential dinner with a member of the African diaspora, see McCullough, *John Adams*, 519; Wills, *"Negro President,"* 519; Gordon Brown, *Toussaint's Clause*, 137; Matthewson, *Proslavery Foreign Policy*, 66–67.

7. *Courier of New Hampshire* (Concord), 12 January 1799.

8. TP to AH, 9 February 1799, 25 February 1799, in *Hamilton Papers*, 22:474, 500.

9. RK, "Notebook 1794–1801," 6 November 1798, Rufus King Papers, MS 1660, vol. 73, New-York Historical Society, New York. See also *Gazette Française* (New York), 8 October 1798; TP to RK, 15 December 1798, Pickering Papers, reel 37, 372A; Ernst, *Rufus King*, 268–70; Perkins, *First Rapprochement*, 106–15.

10. RK to TP, 10 January 1799, in *LCRK*, 2:500, 502; RK, "Notebook 1794–1801," 10 January 1799, King Papers, vol. 73.

11. RK to TP, 10 January 1799, in *LCRK*, 2:499, 503; TP to RK, 15 December 1798, Pickering Papers, reel 37, 372–73; RK to AH, 21 January 1799, in *Hamilton Papers*, 22:426; RK, "Notebook 1794–1801," 10 January 1799, King Papers, vol. 73.

12. RK to TP, 10 January 1799, in *LCRK*, 2:502–3; RK to AH, 21 January 1799, in *Hamilton Papers*, 22:426; RK, "Notebook 1794–1801," 6 November 1798, King Papers, vol. 73.

13. Ernst, *Rufus King*, 265–69; RK to Messrs. Pinckney, Marshall, and Gerry,

2 April 1798, in *LCRK*, 2:301; RK, "Notebook 1794–1801," 10 January 1799, King Papers, vol. 73.

14. Girard, "Rêves d'Empire," 394–99; Diary Entry, 15 August 1794, in Drinker, *Diary*, 1:582–83.

15. Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*, 196–97; Fick, *Making of Haiti*, 183–90; Stewart R. King, *Blue Coat or Powdered Wig*, 65–75; Dubois and Scott, *Origins of the Black Atlantic*, 81; Moïse, *Dictionnaire Historique*, 275–81; Madiou, *Histoire d'Haïti*, 1:61; Doret, *André Rigaud*, 28–29; Commissioners to Commission of Foreign Relations, January 14, 1795, Joseph Fauchet to Committee of Public Safety, 21 March 1795, Pierre Adet to Committee of Public Safety, 15 December 1795, in Frederick J. Turner, *Correspondence*, 1:542–44, 2:613, 805.

16. Yacou, *Saint-Domingue Espagnol*, 187–201; Pierre Adet to Committee of Public Safety, 15 December 1795, in Frederick J. Turner, *Correspondence*, 2:805; Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*, 196.

17. Joseph Fauchet to Committee of Public Safety, 21 March 1795, in Frederick J. Turner, *Correspondence*, 2:613.

18. Pluchon, *Histoire de la Colonisation Française*, 901; Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*, 203; Fick, *Making of Haiti*, 191–92.

19. TL to Executive Directory, n.d., in *Francois Dominique Toussaint Louverture*, ed. Chignola, 8–9. Louverture's reference to "the end of the month of Frimaire, or the beginning of Nivose" likely dates the letter to late 1796 or early 1797.

20. Lokke, *France and the Colonial Question*, 160; Yacou, *Saint-Domingue Espagnol*, 203–10.

21. Earl of Malmesbury to Lord Grenville, 28 November 1796, in Malmesbury, *Diaries and Correspondence*, 3:334.

22. Geggus and Fiering, *World of the Haitian Revolution*, 165–69; Vaublanc, *Discours*, 46–47.

23. Lokke, *France and the Colonial Question*, 165–69; Talleyrand-Périgord, *Essai*, 289, 299.

24. Laveaux, *Réponse*, 14.

25. Talleyrand-Périgord, *Essai*, 297–301.

26. Leborgne, *Compte Rendu*, 8, 23; Joseph Leborgne to the Directory, 1 December 1796, quoted in Vertus Saint-Louis, *Origines du Drame d'Haïti*, 81; "Plan de. D. pour l'Approv't des Colonies," 11 September 1797, MAE Records, 48:237–38; Anna Julia Cooper, *Slavery and the French and Haitian Revolutionists*, 104.

27. Fauchet, *Sketch*, 27; Vertus Saint-Louis, *Origines du Drame d'Haïti*, 35–42; Saintoyant, *Colonisation Française*, 2:155.

28. Guerrero, *John Adams' Vice Presidency*, 55–85, 173–87.

29. AA to JA, 28 December 1793, JA to AA, 8 February 1794, 9 February 1794, in *Adams Family Papers*.

30. JA to AA, 3 May 1794, 9 February 1794, 16 January 1797, in ibid.

31. Diary Entry, 23 February 1777, in John Adams, *Diary*, 2:261; AA to Cotton Tufts, 28 November 1800, quoted in McCullough, *John Adams*, 553.

32. Diary Entry, 17 June 1771, in John Adams, *Diary*, 2:36.

33. James Sullivan to Jeremy Belknap, 9 April 1795, Jeremy Belknap Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston; Jared Ingersoll to Charles Cushing, 10 March 1798, quoted in O'Brien, "Did the Jennison Case Outlaw Slavery?" 221; Cushing, "Cushing Court," 133.

34. JA to Jeremy Belknap, 21 March 1795, in John Adams, *Legal Papers*, 2:48.

35. JA to Charles Dumas, 22 December 1784, William Vans Murray Papers, Box 5, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Adams's use of "the Port" likely refers to the Sublime Porte, a term for the central government of the Ottoman Empire, by reference to the gate giving access to the principal state departments in Istanbul.

36. Lambert, *Barbary Wars*, 51–118.

37. Hutson, *John Adams and the Diplomacy*, 11.

38. BS to John Barry, 16 January 1799, BS to Thomas Truxtun, 16 January 1799, in *Naval Documents*, 2:241–43.

39. Gilbert, *To the Farewell Address*, 136; Hutson, *John Adams and the Diplomacy*, 155.

40. *City Gazette and Daily Advertiser* (Charleston, S.C.), 9 January 1799.

41. *Debates*, 5th Cong., 3rd sess., 2724, 2741, 2564, 2572–74, 2583–85, 2677; TP to RK, 15 December 1799, Pickering Papers, reel 37, 372; TP to RK, 12 March 1799, in *LCRK*, 2:557.

42. *Debates*, 5th Cong., 3rd sess., 2749.

43. Quoted in Gallatin, *Writings*, 86; *Debates*, 5th Cong., 3rd sess., 2752.

44. *Debates*, 5th Cong., 3rd sess., 2741–42, 2750–52, 2769.

45. Ibid., 2743–44.

46. Senate Speech, 25 January 1820, quoted in Morison, *Harrison Gray Otis*, 430–32.

47. *Debates*, 5th Cong., 3rd sess., 2745.

48. Ibid., 2760–61.

49. Senate Speech, 20 January 1820, quoted in *Dodd*, *Life of Nathaniel Macon*, 322–23; *Debates*, 5th Cong., 3rd sess., 2676.

50. *Debates*, 5th Cong., 3rd sess., 2766–67.

51. Ibid., 2766; Hunt, *Haiti's Influence on Antebellum America*, 120.

52. *Debates*, 5th Cong., 3rd sess., 2746.

53. Papenfuse, *Evils of Necessity*, 1–37.

54. TJ to JM, 12 February 1799, in Jefferson, *Works*, 9:39–40.

55. TP to AH, 9 February 1799, in *Hamilton Papers*, 22:474; TP to RK, 12 March 1799, in *LCRK*, 2:557–58.

56. TP to AH, 9 February 1799, 20 February 1799, in *Hamilton Papers*, 22:474, 491–92.

57. AH to TP, 9 February 1799, 21 February 1799, TP to AH, 9 February 1799, in *Hamilton Papers*, 22:474–75, 492.

58. Clarfield, *Timothy Pickering and the American Republic*, 34; Wood, *Radicalism of the American Revolution*, 246–47.

59. RK to TP, 10 January 1799, in *LCRK*, 2:503.

CHAPTER THREE. Edward Stevens

1. *Senate Journal*, 5th Cong., 3rd sess., 11 February 1799; JA to TP, 17 April 1799, in *Adams Works*, 8:634–35.

2. OW to JA, 15 November 1799, in *Memoirs*, 2:300–301.

3. Day, *Edward Stevens*, 97; Gordon Brown, *Toussaint's Clause*, 153–55; DeConde, *Quasi-War*, 136; Matthewson, *Proslavery Foreign Policy*, 69; Hickey, "America's Response," 366–67; Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*, 224; Egerton, "Empire of Liberty Reconsidered," 315–16; Montague, *Haiti and the United States*, 37; Treudley, "United States and Santo Domingo," 134; Logan, *Diplomatic Relations*, 93–94; Palmer, *Stoddert's War*, 91; Tansill, *United States and Santo Domingo*, 46.

4. "Stevens," in Holsoe, *Virgin Island Families*; Chapman, "Slave Villages," 109.

5. Hall, *Slave Society*, 50–55.

6. Chernow, *Alexander Hamilton*, 23, 27–28; Day, *Edward Stevens*, 24, 35–40; Horton, "Alexander Hamilton," 16–24; Harold Larson, "Alexander Hamilton," 140–51; Peterson, "Black Treasure," 25.

7. AH to ES, 11 November 1769, in *Hamilton Papers*, 1:4–5; Diary Entry, 15 February 1831, "Edward Bliss Emerson's Puerto Rico Notes and Journal," Emerson Family Papers, MS Am 1280.235 (576), Ralph Waldo Emerson Memorial Association Deposit, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. Historical inferences to Hamilton's influence on Stevens's nomination include Logan, *Diplomatic Relations*, 93; Treudley, "United States and Santo Domingo," 134; Egerton, "Empire of Liberty Reconsidered," 316; DeConde, *Quasi-War*, 136; Gordon Brown, *Toussaint's Clause*, 153–54; Matthewson, *Proslavery Foreign Policy*, 69.

8. Roderick A. McDonald, "Slavery and Emancipation," 17; Haynes, "'Liberty Further Extended,'" 95. For more on the Black Atlantic, see Dubois and Scott, *Origins of the Black Atlantic.*

9. Richard S. Newman, *Lemuel Haynes*, 12; "Stevens," in Holsoe, *Virgin Island Families*; Sheridan, *Doctors and Slaves*, 45–54, 62; Hall, *Slave Society*, 85–86; Lawaetz, *St. Croix*, 309.

10. Sheridan, *Doctors and Slaves*, 42–46, 292–342; Jensen, "Colonial Crossroads," 8; Philip D. Morgan, "Slave Population," 5; Collins, *Practical Rules*, 252–66, 300–312.

11. Lawaetz, *St. Croix*, 309; "Stevens," in Holsoe, *Virgin Island Families*; William Thornton to ES, 2 September 1792, in Thornton, *Papers*, 207.

12. "Stevens," "Kortright," and "Yard," in Holsoe, *Virgin Island Families*; *Philadelphia Directory and Register* (1793), 157, 162.

13. Popkin, *You Are All Free*, 1.

14. White, *Encountering Revolution*, 34–123.

15. John Thomas Carré to Charles Willson Peale, ca. 1793, in Peale, *Selected Papers*, 2:79–83.

16. Nash, *Forging Freedom*, 140–42; Richard S. Newman, *Freedom's Prophet*, 63–71.

17. Prince Hall, "A Charge Delivered to the African Lodge, June 24, 1797," in *"Face Zion Forward,"* ed. Brooks and Saillant, 204.

18. Fanning, "Roots of Black Nationalism," 64–76; White, *Encountering Revolution*, 145–46; Cleves, *Reign of Terror in America*, 176–77.

19. Childs, *French Refugee Life*, 141–59; White, *Encountering Revolution*, 87–123; Estes and Smith, *Melancholy Scene of Devastation*, 119.

20. Diary Entries, 8 July 1793, 22–27 August 1793, in Drinker, *Diary*, 1:495–97.

21. AH to College of Physicians, 11 September 1793, in *Hamilton Papers*, 15:331.

22. ES to John Redman, 16 September 1793, in Rush, *Account*, 217, 221. Selected College of Physicians works consulted on yellow fever include Condie and Folwell, *History of the Pestilence*; Pascalis-Ouviere, *Account*; Cresson, *Meditations*; Currie, *Memoirs*; Benjamin Duffield, *List of Physicians*, ca. 1797, MSS 2/02/-01, College of Physicians Historical Medical Library, Philadelphia; Samuel Powell Griffitts, Diary, 20 July–30 November 1798, College of Physicians Historical Medical Library; Thomas Parke, *Cases of the Yellow Fever Which Occurred in the Pennsylvania Hospital in the Year 1798* (July 1805), College of Physicians Historical Medical Library; *Occasional Essays on the Yellow Fever*. Other studies that treat Stevens in the yellow fever epidemic include Tise, *American Counterrevolution*, 472; Clarfield, *Timothy Pickering and the American Republic*, 145–47; Pernick, "Politics, Parties, and Pestilence," 563; Day, *Edward Stevens*.

23. Edward and Hester Stevens lived briefly in New York City, where he served as a professor of medicine at his alma mater, then named Columbia College. By November 1795, the couple had returned to Philadelphia, and Stevens was again making medical house calls (*Prospect of Philadelphia* (1795), 123; *Catalogue of the Governors*, 29). On yellow fever, see Benjamin Rush to JA, 12 May 1807, in John Adams, *Spur of Fame*, 9, 15, 92; Condie and Folwell, *History of the Pestilence*, 57; Folwell, *Short History*, 32–36, 44, 60–63; *Time Piece* (New York), 18 October 1797; Gross, *Lives*, 386–87; Scharf and Westcott, *History of Philadelphia*, 2:1606; *Philadelphia Monthly Magazine*, 17 August 1798.

24. On Stevens as a Federalist, see Matthewson, *Proslavery Foreign Policy*, 69; Egerton, "Empire of Liberty Reconsidered," 315; Pernick, "Politics, Parties, and Pestilence," 563; Tise, *American Counterrevolution*, 482.

25. *Time Piece* (New York), 12 March 1798; Greg H. Williams, *French Assault on American Shipping*, 263; Thomas Mifflin to Don Ramón de Castro, 10 March 1798, Society Collection, HSP.

26. TP to Don Ramón de Castro, 12 July 1798, BS to John Barry, 11 July 1798, BS to Alexander Murray, 28 September 1798, BS to Messrs. Nicklin and Griffith, 28 September

1798, BS to Alexander Murray, 2 October 1798, in *Naval Documents*, 1:189–92, 199, 462, 464–65, 483.

27. *Philadelphia Magazine and Review*, 1799, 402; ES to TP, 3 May 1799, in *AHR*, 68.

28. ES to Thomas Maitland, 23 May 1799, in *Edward Stevens*, ed. Day, 118; Robert Goodloe Harper, 20 March 1799, in Cunningham, *Circular Letters*, 1:171.

29. du Pont, *Journey to France and Spain*, 88; Gaspar and Geggus, *Turbulent Time*, 141; Théodat, *Haïti, République Dominicaine*, 60; Sagás and Inoa, *Dominican People*, 62–64; Louis Ambrose Grandjean to Marie Bunel, 18 September 1804, Bunel Papers, Arthur C. Bining Collection, HSP; Juan Bautista Oyarzábal to ES, 3 January 1799, DCH, reel 1; Barros and Smith, *Life-Writings by British Women*, 393.

30. Juan Bautista Oyarzábal to ES, 3 January 1799, 20 February 1799, DCH, reel 1.

31. TP to ES, 16 December 1803, Pickering Papers, reel 14, 52; Robert Goodloe Harper, 20 March 1799, in Cunningham, *Circular Letters*, 1:171.

32. Juan Bautista Oyarzábal to ES, 3 January 1799, 20 February 1799, DCH, reel 1; TP, Political Notebook, 15 February 1822, Pickering Papers, reel 51, 250.

33. Marquis James, *Biography of a Business*, 18, 73, 112; *Weekly Magazine of Original Essays* (Philadelphia), 1798, 2:223; Herman, *Town House*, 253; James Yard to JM, 19 March 1801, in *Madison Papers*, 1:28–30; TP, Political Notebook, 15 February 1822, 29 June 1822, Pickering Papers, reel 51, 250, 302–3.

34. On Pickering, see Shaw, *Character of John Adams*, 254–55; Grant, *John Adams*, 385; Ellis, *Passionate Sage*, 33–34, 68; Clarfield, *Timothy Pickering and American Diplomacy*, 90–94; Elkins and McKitrick, *Age of Federalism*, 631–4l. Historical inferences to Hamilton's influence on Stevens's nomination include Logan, *Diplomatic Relations*, 93; Treudley, "United States and Santo Domingo," 134; Egerton, "Empire of Liberty Reconsidered," 316; DeConde, *Quasi-War*, 136; Gordon Brown, *Toussaint's Clause*, 153–54; Matthewson, *Proslavery Foreign Policy*, 69.

35. See also Gordon Brown, *Toussaint's Clause*, 50, 52, 62.

36. *Senate Executive Journal*, 4th Cong., 1st sess., 30 May 1796, 31 May 1796, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; TP to RK, 15 December 1798, Pickering Papers, reel 37, 372.

37. *Memoirs*, 2:227.

38. TP to ES, 16 December 1803, Pickering Papers, reel 14, 51–55; *Senate Executive Journal*, 5th Cong., 3rd sess., 16 February 1799, 18 February 1799, 21 February 1799; Gordon Brown, *Toussaint's Clause*, 154; Egerton, "Empire of Liberty Reconsidered," 315.

39. On Stevens's role in Saint-Domingue, see Gordon Brown, *Toussaint's Clause*, 153–55; DeConde, *Quasi-War*, 136; Matthewson, *Proslavery Foreign Policy*, 69; Day, *Edward Stevens*, 96; Ott, *Haitian Revolution*, 108; Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*, 224; Montague, *Haiti and the United States*, 37; TP to ES, 16 December 1803, Pickering Papers, reel 14, 54; TJ to Edmund Pendleton, 19 February 1799, in Jefferson, *Writings*, 9:115; AH to TP, 21 February 1799, in *Hamilton Papers*, 22:493.

40. PL to CT, 5 April 1799, MAE Records, 51, 117; OW to Samuel Smith, 20 March 1799,

OW to JA, 15 November 1799, in *Memoirs*, 2:228, 303–4; RK to AH, 21 January 1799, in *Hamilton Papers*, 22:426.

41. TP to unknown, 23 March 1802, Pickering Papers, reel 14, 29–29A.

42. TP to ES, 16 December 1803, Pickering Papers, reel 14, 52, 54; James Yard to JM, 19 March 1801, in *Madison Papers*, 1:29; TJ to Albert Gallatin, 19 February 1804, in Jefferson, *Writings*, 4:530.

43. Steiner, *Life and Correspondence*, 420; OW to Samuel Smith, 20 March 1799, in *Memoirs*, 2:228.

44. PL to CT, 6 January 1799, 25 February 1799, 16 March 1799, 5 April 1799, 17 April 1799, 27 April 1799, MAE Records, 51:15–142.

CHAPTER FOUR. Dominguan-American Diplomacy

1. BS to Thomas Tingey, 28 March 1799, in *Naval Documents*, 2:483; TP to RK, 3 April 1799, Pickering Papers, reel 10, 561; *Debates*, 5th Cong., 3rd sess., 2752; Charles Peale to Ambroise Palisot de Beauvois, 16 June 1799, Charles Peale to Raphaelle Peale, 4 September 1803, in Peale, *Selected Papers*, 2:243–47, 601–3.

2. BS to Thomas Tingey, 16 March 1799, in *Naval Documents*, 2:479. For information on the *Kingston*, see *Naval Documents*, 2:175, 3:81, 7:409.

3. TP to AH, 7 March 1799, DCH, reel 1; TP to ES, 28 February 1799, Pickering Papers, reel 10, 423–25; TP to AH, 9 February 1799, 20 February 1799, in *Hamilton Papers*, 22:473–75, 491.

4. TP to TL, 4 March 1799, DCH, reel 1; Tobias Lear to JM, 17 July 1801, in *Madison Papers*, 1:427.

5. OW to JA, 15 November 1799, in *Memoirs*, 2:301–2; TP to JA, 20 February 1799, DCH, reel 1; TP to ES, 26 February 1799, Pickering Papers, reel 10, 416; PL to CT, 17 April 1799, MAE Records, 51:128–29; BS to Samuel Smith, 16 March 1799, in *Naval Documents*, 2:480; OW to Samuel Smith, 20 March 1799, in *Memoirs*, 2:228–29.

6. Charles Lee to TP, 20 February 1799, DCH, reel 1; OW to JA, 15 November 1799, in *Memoirs*, 2:302; TP to JA, 20 February 1799, DCH, reel 1.

7. TP to JA, 20 February 1799, DCH, reel 1; PL to CT, 21 June 1799, MAE Records, 51:193; Honoré Pinson to TL, 13 March 1799, 28 April 1799, Toussaint Louverture Account Records, Borie Family Papers, Box 6, Folder 7, HSP

8. TP to JA, 20 February 1799, DCH, reel 1; OW to JA, 15 November 1799, in *Memoirs*, 2:301; Hunter Miller, *Treaties*, 2:383.

9. Charles Lee to TP, 20 February 1799, DCH, reel 1; "Suggestions by Dr. Stevens," Pickering Papers, reel 42, 183–84; George Washington to James McHenry, 11 August 1799, George Washington to TP, 11 August 1799, in Washington, *Writings*, 37:327–29; OW to JA, 15 November 1799, in *Memoirs*, 2:302. For Washington's financial interests in Saint-

Domingue, see George Washington to Clement Biddle, 6 June 1799, George Washington to James McHenry, 7 June 1799, in Washington, *Writings*, 37:220–21, 230–31.

10. JA to TP, 17 April 1799, in *Adams Works*, 8:634–35; TP to Stephen Higginson, 15 March 1799, in *Naval Documents*, 2:472.

11. "West Indies," *Philadelphia Magazine and Review, 1* April 1799.

12. Girard, "Black Talleyrand," 98–99; JA to TP, 2 July 1799, in *Adams Works*, 8:661.

13. AH to TP, 21 February 1799, TP to AH, 25 February 1799, in *Hamilton Papers*, 22:493, 500; Ellis, *Passionate Sage*, 33; *Memoirs*, 2:225.

14. JA to TP, 2 July 1799, in *Adams Works*, 8:661; Isani, "Far from 'Gambia's Golden Shore,'" 353–59.

15. Samuel Hopkins to Thomas Cushing, 29 December 1775, in John Adams, *Papers*, 2:388–90; *Thomas's Massachusetts Spy* (Worcester), 19 December 1798; Saillant, "Black Body Erotic," 403–7.

16. ES to TL, 18 April 1799, DCH, reel 1; Thomas Tingey to BS, 21 April 1799, in *Naval Documents*, 3:81–82; ES to TP, 6 May 1799, Pickering Papers, reel 42, 152; Korngold, *Citizen Toussaint*, 13–14; Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*, 22–26.

17. ES to TP, 6 May 1799, Pickering Papers, reel 42, 153; "Liaisons Commerciales entre Saint-Domingue et les États-Unis d'Amérique," 25 April 1799, MAE Records, 51:137–39; ES to TP, 3 May 1799, in *AHR*, 67; Korngold, *Citizen Toussaint*, 215; C. L. R. James, *Black Jacobins*, 251.

18. ES to TP, 6 May 1799, Pickering Papers, reel 42, 153; ES to TP, 3 May 1799, in *AHR*, 67.

19. ES to TP, 6 May 1799, Pickering Papers, reel 42, 153; ES to TP, 3 May 1799, in *AHR*, 67.

20. ES to TP, 6 May 1799, Pickering Papers, reel 42, 154; ES to TP, 3 May 1799, in *AHR*, 67.

21. *Philadelphia Magazine and Review, 1* January 1799; Dain, *Hideous Monster of the Mind*, 58–62; "Observations on the Negroes by Professor Blumenbach," *Monthly Magazine, and American Review,* 1 September 1799, 453–56; Charles Brockden Brown, *Arthur Mervyn*, 440.

22. "Observations on the Negroes by Professor Blumenbach," *Monthly Magazine, and American Review,* 1 September 1799, 453–56.

23. ES to TP, 6 May 1799, Pickering Papers, reel 42, 154; John Quincy Adams to William Vans Murray, 4 May 1799, in John Quincy Adams, *Writings*, 2:415; RK to TP, 14 June 1799, in *LCRK*, 3:46.

24. ES to TP, 6 May 1799, Pickering Papers, reel 42, 154; AH to TP, 9 February 1799, in *Hamilton Papers*, 22:475; ES to TP, 24 June 1799, in *AHR*, 77.

25. ES to TP, 6 May 1799, Pickering Papers, reel 42, 155.

26. Ibid.

27. TL to JA 28 April 1799, Joseph Bunel to unknown, 28 April 1799, ES to TP, 3 May 1799, Joseph Bunel to TP, 4 May 1799, DCH, reel 1; Citoyen Cassarrouy to Stephen Girard, 6 June 1799, in *Edward Stevens*, ed. Day, 103; Thomas Maitland to TP, 23 May 1799, in *Naval Documents*, 3:235; JA to TP, in *Adams Works*, 8:658.

28. ES to TP, 3 May 1799, TP to ES, 1 June 1799, DCH, reel 1; ES to TP, 6 May 1799, Pickering Papers, reel 42, 155; BS to JA, 29 May 1799, in *Naval Documents*, 3:272–73; JA to BS, 7 June 1799, in *Adams Works*, 8:655.

29. TL to Julien Raimond, 29 March 1799, TL to Citoyen Pascal, 15 April 1799, TL to Julien Raimond, 12 November 1798, Toussaint Louverture Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; TL to Étienne Bruix, Spring 1798, in *Francois Dominique Toussaint Louverture*, ed. Chignola, 57–64; PL to CT, 16 March 1799, 5 April 1799, 17 April 1799, MAE Records, 51:109–10, 116–17, 128–33; *Relazione della Spedizione*, 23.

30. PL to CT, 6 January 1799, 16 February 1799, 25 February 1799, 3 March 1799, 16 March 1799, 5 April 1799, MAE Records, 51:15, 58–59, 72–73, 84–85, 109–10, 116–17; ES to TP 23 June 1799, in *AHR*, 74; Gordon Brown, *Toussaint's Clause*, 159–60; Korngold, *Citizen Toussaint*, 154; "Convention Secrete," 13 June 1799, DCH, reel 1. An Italian newspaper reported that Louverture, Stevens, and Roume negotiated a bilateral Dominguan-American commercial treaty, with no mention of Maitland or British involvement (*Gazzetta Universale* [Florence, Italy], 24 October 1799).

31. ES to TP, 6 May 1799, Pickering Papers, reel 42, 155–57; TP to Charles Pinckney, 16 May 1799, in *Naval Documents*, 3:193; PL to CT, 22 August 1799, MAE Records, 51:221–26; "Convention Secrete," 13 June 1799, DCH, reel 1.

32. ES to TP, 26 October 1799, in *AHR*, 86.

33. Purchase Order, 11 June 1800, Saint-Domingue Government Accounts, Borie Family Papers, Series 5b, Box 6, Folder 8; Purchase Order, 23 May 1801, "Toussaint Louverture Account Records," Borie Family Papers, Series 5b, Box 6 Folder 7; Korngold, *Citizen Toussaint*, 13–14.

34. Purchase Order, 11 June 1800, Saint-Domingue Government Accounts, Borie Family Papers, Series 5b, Box 6, Folder 8; Purchase Order, 23 May 1801, Toussaint Louverture Account Records, Borie Family Papers, Series 5b, Box 6, Folder 7; Bell, *Toussaint Louverture*, 73, 120–21; Korngold, *Citizen Toussaint*, 215; ES to TP, 6 May 1799, Pickering Papers, reel 42, 159; *AHR*, 74. For details on Stevens's residence in Cap Français, see Korngold, *Citizen Toussaint*, 13–14.

35. ES to TP, 30 September 1799, 26 October 1799, in *AHR*, 84, 86.

36. ES to ST, 2 January 1800, William Maley, "Journal of *U.S.S. Experiment*," 1 January 1800, Robert Ritchie, "Protest," 3 January 1800, in *Naval Documents*, 5:1–7; ES to TP, 16 January 1800, in *AHR*, 88–89.

37. ES to TP, 27 December 1799, in *Naval Documents*, 4:570.

38. ES to TP, 16 January 1800, in *AHR*, 90.

39. TL to ES, 21 March 1800, [1800], 16 March 1800, DCH, reel 1.

40. Tobias Lear to JM, 20 July 1801, in *Madison Papers*, 1:445.

41. ES to TP, 24 June 1799, in *AHR*, 79; ES to TP, 6 May 1799, Pickering Papers, reel 42, 154.

42. Lundahl, "Toussaint L'Ouverture," 124; Geggus and Fiering, *World of the Haitian Revolution*, 119; Horn, Lewis, and Onuf, *Revolution of 1800*, 299.

43. TP to JA, 19 March 1799, Pickering Papers, reel 10, 493; TP to RK, 14 March 1799, in *LCRK*, 2:558.

44. TL to Julien Raimond, 12 November 1798, Louverture Papers; ES to John Marshall, 10 September 1800, in *AHR*, 101; Popkin, *Facing Racial Revolution*, 280; Lundahl, "Toussaint L'Ouverture," 135; "West India News," *Philadelphia Magazine and Review*, 1 June 1799; Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*, 224.

45. PL to CT, 22 August 1799, MAE Records, 51:221–26; Lundahl, "Toussaint L'Ouverture," 126; Pluchon, *Toussaint Louverture*, 274–84; Girard, "Black Talleyrand," 97; DeConde, *Quasi-War*, 124; Gordon Brown, *Toussaint's Clause*, 176; Ott, *Haitian Revolution*, 132; Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*, 225.

46. Girard, "Black Talleyrand," 91; de Cauna, *Toussaint Louverture*, 69–74; Palmer, *Stoddert's War*, 75.

47. Pluchon, *Toussaint Louverture*, 262; Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*, 226–28; C. L. R. James, *Black Jacobins*, 156–57; Lundahl, "Toussaint L'Ouverture," 129.

48. *North-Carolina Journal* (Halifax), 24 December 1798, 18 February 1799, 15 April 1799; Rigaud, *Réponse du Général de Brigade André Rigaud*, 2–7; Geggus and Fiering, *World of the Haitian Revolution*, 119; de Cauna, *Toussaint Louverture*, 91–95; Bell, *Toussaint Louverture*, 158–61; *Gazzetta Universale* (Florence, Italy), 28 July 1798, 2 June 1801; Edward Corbett to Earl of Balcarres, 31 March 1801, in Tyson, *Toussaint L'Ouverture*, 92; Lundahl, "Toussaint L'Ouverture," 130.

49. TL, "Regolamento per le Colture," 12 October 1800, in *Francois Dominique Toussaint Louverture*, ed. Chignola, 94.

50. Ibid., 93–97.

51. "Nouvelles Officielles," 19 February 1802, 2, HMC, Toussaint Louverture Folder 2.

52. Nesbitt, *Universal Emancipation*, 79; TL, "Regolamento per le Colture," 12 October 1800, in *Francois Dominique Toussaint Louverture*, ed. Chignola, 93. For views on Toussaint Louverture and universal emancipation, see Nesbitt, *Universal Emancipation*, 78–80, 153–76; Garraway, *Tree of Liberty*, 63–84; Fischer, *Modernity Disavowed*, 229–30.

53. Albert Gallatin, Speech to the House of Representatives, January 1799, in Tyson, *Toussaint L'Ouverture*, 95–96; Jean-Jacques Dessalines in Bell, *Toussaint Louverture*, 204.

54. TL, Open Letter, 19 February 1802, 3–4, HMC, Toussaint Louverture Folder 2. For a fuller discussion of tensions between black and white Dominguans over plantation ownership, see Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*, 226–30; Popkin, *Facing Racial Revolution*, 274–76.

55. *New Hampshire Gazette* (Portsmouth), 24 June 1800, in *Naval Documents*, 5:473;

Charles Peale to Raphaelle Peale, 4 September 1803, Charles Peale to Ambroise Palisot de Beauvoir, 16 June 1799, in Peale, *Selected Papers*, 2:243–48, 601–2.

56. de Cauna, *Toussaint Louverture*, 92.

57. ES to TP, 6 May 1799, Pickering Papers, 42, 152–65; ES to TP, 23 June 1799, 24 June 1799, in *AHR*, 74–79.

58. JA to BS, 7 June 1799, JA to TP, 15 June 1799, in *Adams Works*, 8:655, 658.

59. ES to TP, 24 June 1799, ES to TP, 16 January 1800, in *AHR*, 80–81, 91–92.

60. Lambert, *Barbary Wars*, 42–48.

61. JA to TP, 15 June 1799, in *Adams Works*, 8:658; TP to John Quincy Adams, 24 April 1799, Pickering Papers, reel 10, 632; BS to JA, 25 July 1799, in *Naval Documents*, 3:538–39; OW to JA, November 1799, in *Memoirs*, 2:303–4.

62. JA to TP, 15 June 1799, in *Adams Works*, 8:658.

63. TP to RK, 12 March 1799, in *LCRK*, 2:557–58; BS to JA, 23 September 1799, in *Naval Documents*, 4:217.

64. Edward Corbett to Earl of Balcarres, 31 March 1801, in Tyson, *Toussaint L'Ouverture*, 92.

65. OW to JA, November 1799, in *Memoirs*, 2:303–4; JA to TP, 12 November 1799, JA to OW, 15 November 1799, in *Adams Works*, 9:41; John Adams, "Speech to Both Houses of Congress," 3 December 1799, in *Adams Works*, 9:138.

66. *Pennsylvania Gazette* (Philadelphia), 18 December 1799.

CHAPTER FIVE. Allied Command

1. Fowler, *Silas Talbot*, 17; Palmer, *Stoddert's War*, 79–81.

2. ST to JA, 9 July 1799, Silas Talbot Papers, MSS 747, Box 1, Folder 25, Rhode Island Historical Society, Providence.

3. JA to ST, 8 July 1799, in ibid.

4. Fowler, *Silas Talbot*; Tuckerman, *Life of Silas Talbot*.

5. JA to BS, 23 July 1799, Logbook Extract, USS *Constitution*, 23 July 1799, in *Naval Documents*, 3:528–33.

6. Journal Extract, USS *Constitution*, 15–17 October 1799, in ibid., 4:289–93; Rigaud, *Réponse du Général de Brigade André Rigaud*, 6; ES to TP, 24 June 1799, in *Naval Documents*, 3:389–93; [PL] to CT, 23 August 1799, MAE Records, 51:227–28.

7. ES to TP, 24 June 1799, in *Naval Documents*, 3:391.

8. Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*, 224; Stephen Higginson to TP, 20 September 1799, 3 October 1799, Stephen Higginson to Le Roy, Bayard, and McEvers, 28 October 1799, in Stephen Higginson, "Letters," 825–30; BS to Stephen Higginson, 27 September 1799, in *Naval Documents*, 4:235; James Yard to JM, 19 March 1801, in *Madison Papers*, 1:29–30; PL to CT, 13 June 1800, MAE Records, 52:68.

9. ES to TP, 9 December 1799, in *Naval Documents*, 4:503–6; ES to TP, 27 December 1799, Pickering Papers, reel 42, 217–218A.

10. TP to ES, 14 November 1799, Pickering Papers, reel 12, 337–39; BS to ST, 15 January 1800, in *Naval Documents*, 5:82–83.

11. ES to ST, 23 January 1800, ST to Christopher Perry, 5 April 1800, in *Naval Documents*, 5:119–20, 385.

12. Alexander Murray to BS, 31 July 1800, in ibid., 6:211; Palmer, *Stoddert's War*, 157; Fowler, *Silas Talbot*, 161.

13. BS to ST, 15 January 1800, in *Naval Documents*, 5:82–83.

14. ST to Christopher Perry, 18 January 1800, "Letter from *General Greene* Officer," 27 April 1800, in ibid., 5:94, 250–51.

15. "Letter from *General Greene* Officer," 27 April 1800, in *Naval Documents*, 5:250–51; Girard, "Black Talleyrand," 109; Palmer, *Stoddert's War*, 162; Gordon Brown, *Toussaint's Clause*, 171; Perry, *Perrys of Rhode Island*, 64.

16. H. L., "Termination of Negro Slavery," *Monthly Magazine, and American Review (New York), 1* February 1800; "Rush and His Supporters," *Rush-Light* (New York), 28 February 1800.

17. Z, "Bear Ye One Another's Burdens," *Cheap Repository* (Philadelphia), 1 January 1800.

18. *Baltimore Weekly Magazine*, 28 April 1800; *Pennsylvania Gazette* (Philadelphia), 12 March 1800; *Weekly Museum* (New York), 10 May 1800; Perry, *Perrys of Rhode Island*, 66; James Fenimore Cooper, "Oliver Hazard Perry," 266.

19. "Letter from *General Greene* Officer," 27 April 1800, Protest of Jeppe Didricksen, 3 March 1800, Christopher Perry to ES, 17 March 1800, in *Naval Documents*, 5:250–51, 266–69, 318; Skaggs, *Oliver Hazard Perry*, 17.

20. Christopher Perry to a Gentleman in Providence, 5 December 1799, Extract of Christopher Perry, 14 December 1799, in *Naval Documents*, 4:468–69, 537. Perry's letters embarrassed the administration, prompting the president to forbid military officers from publishing letters on public affairs (BS to ST, 23 January 1800, in *Naval Documents*, 5:120–21).

21. TL to ES, 16 March 1800, Protest of Jeppe Didricksen, 3 March 1800, in *Naval Documents*, 5:309–10, 266–69. See also "Letter from *General Greene* Officer," 27 April 1800, in *Naval Documents*, 5:250–51; Palmer, *Stoddert's War*, 163; Skaggs, *Oliver Hazard Perry*, 22. The estimated value of Louverture's gift is based on coffee rates quoted in the *Gazette of the United States* (Philadelphia) throughout 1800, when the average price was twenty-six cents per pound.

22. ST to Archibald McElory, 12 July 1800, "Court of Enquiry to Investigate Captain Perry," 13 October 1800, in *Naval Documents*, 6:140, 472–73; Palmer, *Stoddert's War*, 163, 170–72; Skaggs, *Oliver Hazard Perry*, 22.

23. Christopher Perry to BS, 12 April 1800, in Skaggs, *Oliver Hazard Perry*, 17; ST to BS, 26 April 1800, Journal of Isaac Hull, 26 April 1800, USS *General Greene* Logbook, 26 April 1800, in *Naval Documents*, 5:458–59, 461–62.

24. Christopher Perry to ST, 25 April 1800, 26 April 1800, ST to BS, 26 April 1800, ST to Christopher Perry, 26 April 1800, USS *General Greene* Logbook, 27 April 1800, in *Naval Documents*, 5:446–47, 457–60, 463; Skaggs, *Oliver Hazard Perry*, 17–22.

25. *Rush-Light* (New York), 28 February 1800; Wylie, "Ethnohistory and Political Change," 121; More, *Black Prince*; *Columbian Phoenix and Boston Review*, April 1800; *Cheap Repository* (Philadelphia), January 1800; *New-York Missionary Magazine*, 1–2 January 1800.

26. Lacey, "Visual Images," 160–62; Sypher, "African Prince in London," 245–47.

27. TL to ST, 16 April 1800, Talbot Papers, Box 1, Folder 32; TL to ES, 21 March 1800, in *Naval Documents*, 5:336.

28. Palmer, *Stoddert's War*, 162.

29. TL to ST, 21 March 1800, Talbot Papers, Box 1, Folder 31.

30. ES to ST, 26 March 1800, ST to ES, 28 March 1800, Journal of Isaac Hull, 31 March 1800, in *Naval Documents*, 5:349, 355, 369.

31. ST to ES, 28 March 1800, in *Naval Documents*, 5:355.

32. ES to TP, 4 April 1800, in ibid., 5:383.

33. TL to ST, 16 April 1800, Talbot Papers, Box 1, Folder 32.

34. Ibid.; ST to George Little, 5 May 1800, in *Naval Documents*, 5:480.

35. ST to Archibald McElroy, 12 July 1800, in *Naval Documents*, 6:139–40; Palmer, *Stoddert's War*, 180.

36. TL to ST, 10 July 1800, Talbot Papers, Box 1, Folder 34.

37. Journal of USS *Constitution*, 16 July 1800, Isaac Hull Journal, 16 July 1800, in *Naval Documents*, 6:157; *Pennsylvania Gazette* (Philadelphia), 3 September 1800.

38. ST, "Memorandum of Mr. Collins's Conduct at Cape François," 17 July 1800, Silas Talbot Collection, Coll. 18, Box 7, Folder 4, G. W. Blunt White Library, Mystic Seaport Museum, Mystic, Conn.; Fowler, *Silas Talbot*, 166.

39. ST, "Memorandum of Mr. Collins's Conduct at Cape François," 17 July 1800, Silas Talbot Collection, Coll. 18, Box 7, Folder 4.

40. ST to David Jewett, 22 July 1800, in *Naval Documents*, 6:165–66.

41. TL to ST, 22 July 1800, Talbot Papers, Box 1, Folder 35.

42. BS to ST, 3 September 1800, in *Naval Documents*, 6:315.

43. Bolster, *Black Jacks*, 80–88, 129–38; Langley, "Negro in the Navy," 274; Journal of Silas Talbot, 15 July 1800, Journal of Isaac Hull, 15 July 1800, in *Naval Documents*, 6:154–55.

44. TL to Robert Ritchie, 9 July 1799, Simon Gratz Collection 250a, Case 13, Box 34d, HSP.

45. ES to TP, 27 April 1800, in *AHR*, 98; Beard, *Toussaint L'Ouverture*, 106; Korngold, *Citizen Toussaint*, 215–18.

46. Fowler, *Silas Talbot*, 67.

47. Lorenzo J. Greene, "Some Observations," 143; Rider, *Rhode Island Historical Tracts*, 53, 73; Stone, *Our French Allies*, 86.

48. Fowler, *Silas Talbot*, 124.

49. Bolster, *Black Jacks*, 90–91, 101.

50. Williams and Rhenisch, *Mutual Accommodation*, 325–26.

51. BS to ST, 3 September 1800, in *Naval Documents*, 6:315.

52. Fowler, *Silas Talbot*, 188–89, 195.

CHAPTER SIX. The United States and Hispaniola

1. Beard, *Toussaint L'Ouverture*, 126–27; Ros, *Night of Fire*, 115–20; Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*, 236–38; Sannon, *Histoire de Toussaint-Louverture*, 2:205–28; de Cauna, *Toussaint Louverture*, 108–9; C. L. R. James, *Black Jacobins*, 237–39; Bell, *Toussaint Louverture*, 186–91.

2. For the Spanish cession of Santo Domingo, see Moya Pons, *Dominican Republic*, 91–116; Schaeffer, "Delayed Cession," 46–68.

3. Korngold, *Citizen Toussaint*, 166, 219; Beard, *Toussaint L'Ouverture*, 126–27; Ros, *Night of Fire*, 115–20; Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*, 236–38; de Cauna, *Toussaint Louverture*, 108–9; Bell, *Toussaint Louverture*, 186–91.

4. OW to Samuel Smith, 23 January 1800, in *American State Papers*, 2:285–86.

5. *Debates*, 6th Cong., 1st sess., 519, 528.

6. Ibid., 528–29.

7. Ibid., 54–62.

8. Ibid., 529.

9. Ibid. Section 10 was not included in the final version of the Intercourse Act of 1800. Stevens tried for the next two decades to secure the monies that Adams and Pickering had promised him.

10. *Debates*, 6th Cong., 1st sess., 62, 531.

11. Marc Giraud to CT, 1 March 1800, PL to CT, 30 June 1800, MAE Records, 51:349–50, 52:123.

12. ES to TP, 26 October 1799, 3 December 1799, in *AHR*, 85–88; Schaeffer, "Delayed Cession," 61.

13. Ros, *Night of Fire*, 116; Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*, 236–37; ES to TP, 27 April 1800, in *AHR*, 98.

14. ES to TP, 16 January 1800, 16 March 1800, 19 April 1800, in *AHR*, 88–95. Louverture released Roume from the Government House on 10 April 1800.

15. The Dominguan administration and population greeted the first consul's next commission delegation with insults, mistreatment, and imprisonment. See ES to TP, 19 April 1800, 27 April 1800, in *AHR*, 95–96, 98; ES to TP, 24 April 1800, DCH, reel 1; Schaeffer, "Delayed Cession," 62.

16. ES to TP, 19 April 1800, 24 April 1800, DCH, reel 1.

17. ES to TP, 13 February 1800, 24 April 1800, 27 April 1800, in *AHR*, 93, 97.

18. ES to TP, 19 April 1800, DCH, reel 1.

19. Charles Lee to ES, 21 May 1800, in *Naval Documents*, 5:541–42.

20. John Adams, *Discourses on Davila*, 20–21. The essays originally appeared in 1790 as individual articles in the *Gazette of the United States* (Philadelphia). See also Gelles, *Abigail and John*, 226–30. For relevant discussions on the United States of the late eighteenth century, see Wood, *Radicalism of the American Revolution*; Bailyn, *Ideological Origins*; Appleby, *Inheriting the Revolution*.

21. ES to TP, 6 May 1799, Pickering Papers, reel 42, 154.

22. Paul Douglas Newman, "Fries's Rebellion"; Henderson, "Treason, Sedition, and Fries' Rebellion," 308–18; Grant, *John Adams*, 410–12.

23. Bradburn, "Clamor in the Public Mind," 565–600.

24. TL, Proclamation, 7 April 1796, HMC, Toussaint Louverture Folder.

25. TL, 17 March 1800, Henri Grégoire Papers, Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, New York Public Library, New York; TL, Decree on Public Finance, 14 May 1800, HMC, Toussaint Louverture Folder 1.

26. "Ordonnance de Toussaint Louverture," 14 October 1800, HMC, Toussaint Louverture Folder 1; TL, Circular Letter, 23 September 1798, HMC, Hédouville Correspondence Folder 2.

27. ES to TP, 24 June 1799, in *Naval Documents*, 3:389–93; ES to John Marshall, 10 September 1800, in *AHR*, 101.

28. ES to TP 28 May 1800, 27 May 1800, in *AHR*, 98–100.

29. Alexander Murray to TL, 25 July 1800, in *Naval Documents*, 6:178–79.

30. Alexander Murray to David Jewett, 27 July 1800, 31 July 1800, TL to Alexander Murray, 17 September 1800, Alexander Murray to BS, 28 August 1800, in *Naval Documents*, 6:186, 210–11, 357, 300.

31. DeConde, *Quasi-War*, 272–73; Page Smith, *John Adams*, 2:1020.

32. John Marshall to JA, 6 September 1800, in Marshall, *Papers*, 4:261–63.

33. Ibid.; Proclamation on Commerce between United States and Hispaniola, 6 September 1800, in *Naval Documents*, 6:321–22.

34. Pierre Forfait to CT, 7 April 1800, 19 April 1800, MAE Records, 51:420–21, 467–69.

35. PL to CT, 30 June 1800, MAE Records, 52:123–24, 126.

36. "Instructions for the Ministers Plenipotentiary of France," April 1800, MAE Records, 51:389–95.

37. Ibid.; "Instructions to Ministers Plenipotentiary of the United States," 22 October 1799, in *American State Papers*, 2:306.

38. JA to TP, 6 August 1799, in *Adams Works*, 9:11; ES to John Marshall, 10 September 1800, DCH, reel 1; *European Magazine, and London Review*, July–December 1802, 319, in *Madison Papers*, 1:394 n. 3, 462 n. 3; TP to George Cabot, 16 June 1800, in Lodge, *Life and Letters*, 277.

39. John Marshall to TL, 26 November 1800, in Marshall, *Papers*, 6:22; DeConde, *Quasi-War*, 283.

40. Horn, Lewis, and Onuf, *Revolution of 1800*, 80–81, 322; BS to ST, 18 November 1800, in *Naval Documents*, 6:536–37.

41. ES to TP, 24 May 1800, DCH, reel 1.

42. Yacou, *Saint-Domingue Espagnol*, 250–57; Beard, *Toussaint L'Ouverture*, 126–27; Ros, *Night of Fire*, 115–20; Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*, 236–38; Sannon, *Histoire de Toussaint-Louverture*, 2:205–28; de Cauna, *Toussaint Louverture*, 108–9; C. L. R. James, *Black Jacobins*, 237–39; Bell, *Toussaint Louverture*, 186–91.

43. On Federalist involvement in the Saint-Dominguan Revolution, see Gordon Brown, *Toussaint's Clause*, 137–43; DeConde, *Quasi-War*, 133–34; Egerton, "Empire of Liberty Reconsidered," 314–15; Logan, *Diplomatic Relations*, 79–82.

44. *Pennsylvania Gazette* (Philadelphia), 17 December 1800.

CHAPTER SEVEN. After Adams and Louverture

1. McCullough, *John Adams*, 537. For the 1800 presidential election, see Horn, Lewis, and Onuf, *Revolution of 1800*; Ferling, *Adams vs. Jefferson*; Weisberger, *America Afire*.

2. *National Magazine* (Richmond, Va.), 1 December 1800.

3. JA to AA, 16 February 1801, in *Adams Family Papers*.

4. AA to JA, 21 February 1801, in ibid.; JA to James Lloyd, 31 March 1815, in *Adams Works*, 19:154–55.

5. JA to George Churchman and Jacob Lindley, 24 January 1801, in ibid., 9:92.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.; Diary Entry, July–August 1804, John Adams, *Diary and Autobiography*, 3:249–50.

9. TJ to JM, 12 March 1801, Louis-André Pichon to JM, 7 May 1801, JM to Tobias Lear, 1 June 1801, JM to Robert Livingston, 28 September 1801, in *Madison Papers*, 1:12–13, 146–47, 243–44, 2:146; Lecorps, *Politique Extérieure*, 5; Walter B. Smith, *America's Diplomats and Consuls*, 35, 107.

10. Tobias Lear to JM, 17 July 1801, TJ to JM, 22 August 1801, in *Madison Papers*, 1:427, 2:60.

11. Tobias Lear to JM, 26 July 1801, 27 July 1801, 30 August 1801, in *Madison Papers*, 1:445, 483, 2:74.

12. Tobias Lear to JM, 17 August 1801, in *Madison Papers*, 2:54; ES to TP, 16 October 1803, Pickering Papers, reel 26, 309–10.

13. TP to ES, 23 March 1802, 16 December 1803, Pickering Papers, reel 14, 28–28A, 51–55; TP to William Thornton, 4 January 1826, Pickering Papers, reel 16, 83–83A; TJ to Albert Gallatin, 19 February 1804, 12 June 1804, Thomas Jefferson Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

14. "Kortright" and "Stevens," in Holsoe, *Virgin Island Families*; ES to Gouverneur and Kemble, 22 March 1806, 16 April 1806, 3 May 1806, 11 May 1806, 29 October 1806, Gratz Collection 250b, HSP; Morgan, "Slave Population on St. Croix," 9–10.

15. ES to David Hossack, 16 October 1823, Simon Gratz Collection 250b, HSP; "Stevens," in Holsoe, *Virgin Island Families*.

16. ES to Gouverneur and Kemble, 29 October 1806, Gratz Collection 250b; Lawaetz, *St. Croix*, 309–10; "The Estates of St. Croix, 1816–c. 1859" and "Stevens," in Holsoe, *Virgin Island Families*; Morgan, "Slave Population on St. Croix," 9–10.

17. Lewinsohn, *St. Croix under Seven Flags*, 216–22; Lawaetz, *St. Croix*, 309–10; William Thornton to Henry Clay, 1 September 1825, Pickering Papers, reel 44, 285–88; TP to William Thornton, 4 January 1826, Pickering Papers, reel 16, 83–83A; William Thornton to TP, 12 December 1825, Pickering Papers, reel 44, 284–284A.

18. Diary Entry, 15 February 1831, 20 March 1831, "Edward Bliss Emerson's Puerto Rico Notes and Journal," Emerson Family Papers, MS Am 1280.235 (576), Ralph Waldo Emerson Memorial Association Deposit, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

19. BS to ST, 23 March 1801, Henry Dearborn to ST, 19 June 1801, Robert Smith to ST, 21 September 1801, in *Naval Documents*, 7:154, 256, 286; Palmer, *Stoddert's War*, 12, 232; Fowler, *Silas Talbot*, 181–97.

20. TP to TJ, 24 February 1806, Jefferson Papers.

21. TP to William Thornton, 4 January 1826, Pickering Papers, reel 16, 83–83A.

22. Dubroca, *Vie de Toussaint-Louverture*, 11.

23. TL to the Executive Directory, 29 October 1797, in *Francois Dominique Toussaint Louverture*, ed. Chignola, 38.

24. *Political Magazine and Miscellaneous Repository* (Ballston, N.Y.), 1 November 1800.

25. *Pennsylvania Gazette* (Philadelphia), 29 October 1800; *New York Gazette*, 24 October 1800; *Port-Folio* (Philadelphia), 14 November 1801.

26. McLeod, *Negro Slavery Unjustifiable*, 24.

27. Crèvecoeur, *Letters from an American Farmer*, 54–56; Furstenberg, "Beyond Freedom and Slavery," 1300; Hunt, *Haiti's Influence on Antebellum America*, 85–86.

28. Girard, "Napoléon Bonaparte," 591; *Weekly Museum* (New York), 20 December 1800.

29. Hunt, *Haiti's Influence on Antebellum America*, 84–92; Nesbitt, *Universal Emancipation*, 168; Wright, *Becoming Black*, 54–55; TJ to James Monroe, 24 November 1801, Jefferson Papers.

30. Bell, *Toussaint Louverture*, 155; Geggus and Fiering, *World of the Haitian Revolution*, 250–52; Furstenberg, "Beyond Freedom and Slavery," 1320–21; Matthewson, "Abraham Bishop," 148–54.

31. Hunt, *Haiti's Influence on Antebellum America*, 87; Furstenberg, "Beyond Freedom and Slavery," 1302.

32. Furstenberg, "Beyond Freedom and Slavery," 1308.

33. Colley, *Britons*, 1–25.

34. Wright, *Becoming Black*, 7, 8, 4–16, 54, 64–65; Dain, *Hideous Monster of the Mind*, 90.

35. Colley, *Britons*, 1–25; Wright, *Becoming Black*, 7, 8, 4–16, 54, 64–65.

36. Tansill, *United States and Santo Domingo*, 84–85.

37. Journal Entries, April 1801, 1 December 1801, 8 April 1802, 24 April 1802, 26 December 1803, in Nugent, *Lady Nugent's Journal*, 2, 42, 86, 98, 188.

38. Ibid., 21 October 1801, 22 November 1801, 18 June 1803, 13 December 1803, in Nugent, *Lady Nugent's Journal*, 33, 40, 164, 187.

39. *Gazzetta Universale* (Florence, Italy), 16 February 1799.

40. Duggan, *Force of Destiny*, 8, 15; De Felice, *Giornali Giacobini Italiani*, ix–lvii.

41. Mantegazza, *Viaggio*, 107, 109.

42. *Relazione della Spedizione*, iii, 11, 12, 36.

43. OW to JA, November 1799, in *Memoirs*, 2:304; AH to TP, 21 February 1799, in *Hamilton Papers*, 22:492.

44. For a analysis of the importance of the Constitution of 1801, see Nesbitt, *Universal Emancipation*, 154–62; Fischer, *Modernity Disavowed*, 229–30.

45. AH to TP, 21 February 1799, in *Hamilton Papers*, 22:493; Horton, "Alexander Hamilton," 23.

46. "Mémoire Secret de Pascal," n.d., HMC, Folder 1; Tyson, *Toussaint L'Ouverture*, 75.

47. TL, Open Letter, 19 February 1802, 3–4, HMC, Folder 2; Diary Entries, 26 January 1802, 1 February 1802, in Drinker, *Diary*, 2:1489, 1490.

48. TL, "Nouvelles Officielles," 19 February 1802, HMC, Folder 2.

49. Diary Entry, 5 March 1802, in Drinker, *Diary*, 2:1497; Journal Entry, 19 July 1803, in Nugent, *Lady Nugent's Journal*, 169.

50. For Saint-Domingue after Leclerc's landing and Louverture's arrest, see Fick, *Making of Haiti*, 204–36; Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*, 280–301; Sannon, *Histoire de Toussaint-Louverture*, 3:111–48. For the role of Saint-Domingue in the Louisiana Purchase, see Gaspar and Geggus, *Turbulent Time*, 204–25; Geggus, *Impact of the Haitian Revolution*, 209–30; Jose Saint-Louis, *Haitian Revolution*, 24–26. For suggestions that

Napoleon supported universal emancipation in Saint-Domingue, see Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*, 259; Girard, "Napoléon Bonaparte," 601–3, 617–18.

51. Avril, *From Glory to Disgrace*, 46; McLynn and Drescher, *Meaning of Freedom*, 175; Blackburn, *Overthrow of Colonial Slavery*, 290.

52. Register of Wills and Administrations, Book L (56-1812 to 23-1817), p. 316, no. 20, Philadelphia City Hall; Bell, *Toussaint Louverture*, 246; Girard, "Trading Races," 374–76.

53. For detailed discussions of Louverture's life after his arrest, see Bell, *Toussaint Louverture*, 263–85; Korngold, *Citizen Toussaint*, 283–320; Beard, *Toussaint L'Ouverture*, 225–42; Césaire, *Toussaint Louverture*, 325–31; Sannon, *Histoire de Toussaint-Louverture*, 3:149–73; Doret, *André Rigaud*, 80–83; Nemours, *Toussaint Louverture*, 87–96.

54. Bell, *Toussaint Louverture*, 263–85; Korngold, *Citizen Toussaint*, 283–320; Beard, *Toussaint L'Ouverture*, 225–42; Césaire, *Toussaint Louverture*, 325–31; Sannon, *Histoire de Toussaint-Louverture*, 3:149–73; Doret, *André Rigaud*, 80–83; Nemours, *Toussaint Louverture*, 87–96.

55. Diary Entry, 17 June 1803, in Drinker, *Diary*, 3:1659.

56. Sannon, *Histoire de Toussaint-Louverture*, 3:107; Bell, *Toussaint Louverture*, 265; Césaire, *Toussaint Louverture*, 314.

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INDEX

Italicized page numbers refer to maps and illustrations.

Adams, Abigail, 1, 32, 53–55, 162
Adams, John: and Barbary States negotiations, 56–57; and Britain, 31, 54, 109–11; and Bunel, Joseph, 39–43; *Discourses on Davila*, 147–48; and Dominguan-American diplomacy, 3, 11, 23–26, 39–43, 81–86, 91–94; and Dominguan-American trade, 100, 111–12; 1800 electoral defeat of, 138, 160–62; and France, 14, 23–24, 30, 53–54; and Fries's Rebellion, 148; inaugural ceremony and address of, 1, 57; later life of, 162–64; and Louverture, 29, 92–93, 140–43, 148, 176; and Marshall, 152; and Pickering, Timothy, 39–40, 147, 152; and race, 31–33, 37–38, 54–56, 173; as revolutionary or elitist, 147–49; and Saint-Dominguan expansion throughout Hispaniola, 138, 140–43; and Saint-Dominguan independence, 3–4, 29, 68–69, 97–98, 144, 189n33; and Saint-Dominguan Revolution, 14, 17–18, 41–43; and slavery, 54–56, 69–70, 162–63; and Talbot, 114–16; as vice president, 53–54
Adams, John Quincy, 29, 97, 167
Adet, Pierre, 48
Admiralty Court (Santo Domingo), 78
Africa, 51–52
African Episcopal Church of St. Thomas (Philadelphia), 74
African Masonic Lodge, 75
African Methodist Episcopal Church, Bethel, 74
Agé, Pierre, 151
Alien and Sedition Acts, 25, 45, 149, 161
Allen, Richard, 74, 93
American Museum, or Universal Magazine (Philadelphia), 16
American Revolution, 33, 46, 133
Amphitrite, 165
Angiolini, Gasparo, 175
Arthur Mervyn (C. B. Brown), 97
Augusta, 126
Avengers of the New World (Dubois), 5

Babbit, Elizabeth, 71
Barbary States, 31, 56–57, 90–91
Basel, Treaty of (1795), 50, 137
Beauvais, Louis-Jacques, 48
Belknap, Jeremy, 56
Biassou, Georges, 186n5
Bingham, William, 29
Bishop, Abraham, 16, 172
Black Prince, The (More), 124
Blumenbach, Johann Friedrich, 96–97
Bolster, Jeffrey, 131, 134
Bonaparte, Joseph, 154

Bonaparte, Napoleon, 3, 179–81, 207–8n50
Boudaine, La, 78
Boukman, 186n5
Boyer, Jean-Pierre, 180
Bréda, Pantaléon II de, 96
Britain: and Dominguan-American trade and diplomacy, 84–85, 98–101, 108–12, 198n30; in Franco-British war, 52; and Saint-Dominguan Revolution and civil war, 43–44, 102, 117–18, 126, 145, 179; and United States, 23–24, 144
Brown, Charles Brockden, 96–97; *Arthur Mervyn*, 97
Brown, Gordon, 6
Bullet, Jeannot, 186n5
Bunel, Joseph: Adams's meetings with, 39–43, 57, 190n6; background and later life of, 14–15, 19–23, 69, 180–81; and Intercourse Act, 59–60; Pickering dinner with, 13–14, 17–18, 24–26, 28, 36–38, 40
Bunel, Marie Françoise Mouton, 20–21, 23, 87, 180–81
Buonarroti, Filippo, 175
Burr, Aaron, 162
Bush Hill Hospital (Philadelphia), 77

Canada, 52
Canandaigua, Treaty of, 34
Cap Français, 2, 94
Carden, James, 166
Carey, Mathew, 173
Carmick, Daniel, 129
Carré, Charles, 87
Carré, John Thomas, 73, 87, 108
Chanlatte, Antoine, 143
Charles (enslaved African), 134
Chavannes, Jean-Baptiste, 33
Christianity, 170
Christiansted (Danish West Indies), 70
Christophe, Henry, 23, 48, 79, 101, 106, 179–80
Clay, Henry, 167
College of Physicians, 76
Collins, Isaac, 129
Constitution (France), 49
Constitution (ship), 113–18, *115*, 126, 128–29, 133–36
Constitutional Assembly and Constitution (Saint-Domingue), 177
Constitutional Convention (U.S.), 33
Cooper, Anna Julia, 52
Corbett, Edward, 111
Corbett, William, 121
Council of Five Hundred (France), 50–51
Coxe, Tench, 161
creoleness, 41, 73
Crèvecoeur, J. Hector St. John, 171
Cushing, William, 55–56

Dain, Bruce, 7
Dandridge, Bartholomew, 156, 164
Davie, William R., 155
Davies, Benjamin, 96
Davis, David Brion, 5
Dayton, Jonathan, 25
Decatur, Stephen, 183
Declaration of Independence (U.S.), 19, 33, 55
Declaration of Rights (Massachusetts Constitution), 55
DeConde, Alexander, 4
Delacroix, Charles, 50
Democratic-Republicans: Adams administration and Federalists, 91, 148, 161; Alien and Sedition Acts, 149; Dominguan-American diplomacy,

83, 85, 159; Intercourse Act, 62–65, 68, 139–40, 142; interracial marriage, 21, 23. *See also specific politicians*
Denmark Vesey insurrection plot, 64
Dessalines, Jean-Jacques, 23, 48, 79, 106–7, 179–80
Devèze, Jean, 76
Didricksen, Jeppe, 122
Directory (France), 46, 49–50
Discourses on Davila (J. Adams), 147–48
Dominguan-American diplomacy: modern analysis of, 5, 186n6; motivations for, 4–5, 8–9, 30–33; and race, 4, 17–23, 37–38, 86, 91–94, 183–84; results of, 3–4, 12, 30–33, 108–12, 183–84; and trade relations, 3–5, 17–18, 36–38, 141, 144, 183
Drinker, Elizabeth, 16, 46, 76, 178–79, 181
Dubois, Laurent, 7; *Avengers of the New World*, 5
Dumaine, Jean, 95
Dundas, Henry, 43

Egypt, 51
Ellsworth, Oliver, 155
Emerson, Edward, 167
exclusif, 14
Experiment, 102, 126

Farewell Address (Washington), 57
Fauchet, Joseph, 48–49, 52–53
Federal Direct Tax, 148
Federalists: Alien and Sedition Acts, 149; Dominguan-American diplomacy, 85, 159; 1800 election, 161; France, 24–25; Intercourse Act, 63, 140; Jefferson, 21; party organization, 45; slavery, race, and social class, 66, 121, 148. *See also specific politicians*
Ferrand, L. (French brigadier general), 19, 21
Fiering, Norman, 5
Finkelman, Paul, 33
Fitzsimmons, David, 31
Forfait, Pierre Alexandre, 154
Forten, James, 19
Foscolo, Ugo, 175
France: and America, 23–25, 45, 52–53, 59, 139; and Britain, 52; and Dominguan-American diplomacy, 85–86, 99, 142–43, 154–55, 168; and Jamaica, 101; and race, 51–52; and Saint-Domingue, 84, 103–4, 108, 111, 144–45, 179–81; threats of, to U.S. shipping, 36, 40, 140, 144; Western Atlantic policy of, 45–53
Franklin, Benjamin, 30, 56
Free African Society (Philadelphia), 74
French Embargo Act (1798), 59, 64, 90
Fries, John, 148
Fries's Rebellion, 148–49, 178
Fugitive Slave Law, 18–19

Gabriel's Rebellion, 75
Galiani, Ferdinando, 30
Gallatin, Albert: and Dominguan-American diplomacy, 10; and Intercourse Act, 25, 60–61, 139–41; and Louverture, 37; and race and slavery, 60–61, 107; and Saint-Dominguan Revolution, 21, 39; and Stevens, Edward, 165
García y Moreno, Joaquín, 137, 151, 159
Gaspar, David Barry, 5
Gazzetta Universale (Florence), 175
Geggus, David Patrick, 5
General Greene, 120–24, 142
Genovese, Eugene, 7

Gerry, Elbridge, 77
Gilbert, Felix, 31, 58
Girard, Philippe, 92
Giraud, Alexis, 142
Goodrich, Chauncey, 61
Gouverneur, Kemble, and Company, 166
Grandjean d'Aubancourt, Louis Ambrose, 79
Grant (British representative to Saint-Domingue), 67
Greenville, Treaty of, 35
Grenville, William, 43
Griffitts, Samuel, 76

Haitian Revolution and Republic, 3, 180, 183, 186n4
Hall, Prince, 75
Hamilton, Alexander: and 1800 election, 160; and Saint-Domingue, 44, 83, 88, 176–77; and slavery, race, and social class, 66, 70–71; and Stevens, Edward, 70–71, 193n7, 195n34; and yellow fever epidemic, 76–77
Hamilton, Eliza, 76–77
Hammond, Henry, 156
Harper, Robert Goodloe, 10, 25, 60–61, 64, 79–80
Hauterive, Alexandre Maurice, 31
Haynes, Lemuel, 93; *Liberty Further Extended*, 71
Hédouville, Theodore, 23, 52, 78–79, 99, 133
Hemings, Sally, 21
Herald, 126
Herring, George, 31
Higginson, Stephen, 117
Hispaniola, 116–35, 137–40, *141*, 143–47, 151–52, 177
Hodge (captain of *Kingston*), 87
Hollingsworth, John, 36
Hull, Isaac, 136, 183

idealistic internationalism, 31–32
Idlinger, Joseph Antoine, 95
Incle and Yarico (Thelwall), 15–16
Industry, 133–34
Intercourse Act, 40, 58–65, 100, 139–44, 152, 159
Italy, 10, 175

Jamaica, 43, 174–75
James, C. L. R., 14
Jay Treaty (U.S.-Britain), 23
Jean-François (insurrection leader), 186n5
Jefferson, Thomas: diplomatic strategy of, 56–58; and Dominguan-American diplomacy, 10, 18, 31, 83, 164–65, 168; in 1800 election, 138, 162; and France, 30, 179; and Haitian embargo plans, 168; and Intercourse Act, 65; and Louverture, 31, 88, 168, 172, 179; *Notes on Virginia*, 173; and race, 21, 31, 168, 173; as revolutionary, 19, 181, 183; and Stevens, Edward, 85; and Virginia Resolutions, 149
Jewett, David, 130
Jim (enslaved African), 122
Jones, Absalom, 74
Jordan, Winthrop D., 5

Kagan, Robert, 4–5
Kentucky Resolutions, 149
Kerversau, François-Marie Perichou de, 23, 143
King, Rufus: and Dominguan-American diplomacy, 43–44, 66–67, 84, 97, 176; and Latin American independence movements, 28, 45; and slavery, 32–33

Kingston, 87
Knight, Franklin, 7
Kondiaronk (Huron chief), 155
Krenn, Michael, 6–7
Kuhn, Adam, 76

Lavallée, Joseph, 16
Laveaux, Étienne, 23, 48, 51, 133, 149
Law of Nations, The (Vattel), 81
Laws of the United States of America (U.S.), 88
Lear, Tobias, 68, 88, 103, 164–65
Leborgne, Joseph, 52
Leclerc, Charles Victor Emmanuel, 179–80, 207n50
Lee, Charles, 90, 147, 152
Letombe, Philippe, 24, 86, 99, 104, 116–17, 142–43, 155
Lewis, David, 18, 38
Liberty Further Extended (Haynes), 71
Lindsay, Alexander (Lord Balcarres), 119
Liston, Robert, 20
Livingston, Edward, 59–60
Livingston, Robert, 164
Logan, Rayford, 4
Louisiana Territory, 3, 51–52, 180, 207n50
Louverture, Toussaint: and abolition of slavery, 26; American government attitude toward, 117, 150–52, 161, 164–65; American popular attitudes toward, 37, 40, 140–41, 170–73; background of, 48–49, 96, *100*, 105–6; and Britain, 98–99, 109–10; and Dominguan-American diplomacy, 2–3, 22–23, 41, 78, 81–82, 84, 91–94; economic and social policies of, 87, 90–91, 103–8, 132–33, 149–51, 171; and France, 79, 98–101, 183; international attitudes toward, 174–76; overthrow and death of, 178–79, 181, *182*; rise to power of, 2, 16, 49–50; and Roume, Philippe, 203n14; and Saint-Dominguan civil war, 47, 120, 135, 142, 148; and Saint-Dominguan expansion throughout Hispaniola, 137–39, 143–47, 151–52, 158–59, 177; and Saint-Dominguan independence, 179; and Saint-Dominguan Revolution, 183, 186nn4–5; and Stevens, Edward, 94–103; and U.S. Navy, 113, 121, 123–30
Lyon, James, 161

Macon, Nathaniel, 63
Madison, James, 18, 149, 164, 183
Maitland, Thomas, 43, 98, *100*, 109, 133
Mantegazza, Carlo, 175–76
maritime culture, 10–11, 129–36
Marshall, John, 10, 77, 139, 152–57, *153*, 164
Martinez de Yrujo, Carlos, 86
Matthewson, Timothy, 6
Mauviel, Guillaume, 20–21
Mayer, Jacob, 13, 23–24, 87, 91
McHenry, James, 148
McKean, Thomas, 85
McLeod, Alexander, 170
Melish, Joanne Pope, 5
Mifflin, Thomas, 78
Missouri Compromise (U.S., 1820), 121
Model Treaty (U.S.), 57
Monthly Magazine, and American Review (New York), 96
More, Hannah, 124
Mortefontaine, Treaty of, 155–57, 160, 174

Moyse (Saint-Dominguan general): and Louverture, 48, 178; and Saint-Dominguan expansion throughout Hispaniola, 137, 145, 158–59; and Stevens, Edward, 101; and Talbot, 129, 134
Murray, William Vans, 119, 137, 151–52, 155

Naimbanna II (Sierra Leone king), 124
Naples, Kingdom of, 30
Napoleon, 3, 179–81, 207–8n50
National Convention (France), 46
Naturalization Law (U.S., 1798), 173
Navy, U.S.: and Dominguan-American diplomacy, 10–11, 58, 114, 116, 155; and Dominguan civil war and expansion, 116–35, 151–52; organization of, 113–14, 116
Negro Equalled by Few Europeans, The (Lavallée), 16
Neptune, 134
Nesbitt, Nick, 7
New Jersey, 78–79
Newman, Richard S., 5
Newton, Samuel, 166
Nicholas, John, 139
Northwest Confederacy of Native Americans, 35
Northwest Indian War, 35
Notes on Virginia (Jefferson), 173
Nugent, George, 174
Nugent, Maria, 174–75, 179
nurses (African), 72, 77

Ogé, Vincent, 21–22, 33
Otis, Harrison Gray, 25, 40, 61–62
Ott, Thomas, 4
Oyarzábal, Juan Bautista, 79

Paris, Treaty of (1783), 56
Parker, Hyde, 119
Pascal (Louverture aide), 177–78
Paul (insurrection leader), 186n5
Peacefield, 53, 113, 162
Peale, Charles Willson, 73
Perkins, Bradford, 30, 189n34
Perry, Christopher Raymond, 120–24, 201n20
Perry, Matthew Calbraith, 122
Perry, Oliver Hazard, 124, 183
Pétion, Alexandre, 120, 179–80
Philadelphia, 13, 19, 75
Philadelphia Magazine and Review, 96
Pichon, Louis-André, 164
Pickering, Rebecca White, 24
Pickering, Timothy: and aid to Saint-Domingue, 88–91; and Barbary States negotiations, 57; and Britain, 110–11; and Dominguan-American diplomacy, 10–11, 17–18, 33–43, 57, 92, 169, 190n6; and 1800 election, 160; fired as Secretary of State, 59, 147, 168–69; and France, 103; and Hamilton, Alexander, 81; illustration of, *27*; and Intercourse Act, 59–61, 65; interdepartmental conflicts with, 154; and Jefferson's Haitian embargo, 168; and Louverture, 25, 37, *89*, 169; modern assessments of, 195n34; and Native American negotiations, 34–35; as postmaster general, 34; and Saint-Dominguan civil war, 118; and Saint-Dominguan expansion throughout Hispaniola, 138; and Saint-Dominguan independence, 28, 57, 65–66; and slavery, race, and social class, 32, 66; and Stevens, Edward, 80–81, 84, 87–88, 165, 167; and Talbot, 114

Pickering-Bunel dinner, 13–14, 17–18, 24–26, 28, 36–38, 40
Pickering Treaty (Treaty of Canandaigua, 1794), 34
Pinckney, Charles Cotesworth, 77, 140
Pinckney, Thomas, 63–64, 140
Pitt, William, 43
Polverel, Étienne, 45, 73
President's House (Philadelphia), 39, 42
Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, The (Davis), 5

Quasi-War, 5, 14, 52–53, 140, 144, 154–56

race: American attitudes toward, 10–13, 93, 124–25, 160, 171–74; in American Revolution, 133; and Dominguan-American diplomacy, 4, 17–18, 37, 86, 183–84; in France, 51–52; modern analyses of, relations, 5–8, 187n10; sailors' attitudes toward, 10, 129–36; and Saint-Dominguan Revolution and civil war, 96–97, 120–25; Saint-Domingue as multicultural, 2–3, 132–33; and sex and marriage, 21, 187n16
Rael, Patrick, 6
Raimond, Julien, 99
Red Jacket (Sagoyewatha), 34–35
Reign of Terror, 45, 49
Rigaud, André: background and rise to power of, 46–49, *47*, 53; during civil war, 100, 106, 116–23, 128–30, 137–38, 143–45; following civil war, 180–81
Ritchie, Robert, 87, 108, 132
Roberts, William, 133–34, 136
Rochambeau, Donatien, 180
Ross, James, 85
Roume, Philippe, 78–79, 94–98, 143, 145–46, 203n14
Rush, Benjamin, 76–77
Ryswick, Treaty of, 2

Sagoyewatha (Red Jacket), 34–35
Saint-Dominguan civil war, 47, 116–35, 137–38, 142–45
Saint-Dominguan Revolution: earlier revolts preceding, 2, 21–22, 33; and economic development, 104–8; expansion of, throughout Hispaniola, 116–35, 137–59, 177; international impact of, 14–17, 74–75, 175, 186n6; modern assessments of, 5–6, 186n4; and race and class, 2, 132–33, 150, 174, 178, 199n54; refugees from, 54, 73–74, 87, 108, 169; and slavery, 2, 14, 26–28, 73, 145–46
Saint-Louis, Vertus, 53
Santo Domingo, 158–60
Scherr, Arthur, 6
Scott, Julius S., 7
Sedgwick, Theodore, 93
Sigby (enslaved African), 133
Six Nations of the Iroquois Confederacy, 34–35
slavery: in America, 13, 17, 32, 55–56, 122, 133–36; American attitudes toward, 75, 93, 120–22, 135–36, 160, 173; economic justifications for, 32–33, 104–8; modern analyses of, 5–8, 187n10; in other French colonies, 46, 73; and Saint-Dominguan Revolution, 2, 26, 28, 145–46; in Saint-Domingue, 14, 45, 49, 73, 179, 207–8n50; in Santo Domingo, 158–60, 177
Smith, Samuel, 61, 90, 139–42
Sobel, Mechal, 8
Sonthonax, Léger Félicité, 45, 49–51, 73, 133

Spain, 46, 50, 137
"Standing Instructions to Consuls and Vice Consuls of the United States" (U.S.), 88
status etiquette concept, 131–32, 134–35
Stevens, Edward: appointed consul general, 80–83, 142; background and later life of, 70–73, 77, *100*, 165–67, 194nn23–24, 203n9; and Bunel, Joseph, 20; collaboration of, with U.S. Navy, 118–19, 125–26, 135; and Dominguan-American trade and diplomacy, 87–88, 156; and Hamilton, Alexander, 70–71, 193n7, 195n34; and Louverture, 94–103, 148, 150, 152; modern assessments of, 9, 68, 195n39; and *New Jersey* retrieval, 78–79; and Saint-Dominguan expansion throughout Hispaniola, 138; and Saint-Dominguan independence, 146, 157; and slavery and race, 70, 103, 166; and yellow fever, 72, 76–77
Stevens, Eleanora, 71–72
Stevens, Hester Kortright Amory, 72, 87, 165–66, 194n23
Stoddert, Benjamin: and Dominguan-American trade and diplomacy, 10, 78, 110–11, 118–19, 167–68; and French shipping, 157; and Talbot, 113, 116, 130, 135

Talbot, Silas: background of, 113–14, 116, *127*; and Dominguan-American naval cooperation, 119–20, 122–30, 135; and Jefferson administration, 168; and race and slavery, 131, 133–34, 136; and Stevens, Edward, 118–19
Talleyrand, Charles Maurice de, 51–54, 154–55
Tatem, Benjamin, 122
Ternant, Jean Baptiste, 15
Thacher, George, 15–16
Thayer, John, 35–36
Thelwall, John, 15–16
Thornton, William, 72
Tingey, Thomas, 87–88
trade relations (U.S.): and Atlantic world standing, 30–33; with Barbary States, 56–57, 90–91; with Britain, 44–45, 198n30; colonial, 14; and Dominguan-American diplomacy, 3–5, 17–18, 36–38, 141, 144, 183; expansion of, in Saint-Domingue, 152, 154; with France, 64; and Intercourse Act, 40, 58–65, 100, 139–44, 152, 159; reopening of Dominguan-American, 22–23, 26–28, 100, 103–8, 111–12; strategy of Adams and Stevens, 68–69, 83–86
Treaty of Basel (1795), 50, 137
Treaty of Canandaigua, 34
Treaty of Greenville, 35
Treaty of Mortefontaine, 155–57, 160, 174
Treaty of Paris (1783), 56
Treaty of Ryswick, 2
tripartite treaty (1799), 40, 99–100, 108–9, 119, 198n30
Trumbull, 129–30, 151
Truxtun, Thomas, 113–14

Vattel, Emmerich de, 81
Viénot, Vincent-Marie, 50–51
Villatte, Jean-Louis, 48
Virginia Resolution, 149
Voyage to St. Domingo, A (Wimpffen), 40, 96

Waln, Robert, 25
Washington, George: foreign policy of,

57–58, 81–82; and Saint-Dominguan financial interests, 196n9; and Saint-Dominguan Revolution, 15, 18, 26, 33–34, 41, 189n27; and slavery, 19, 41; and Stevens, Edward, 91; and Talbot, 114
Wayne, "Mad" Anthony, 35
West Indian and Guinea Company, 70–71
White, Ashli, 73
White over Black (Jordan), 5
William and Mary, 122
Wimpffen, Francis Alexander Stanislaus, Baron de, 40, 96
Wolcott, Oliver, 68, 110–11, 139, 176
Worthington, William, 18
Wright, Michelle, 173

XYZ affair, 24, 52, 152

Yard, Elizabeth Kortright, 72
Yard, James, 72, 79–81, 117
Yates, Richard, 28, 36
yellow fever, 72, 75–77, 194nn22–23

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